AoA, from project development to implementation and sustainment, risk analysis isused to help refine strategies to meet initial parameter objectives. Currently, acquisitionprograms experience frequent cost and schedule overruns due, in part, to shortcomingsin cost, schedule, and technical per<strong>for</strong>mance risk analysis methods used todefine and adhere to the APB. To address increased fiscal constraints, Congress andthe Office of the Secretary of Defense are requiring more rigorous analytics priorto program approval to limit deviations from cost and schedule objectives. Theserequirements have <strong>for</strong>ced the investigation of improved risk and trade space analysismethods to establish a better-in<strong>for</strong>med APB and limit deviation from parameterobjectives. This presentation will begin with a contextual overview of risk analysis inDoD acquisition programs, and will follow with an elaboration on current risk andtrade space analysis methodologies. It will conclude with a discussion of shortcomingsthat have been identified in these methodologies, and the problems they pose inthe context of the program lifecycle.154P.45 Pai PK; pai_p@utpb.eduThe University Texas of the Permian BasinTOO BIG OR NOT TOO BIG? THAT IS THE SYSTEMIC RISK QUES-TION!This research examines the extent and implications of the systemic exposuresof US financial institutions by determining their sensitivities to systemically importantvariables. These sensitivities are tracked over the 40 quarters to determine the differencesand similarities between and among the largest and the rest of the financialinstitutions. It covers the largest 35 US BHCs as well as about 500 smaller US BHCs.In addition, it covers the possible exposures from about 250 hedge funds as well asa handful of large non-US financial institutions This paper compares the extent ofsystemic risk exposures of the largest BHCs over the past decade, with specific referenceto the observed financial upheavals during 2007-2009. The focus is then turnedto the not too big financial institutions-including those at or below the SIFI thresholdof $50 billion in assets-to study such “smaller” financial institutions’ systemic riskexposure, in addition to similar exposures of non-financial institutions such as theshadow banks, hedge funds, etc. Results indicate an interesting pattern of convergenceof systemic exposures in the case of the not too big financial and non-financialinstitutions towards those of the largest BHCs. This seems to indicate that regulators,institutions, markets, etc., should urgently focus their attention on not just the TBTF,SIFIs, but also on the smaller institutions that may hitherto have been flying under theradar of systemic regulators, possibly towards impending, potential and catastrophicfinancial crisis. The findings of this research should prove to be use <strong>for</strong> regulatorsas they craft the rules <strong>for</strong> determining and regulating SIFI in the near future. In addition,financial institutions as well as academics will also benefit from this research dueto the insights provided <strong>for</strong> determining the inflection point <strong>for</strong> effectively consideringthe when an institution actually becomes too risky or important enough to causecatastrophic systemic failure.M3-F.1 Palma Oliveira J; igor.linkov@usace.army.milUniversity of Lisbon, PortugalINDUSTRY AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: THE CASE OF CO-INCINERATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE BY CEMENT INDUSTRYStakeholder engagement is prone to several ambiguities. On such ambiguitycenters around the different perception that actors have about their role (i.e., opinionversus decision) along with how to weight the diverse ideas that are put <strong>for</strong>ward inthe discussion process. In addition to those different attitudes about the process, weare required to deal with the different positions about the object of discussion (i.e.,the project under discussion). In this presentation, I will illustrate the results of stakeholderengagement in a project where these several levels are taken in consideration.The case involves a set of cement kilns in Portugal owned by SECIL, where the useof alternative fuels (including one that uses hazardous waste) is currently in place. Thetype of waste, the emissions measurement, the studies undertaken, etc. where underclose scrutiny of a Stakeholder commission that help to define the scope and depthof those studies (independently of the legal obligations) and that have the power andresources to contract independent third parties. Additionally, I will present strategieswhich were undertaken to empower stakeholders in the decision making process. Ofparticular relevance is how different stakeholder engagement processes were used(from qualitative to more semi-quantitative ones) that were put in place and weresubsequently adapted to, both the needs of the stakeholders and of the company.Successful stakeholder engagement in this case resulted in: a) The implementationof a consistent science-based risk management strategy; b) The acceptation of theuse of alternative fuels, resulting in significant economic and societal benefits, and c)A consistent reduction of negative perception of cement production and the use ofalternative fuels over 10 years period when the stakeholder engagement program wasput in place.W4-H.2 Panjwani S, Baecher G; susmit@gmail.comUniversity of MarylandCYBER-SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: CHALLENGES AND SOLU-TIONSThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) no longer requires the preparationof <strong>for</strong>mal cyber-security risk analysis [1]. According to the OMB [1], substantialresources have been expended in past doing complex risk analysis with limited tangiblebenefit in terms of improved security. Instead of trying to precisely measurerisk, security ef<strong>for</strong>ts are better served by generally assessing risks and taking actionsto manage them [1]. According to the 2011 Global State of Security survey [2] only30% of respondents used risk reduction to justify cyber-security investment. Reduc-
ing the scope and usage of the cyber-security risk assessment has not improved thestate of security either. The lack of improvement in cyber-security can be attributedto 1) the limitations of current cyber-security risk assessment methodology, 2) thefailure to understand the characteristics of the cyber-security domain and 3) assumingthat there are no “known unknowns” or “unknown unknowns” in cyber-security domain.Cyber-security domain is inherently dynamic, in which the system configurationchanges frequently, and new attacks and vulnerabilities are discovered regularly. Cybersecurity’sthreat agent is intelligent and adapts to the situation and countermeasures.Attack actions are driven by attacker’s exploratory nature, thought process, motivation,strategy, and preferences. The authors developed a new framework <strong>for</strong> automaticallygenerating the cyber-security risk scenarios by, 1) capturing diverse and dynamiccyber-security knowledge, 2) assuming that there are unknowns in the cyber-securitydomain, and new knowledge is available frequently, and 3) emulating the attacker’s exploratorynature, thought process, motivation, strategy and preferences. [1] The Officeof Management and Budget, Circular A130. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a130/a130trans4.html. [2]Respected-but still restrained, in Global State ofIn<strong>for</strong>mation Security Survey2011, PricewaterhouseCoopers.M2-D.3 Pant R, Barker K, Landers TL; rpant@ou.eduUniversity of OklahomaPOST-DISASTER RESILIENCE FOR INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEMS:APPLICATION TO INLAND PORT DISASTERSEconomic resilience is often thought of as an ability exhibited by a systemthat allows it to recover from a disruptive event in a desired time and with an acceptablecost, noting that resilience is planned <strong>for</strong> in advance of a disruptive eventthrough preparedness investments and activities. Resilience is particularly importantin interdependent systems, as disruptions can propagate, resulting in direct as wellas wider-spread indirect impacts. To estimate resilience in interdependent industryand infrastructure sectors, we build a dynamic data assimilation approach to improvethe predictive behavior of a risk-based interdependency model. In our dynamicdata assimilation approach, the “data” represent the level of recovery of the industryand infrastructure sectors after a disruptive event (e.g., attack, natural disaster) hasoccurred, leading to some or all of them being inoperable. As is often the case inreality, we assume that our estimation <strong>for</strong> sector recovery has some noise leading toerrors in <strong>for</strong>ecasting recovery. We aim to minimize the error in prediction so that wecan best achieve the desired level of post disaster recovery. We apply our approachto post-disaster recovery planning <strong>for</strong> the Port of Catoosa, an inland waterway portin Oklahoma. We simulate the daily flow of commodity import-exports through theport and assume that a disruption causes an initial loss of supply leading to inoperabilityin sectors. We suggest metrics of resilience, maximum possible daily outputloss, and total sector loss and/or regional loss as indicators <strong>for</strong> preferred planningoptions <strong>for</strong> industry and infrastructure sectors. Such metrics could help in improvedpreparedness decision-making.M2-B.4 Panzl BM, Weir MH, Pope JM, Rose JB; panzlbri@msu.eduMichigan State UniversityUSE OF QUANTITATIVE MICROBIAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND PRO-JECTIVE TRANSPORT MODELS TO INFORM BEACH CLOSURESNatural water recreation locations are a well known source of gastrointestinalinfection outbreaks. There<strong>for</strong>e a means of projecting not only potential microbialimpacts to recreational beaches, but risk of gastrointestinal infection associated withthese impacts would be a useful tool. This work is underway in an ef<strong>for</strong>t to develop atool <strong>for</strong> beach managers to quickly identify the risk level associated with recreationalexposure to waterborne pathogens in the environment, such as pathogenic E. coli andadenovirus. The tool uses predictive transport models <strong>for</strong> two Great Lakes beachesbased on current, local metrological conditions and water quality data allowing <strong>for</strong> aprojected risk estimate. Transport models were selected from the open literature <strong>for</strong>two test beaches; Silver Beach in Saint Joseph, MI and Washington Park Beach inMichigan City, IN. The first generation of the tool is an Excel macro and spreadsheet;the second generation required a more user friendly environment. There<strong>for</strong>e Java wasselected as the software plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> the latest tool generation. The software providesa graphic user interface, generates the pathogen concentrations from the transportmodel and estimates risk to children, adults and the combined population. A built-inaspect of this tool is the capability to automatically update from the internet, whichgreatly reduces the demand on the user to generate the values independently. Theimmediate next step in the evolution of this tool is to transport it onto an androidsmart phone. This would create a dynamic aspect that would provide any potentialuser with the ability to use it on location, without the need of a computer interface.The next step in tool development is to subject the transport models to bootstrapuncertainty analysis. This tool will provide beach managers with increased decisionmaking potential with a portable means of assessing potential risk to beach users andin<strong>for</strong>ming their sampling strategy.W1-B.3 Paoli G, Ryan C, Hartnett E, Golden NJ, Dearfield K, Kause J, LaBarreD, Disney T; gpaoli@risksciencesint.com<strong>Risk</strong> Sciences InternationalRISK MANAGEMENT METRICS IN DOMESTIC FOOD SAFETY ANDINTERNATIONAL TRADE CONTEXTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OFQUANTIFIED VARIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN DIFFERENTCONTEXTSThe Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement contemplates the application ofrisk-in<strong>for</strong>med sanitary measures through the application of a concept referred toas the Appropriate Level of Protection. In the area of microbiological food safety,155
- Page 4 and 5:
Ballroom C1Monday10:30 AM-NoonM2-A
- Page 9 and 10:
US Environmental Protection Agency
- Page 11 and 12:
Workshops - Sunday, December 4Full
- Page 13 and 14:
WK9: Eliciting Judgments to Inform
- Page 15 and 16:
These freely available tools apply
- Page 17 and 18:
Plenary SessionsAll Plenary Session
- Page 19 and 20:
10:30 AM-NoonRoom 8/9M2-F Panel Dis
- Page 21 and 22:
1:30-3:00 PMRoom 8/9M3-F Symposium:
- Page 23 and 24:
4:50 pm M4-E.5Modeling of landscape
- Page 25 and 26:
P.35 Health risk assessment of meta
- Page 27 and 28:
Works-In-ProgressP.99 Assessing the
- Page 29 and 30:
10:30 AM-NoonRoom 8/9T2-F Error in
- Page 31 and 32:
1:30-3:00 PMRoom 8/9T3-F AppliedMet
- Page 34 and 35:
8:30-10:00 AMBallroom C1W1-A Sympos
- Page 36 and 37:
10:30 AM-NoonBallroom C1W2-A Commun
- Page 38:
1:30-3:00 PMBallroom C1W3-A Communi
- Page 41 and 42:
3:30-4:30 PMRoom 8/9W4-F Environmen
- Page 43 and 44:
oth recent advances, and ongoing ch
- Page 45 and 46:
M3-H Symposium: Analyzing and Manag
- Page 47 and 48:
Part 2, we consider the use of expe
- Page 49 and 50:
T4-E Symposium: Food Safety Risk Pr
- Page 51 and 52:
While integral to guiding the devel
- Page 53 and 54:
have contributed to past difficulti
- Page 55 and 56:
M2-C.1 Abraham IM, Henry S; abraham
- Page 58 and 59:
serious accident of the Tokyo Elect
- Page 60 and 61:
een found that independence assumpt
- Page 62 and 63:
W4-I.1 Beach RH, McCarl BA, Ohrel S
- Page 64 and 65:
M4-A.1 Berube DM; dmberube@ncsu.edu
- Page 66 and 67:
W4-A.1 Boerner FU, Jardine C, Dried
- Page 69 and 70:
M2-G.1 Brink SA, Davidson RA; rdavi
- Page 71 and 72:
M4-H.5 Buede DM, Ezell BC, Guikema
- Page 73 and 74:
same scientists’ environmental he
- Page 75 and 76:
periods of time. Successful adaptat
- Page 77 and 78:
P.123 Charnley G, Melnikov F, Beck
- Page 79 and 80:
derived from mouse and rat testes t
- Page 81 and 82:
esources under any circumstance in
- Page 83 and 84:
W4-B.3 Convertino M, Collier ZA, Va
- Page 85 and 86:
addition, over 10% thought that eve
- Page 87 and 88:
Reference Dose (RfD). The average e
- Page 89 and 90:
W2-H.2 Demuth JL, Morss RE, Morrow
- Page 91 and 92:
T4-H.4 Dingus CA, McMillan NJ, Born
- Page 93 and 94:
methods research priorities and pot
- Page 95 and 96:
W3-A.2 Eggers SL, Thorne SL, Sousa
- Page 97 and 98:
tions) were < 1 for sub-populations
- Page 99 and 100:
sociated with model error. Second,
- Page 101 and 102:
inter-donation interval to mitigate
- Page 103 and 104:
Fukushima nuclear accident coverage
- Page 105 and 106: for growth inhibitor use and retail
- Page 107 and 108: W1-C.1 Goble R, Hattis D; rgoble@cl
- Page 109 and 110: stakeholders. The utility of this m
- Page 111 and 112: T2-E.4 Guidotti TL; tee.guidotti@gm
- Page 113 and 114: M4-C.2 Haines DA, Murray JL, Donald
- Page 115 and 116: providing normative information of
- Page 117 and 118: then allow both systems to operate
- Page 119 and 120: tious disease outbreaks. Several cl
- Page 121 and 122: P.122 Hosseinali Mirza V, de Marcel
- Page 123 and 124: W2-B.1 Isukapalli SS, Brinkerhoff C
- Page 125 and 126: M3-G.3 Jardine CG, Driedger SM, Fur
- Page 127 and 128: P.88 Johnson BB, Cuite C, Hallman W
- Page 129 and 130: metrics to provide risk management
- Page 131 and 132: M4-C.1 Koch HM, Angerer J; koch@ipa
- Page 133 and 134: certainty factors) and comparative
- Page 135 and 136: T3-D.4 LaRocca S, Guikema SD, Cole
- Page 137 and 138: P.71 Lemus-Martinez C, Lemyre L, Pi
- Page 139 and 140: of excretion, and the increased che
- Page 141 and 142: M2-D.4 MacKenzie CA, Barker K; cmac
- Page 143 and 144: isk appetite and optimal risk mitig
- Page 145 and 146: ameters, and enabled a more robust
- Page 147 and 148: over the nature and format of infor
- Page 149 and 150: Analysis (PRA). Existing parametric
- Page 151 and 152: explosion of a bomb in a building,
- Page 153 and 154: T3-G.3 Nascarella MA; mnascarella@g
- Page 155: corresponding slowdown in container
- Page 159 and 160: dose for a variety of exposure scen
- Page 161 and 162: “nanofibers”) is relatively und
- Page 163 and 164: ment (CEA), which provides both a f
- Page 165 and 166: T3-D.2 Resurreccion JZ, Santos JR;
- Page 167 and 168: shore wind turbines have yet been b
- Page 169 and 170: T2-D.3 Rypinski AD, Cantral R; Arth
- Page 171 and 172: time and temperature, determining t
- Page 173 and 174: esponse to requests from the EC, th
- Page 175 and 176: ers and inspectors. Analysis examin
- Page 177 and 178: smoked salmon, and associated expos
- Page 179 and 180: and 95th percentiles). Increasing t
- Page 181 and 182: esponse relationship for B. anthrac
- Page 183 and 184: variation on Day 0. Results showed
- Page 185 and 186: sidered. The most significant resul
- Page 187 and 188: lived in a apartment (not including
- Page 189 and 190: W3-C.4 von Stackelberg KE; kvon@eri
- Page 191 and 192: P.12 Waller RR, Dinis MF; rw@protec
- Page 193 and 194: W2-B.6 Wang D, Collier Z, Mitchell-
- Page 195 and 196: iomonitoring “equivalent” level
- Page 197 and 198: T4-H.2 Winkel D, Good K, VonNiederh
- Page 199 and 200: mation insufficiency, risk percepti
- Page 201 and 202: choices. This work examines these s
- Page 203 and 204: sults and possible intended or unin
- Page 205 and 206: AAbadin HG.................... 36,
- Page 207 and 208:
Gray GM............................
- Page 209 and 210:
Peters E...........................
- Page 211 and 212:
SECOND FLOOR Floor MapConvention Ce