organizations, sectors, and the Nation. As the cybersecurity discipline has become akey focal point of national and homeland security discussions, CIKR sector entitiesand governments at all levels have increased their demand <strong>for</strong> understanding cyberrisks. In response, the National Cyber Security Division has leveraged its uniquepublic-private sector partnership role as a mechanism <strong>for</strong> establishing approaches tohighlight national-level cybersecurity risks and concerns. The presentation will definecyber infrastructure, describe a top-down, functions-based approach to risk management,explain why this approach is best suited <strong>for</strong> the virtual and distributed natureof cyber infrastructure, and explain why organizational risk management approachesare needed to in<strong>for</strong>m a national-level approach to cybersecurity risk management.The presentation will draw upon recent national-level risk management ef<strong>for</strong>ts includingthe National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) implementation and theIn<strong>for</strong>mation Technology Sector Baseline <strong>Risk</strong> Assessment. It will also describe theCybersecurity Assessment and <strong>Risk</strong> Management Approach (CARMA), which is anational-level approach to cyber risk management that can initiate sector, sub-sector,regional, or State and local strategic cyber risk management ef<strong>for</strong>ts. CARMA consistsof five stages and can integrate into established cyber risk management frameworksor be used as a foundation <strong>for</strong> a broader risk management framework. The processesand outputs specific to each stage can be used to scope, identify, and address cyberrisk at the national-, sector-, or enterprise-level.M2-D.1 Oliver G, Tardif C*, Provencher M; michele.provencher@tc.gc.caTransport CanadaRISK MANAGEMENT: THE HEART OF THE TRANSPORT DANGER-OUS GOODS PROGRAMEach year, products identified as dangerous goods are transported across Canadaby road, rail, water and air. Shipments of dangerous goods range from industrialchemicals to manufactured goods and, while indispensable to our modern way of life,can pose a threat to life, property and the environment if not handled safely. TheTransport Dangerous Goods Directorate’s legislated mandate is to promote publicsafety in the transportation of dangerous goods, and its activities reflect the requirementsof the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992. The Transportation ofDangerous Goods Regulations, adopted by all provinces and territories, establish thesafety requirements <strong>for</strong> the transportation of dangerous goods. Federal and provinciallegislation provide <strong>for</strong> the regulation of an extensive list of products, substancesor organisms classified as dangerous. This presentation provides an overview of riskmanagement at the Transport Dangerous Goods (TDG) Directorate of TransportCanada. The organization, its activities, its approach to risk and future challenges arediscussed. The quantities of dangerous goods freight transported in Canada and thenumber of dangerous goods accidents to be reported under the TDG Regulationsare presented to give an overall perspective. A few risk analyses are also mentioned.152<strong>Risk</strong> management and the underlying risk analyses bring the knowledge to developpolicies, regulations and standards and leads to the continuous improvement of theTransportation of Dangerous Goods program and there<strong>for</strong>e public safety.P.30 Ono K, Toyoda T, Shimada S, Nezu T; kyoko.ono@aist.go.jpNational Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and TechnologyEXPOSURE ASSESSMENT FOR AMBIENT HEXAVALENT CHROMI-UM (CR(VI)) IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL AREAAirborne hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)) is a known human respiratory carcinogen.Cr(VI) inhalation risk <strong>for</strong> the general population has been of great concern andits characterization is important. The goal of this study is to assess the risk of ambientCr(VI) <strong>for</strong> general population and identify the mass of high risk sub-population(s).The authors improved and evaluated Cr(VI) sampling and analysis procedures, andmeasured ambient Cr(VI) in Japanese industrial area. A low-volume air sampler wasused <strong>for</strong> sampling with an alkaline (potassium hydrogen carbonate)-treated hydrophobicpolytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) filter, that was designed to prevent Cr(VI) reduction.Field spike-recovery tests typically demonstrated over 80 % recovery of Cr(VI)and no inter-conversion of valence (reduction to trivalent chromium) occurred. Thelimit of detection (LOD) was 0.02 - 0.1 ng per cubic meter, which corresponds to0.4- 2 ng per filter, by this method. This LOD is lower than U.S. EPA’s 10^-5 risk level,which is corresponding to 0.83 ng per cubic meter. The ambient air sampling wasconducted in the spring and autumn of 2009, at industrial area of Tokyo metropolitanwhere some dozen of small chromium plating factories in operation. Populationdensity of the area was eleven thousand persons per square kilometer. The Cr(VI)concentration was up to 0.4 ng per cubic meter, which was less than 10^-5 risk level.Next, ambient Cr(VI) concentration in that area was estimated by an atmosphericdispersion model. Cr(VI) emission factors were characterized on electroplating (hardchromium and decorative chromium) factories and municipal solid waste incinerators.Estimated Cr(VI) concentration was less than 0.1 ng per cubic meter. The estimatedresults were consistent with measured concentration.M2-D.2 Orosz MD, Southwell C, Chen J, Maya I, Chatterjee S, Salazar D, SouthersE; mdorosz@isi.eduUniversity of Southern Cali<strong>for</strong>niaA PORT SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS AND RESOURCE ALLOCATIONSYSTEM - FROM TACTICAL TO STRATEGICSeaports, airports, and other transportation nodal points face many challenges -including maximizing operational efficiency, minimizing risk from terrorism or otherman-made and natural disaster events and minimizing impacts to the environment.Often these challenges are at odds with one another - increasing one often comes atthe expense of achieving others. For example, in a seaport environment, increasingport security by adding additional container inspection stations often causes a
corresponding slowdown in container movements throughout the port - negativelyimpacting both the economy and the environment. The challenge is finding the rightbalance between operational efficiency, security, safety, and the environment. TheUniversity of Southern Cali<strong>for</strong>nia’s National Center <strong>for</strong> <strong>Risk</strong> and Economic <strong>Analysis</strong>of Terrorism Events (CREATE) has responded to this need and is developing Port-Sec - Port Security <strong>Risk</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong> and Resource Allocation System. Under fundingfrom DHS S&T and in collaboration with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach(POLA/LB) and the USCG, a USC team is developing a system that provides portsecurity personnel the tools and methods that will allow them both tactically andstrategically address port security risk, needs and concerns. Tactically, there is a needto adjust in near real-time resource allocations to maximize security (i.e., reduce riskfrom an attack) while simultaneously minimizing impact on day-to-day operationsand the environment. Strategically, there is a need to <strong>for</strong>ecast the impact that futurefacility expansions and new technologies will have on operations, security, safety, andthe environment. A demonstration prototype PortSec system capable of providingtactical analytical support is undergoing evaluations by POLA/LB security personnel.The system is currently being extended to support incident commanders during eventresponses.T4-E.1 Oryang D; david.oryang@fda.hhs.govUS Food and Drug AdministrationPRACTICAL TOOLS FOR PRIORITIZING FOOD SAFETY PROJECTSAND RESEARCHThere is a need <strong>for</strong> risk-based approaches that integrate sound science within<strong>for</strong>mation technology to appropriately manage food safety risks and determineappropriate research priorities. However, these approaches must be practical in twoimportant respects. First, they must recognize that data gaps are inevitable and thattools must be flexible enough to consider both expert judgment and readily availabledata. Second, they must be accessible to risk managers to ensure that the decisionmaking process is intuitive and reproducible. Thus, the selection of qualitative, semiquantitative,and quantitative approaches to risk ranking and risk prioritization maywell depend on the risk manager’s familiarity and experience with decision supporttools, as well as the need to incorporate expert judgment to address specific data gaps.In addition, the practicality of the approach depends on specific risk management objectives.Whereas risk ranking methods typically compare threats to public health, riskprioritization methods often involve multi-factorial techniques that consider a broaderarray of decision attributes (in addition to public health risk) that might influencethe prioritization including, but not limited to, cost burden of the outbreaks, publicperception, feasibility of controls, impact on the industries, and trade impact. Thispresentation will summarize the landscape of practical approaches to determine foodsafety research priorities, discuss the strengths and weakness of various approaches,and offer some thoughts as to how these types of approaches can be used effectivelyto establish research priorities that meet risk management goals.W2-B.3 Ozkaynak H, Egeghy P, Mitchell-Blackwood J; Ozkaynak.Haluk@EPA.GOVUS Environmental Protection AgencyFROM SHEDS TO SHEDS-LITE: DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFICIENTHUMAN EXPOSURE MODELThe per<strong>for</strong>mance of an EPA exposure modeling system was evaluated <strong>for</strong> itsapplicability to the prioritization of 52 “Challenge” chemicals on the basis of exposure.EPA is interested in expanding this and other tools to prioritize thousands ofchemicals under a new multi-level targeted testing research program <strong>for</strong> managingchemical risk. The Stochastic Human Exposure and Dose Simulation (SHEDS) modelsrepresent a family of higher tiered models that simulate realistic distributions ofhuman exposure to different chemicals through the daily activities of representativepopulations. ln evaluating the list of chemicals it was determined that the SHEDSmodel would be applicable <strong>for</strong> several but not all of the chemicals. The probabilisticSHEDS model in its current <strong>for</strong>m requires considerable input data and/or parameters.The availability of the required data can be especially problematic <strong>for</strong> new chemicalswith new pathways of exposure not explicitly considered currently by SHEDS.SHEDS in its current <strong>for</strong>m is structured around using human activity patterns fromthe general population; additional scenarios will be developed <strong>for</strong> industrial or specialpopulations. A key advantage to the model is the ability to readily address both nearand far field exposure considerations. Additionally, generalized exposure estimates arepossible in SHEDS by grouping chemicals with similar properties and usage patterns.Feasible categories <strong>for</strong> this type of modeling configuration of SHEDS are industrial/occupational, plastics, commercial additives, pesticides/herbicides and natural risks.Specific chemicals by category will be mentioned during the presentation. We willbriefly describe an on-going activity regarding the development of a more efficientand broadly applicable exposure-based screening and prioritization modeling tool“SHEDS-Lite” <strong>for</strong> future applications.W1-F.3 Pabon NA, Collier Z, Linkov I; npabon@andrew.cmu.eduUS Army Corps Engineer Research and Development CenterREVIEW OF RISK ANALYSIS USE IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE(DOD) ACQUISITION<strong>Risk</strong> analysis is involved in all stages of all DoD acquisition programs. Theseprograms, intended to resolve specific gaps in joint military capabilities, require acomprehensive <strong>Analysis</strong> of Alternatives (AoA) prior to their approval. <strong>Risk</strong> analysisis used in AoA considerations to help identify the most cost-effective solution thatmeets capability requirements, and to establish parameter objectives in the Acquisition<strong>Program</strong> Baseline (APB), that will guide the acquisition approach. Following the153
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These freely available tools apply
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M2-C.1 Abraham IM, Henry S; abraham
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inter-donation interval to mitigate
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SECOND FLOOR Floor MapConvention Ce