Final Program - Society for Risk Analysis

point uncertainty factors with distributions derived from empirical data for sets ofchemicals and endpoints that are putatively analogous to the chemical and biologicalresponse being considered for standard setting. This paper first reviews past experiencein the application of a “Straw Man” system developed to accomplish theseobjectives. It then uses this system to create a value of information framework forevaluating the amount of reduction in uncertainty obtainable from different in vitroand in vivo tests‚Äîquantifying the reduction in uncertainty in expected risks obtainedafter adding progressively sophisticated and expensive types of toxicological information.An initial illustration uses correlations between in vitro measures of chemicalpotency for different endpoints (AC50’s) with more familiar LOAEL potency data.M2-H.3 Hawkins NL, Kirson A, Levine ES, Susel I, Szwed P, Waters J; natasha.hawkins@dhs.govUS Department of Homeland Security, Office of Risk Management and Analysis, US CoastGuardUSING EXPERT JUDGMENT TO UNDERSTAND THE RARE EVENTTHREAT SPACE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: PRACTICES, CHAL-LENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIESThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages risks to the Nationarising from such threats as terrorism, natural and manmade disasters, cyber attacksand transnational crime. The nature and unpredictability of acts of terrorism presentunique challenges. DHS performs separate biennial Terrorism Risk Assessments(TRAs) for chemical (CTRA) and biological (BTRA) threats as required by HomelandSecurity Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 22 and 10, respectively. DHS also performsan Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA), mandated by HSPD 18, which incorporates,integrates and expands upon the BTRA and CTRA and establishes similaranalyses for radiological and nuclear threats (RNTRA). In addition, the Department’sRisk Assessment Process to Inform Decision-making (RAPID), in support of theDHS Policy for Integrated Risk Management (May 27, 2010), provides an all-hazardsrisk analysis by incorporating the information from all of these TRAs and addressesadditional risks such as those from natural disasters and other threats. All of theseanalyses are probabilistic risk assessments. Due to the rare event nature of many ofthese threats and/or the scarcity of data, some of the key inputs for the TRAs andRAPID have been elicited from the intelligence community and program experts.These inputs have a very high degree of unavoidable uncertainty. To obtain thesejudgments DHS has adapted an expert elicitation process originally developed forthe nuclear power sector. This presentation will describe how that elicitation processhas been adapted by DHS, and discuss the state of the science as it relates to elicitationof judgment for rare or highly uncertain events in key areas such as: de-biasing,quantifying and handling uncertainty, relative versus absolute judgments, treatment114of conflicting results from multiple experts, and validation. The presentation will putforth a research agenda to contribute toward progress in these key areas.M3-J.2 Hawkins B, Shroy B, Montello B, Gooding R, Kolakowski J, WhitmireM, McGarvey D; rachel.gooding@associates.dhs.govBattelle Memorial Institute, DHS Chemcial Security Analysis CenterCHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK ASSESSMENTThe Department of Homeland Security’s Chemical Security Analysis Center(CSAC) is responsible for the science based knowledge and characterization of chemicalrisk to the nation. The CSAC has completed the first phase of the Chemicalinfrastructure Risk Assessment, a study of the acute risk to human health and thenational economy due to a terrorist initiated event within the chemical supply chain.The probabilistic risk assessment, which examines 46 toxic industrial chemicals, considersdifferent types of terrorist groups with varying levels of financial and technicalresources, multiple attack modes and target types. The targets include various featureswithin a chemical facility such as storage vessels, process units, process controlsystems, etc as well as transportation modes such as rail, bulk and non-bulk highway,barges and pipelines. The study was based on a comprehensive synthesis of Departmentof Homeland security chemical facility location data, GIS population data,and GIS data for rail lines, roadways and navigable waterways along with an extensivedataset to provide location specific meteorology to produce an accurate estimate ofconsequences. The impacts of security and mitigation features were also includedin the analysis, as well as the distinction between insider and outsider threats and thelikelihood of interdiction. The baseline study, as well as evolving sensitivity studiescan be used to understand the main contributors of risk from the US chemical supplychain, where the greatest impacts can be achieved, as well as areas where there appearto be diminishing returns with additional efforts to buy down risk.P.102 Hawks C, Waller R*; rw@protectheritage.comProtect Heritage Corp.A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS: SYNERGY IN MANAGING RISKS TO PEO-PLE AND TO MUSEUM COLLECTIONSThe two systems of managing health and safety and of managing preservationof cultural property have many parallels. Either, or both, can exist as predominantlyhabit-based systems. However, when managed from a proactive perspective, they canbe considered goal-directed systems. In the first case, the goal is to maintain healthand avoid accidents to people. In the second case, the goal is to avoid damage and lossto cultural property. Both goals are clear, widely accepted, and even in-arguably nobleand worthy, seemingly a great advantage for both systems. However, this in-arguablegoodness of the goals can lead to unquestioned, habit-based systems rather than rational,strategic approaches. Habit-based and goal-based approaches are not mutuallyexclusive. A well-managed goal-based system will foster adoption of good habits that