tion, respectively. There<strong>for</strong>e, the period-limited acceptable exposure levels were estimatedto be (0.39 x f[work,n=x,GSD=y]/0.0913) mg/m3 <strong>for</strong> healthy workers and(0.014xf[work,n=x,GSD=y]/0.107) mg/m3 <strong>for</strong> the general population. From theresults of risk assessment, it is considered that the risk of C60 is low in the workplaceand general environment.W3-F.4 Sides W, Hall IS; wena.sides@ltsbasset.co.ukLTSB Asset FinanceALIGNING RISK WITH REALITY - A CASE STUDY FROM THE UK FI-NANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRYThis paper uses a case study methodology to examine how a large UK FinancialServices organisation has successfully integrated two diverse risk cultures to align riskappetite and decision making across the wider organisation. It provides insights intohow risk assessment methodologies, and bodies of evidence from decision sciencecan be successfully combined with models from social science areas to drive changesin perception of risk and risk taking behaviour.T3-A.2 Siegrist M, Visschers VHM; msiegrist@ethz.chETH Zurich, SwitzerlandHOW THE ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA AFFECTED THE PUBLIC’SPERCEPTION OF NUCLEAR POWER: RESULTS OF A LONGITUDI-NAL SURVEYMajor nuclear accidents, such as the recent accident at Fukushima, Japan, havebeen shown to decrease the public’s acceptance of nuclear power. Only a few studieshave compared perceptions of nuclear power be<strong>for</strong>e and after a catastrophe. Littleis known, there<strong>for</strong>e, of how acceptance of nuclear power is influenced by a seriousaccident. We conducted a longitudinal mail survey among a representative sample ofthe Swiss population (N = 786). The first wave was in autumn 2010 (be<strong>for</strong>e the accidentin Fukushima), and the second started at the end of March 2011 (two weeksafter the accident in Fukushima). Trust, acceptance, perceived risks, and perceivedbenefits related to nuclear power stations were measured. In our model, we assumedthat benefit and risk perceptions determine acceptance of nuclear power. We furtherhypothesized that trust influences benefit and risk perceptions, and that trust is correlatedacross the two waves. The proposed model explains the data very well (CFI =.96). The results suggest that perceived benefits and risks in 2010 determined people’sacceptance of nuclear power stations in 2010. After the accident in Japan, perceivedbenefits and risks still explained a large amount of the variance in the acceptance ofnuclear power stations. Trust had a strong impact on perceived risks and benefits in2010, the impact was a bit lower in 2011. Trust in 2011 was strongly influenced bythe level of trust in 2010. Trust, acceptance and benefit perceptions were significantlylower and risk perceptions were significantly higher in 2011 compared with 2010. Oursurvey results suggest that even after a severe accident trust remains important <strong>for</strong>174people’s risk and benefit perception. Results are discussed in the framework of thetrust and confidence model.M4-A.2 Siegrist J, Ferson S, Luhmann C, Ginzburg L; jacksie@eden.rutgers.eduRutgers UniversityPROBABILITY PARADOXES EXPLAINED BY THE SECOND UNCER-TAINTY PROCESSORNeuroimaging evidence suggest that we have at least two uncertainty processorsin the multicameral human brain. One of these processors is devoted to risk calculationswhile the other handles detection and processing of epistemic uncertainty.The processors are localized in different parts of the brain and use different chemicalsystems that are separately activated by the <strong>for</strong>mat of sensory input. When bothprocessors fire, they can give conflicting resolutions, but the brain appears to oftengive priority to considerations of incertitude over variability. We explore how thesecompeting processors effect perception and cognition of uncertainty and suggestthat several famous paradoxes in probability and decision making arise because of theinterplay between these mental processors. These phenomena include the EllsbergParadox and ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, the two-envelopes paradox, hyperbolicdiscounting, the two-dimensionality of risk perception, and others. Although thesephenomena are usually presumed to be biases or cognitive illusions, we describe theadaptive significance of these phenomena in humans and other species and placethem in an evolutionary context where they do not appear to be failings of the irrationalhuman brain but rather adaptations. The psychological and neurological evidencesuggests that epistemic and aleatory uncertainty should not be rolled up intoone mathematical concept in risk assessment, but require a two-dimensional view thatrespects biological realities within the decision-maker.W3-E.3 Simon-Cornu M, Beau<strong>for</strong>t A, Gonze MA, Metivier JM, Mourlon C,Parache V; marie.simon-cornu@irsn.frANSES, Maisons Al<strong>for</strong>t, France, Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN),DEI, FranceCOLLECTING DATA TO ASSESS FOOD EXPOSURE: COMPARISONOF A 4-YEAR PROJECT (L. MONOCYTOGENES IN SMOKED SALM-ON) VERSUS A REAL-TIME ASSESSMENT AFTER FUKUSHIMA AC-CIDENT (RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS)Assessing human exposure to a food hazard requires an intensive data collection,relative to the emission of the hazard, the fate of the hazard from emission tothe food “as it is consumed”, and the consumption of the food. When collectingthese data <strong>for</strong> risk assessment, the time frame and the availability of resources maylead to different situations, as illustrated here by two extreme cases. The first caseis a 4-year research project led and self-funded by the French Food Safety Agency,assessing the fate of L. monocytogenes from production to consumption of cold-
smoked salmon, and associated exposures and risks. Intensive data acquisition wasfocused on filling the needs of the exposure model. Data specifically obtained in thiscontext and then directly used as inputs of the risk assessment included <strong>for</strong> example:626 detection analyses, 384 enumeration analyses with a specific sensitive protocol(LOQ=0.2 cfu/g), 61 challenge tests, 15 storage trials, 132 time-temperature profiles.The second case is a feasibility study per<strong>for</strong>med by IRSN (Institute of radioprotectionand nuclear safety) to simulate with the modeling plat<strong>for</strong>m SYMBIOSE the fateof radiological releases (particularly 131I, 134Cs and 137Cs) in the terrestrial environmentof the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station (Japan). The context, i.e. thedistance between France and Japan and the wish to per<strong>for</strong>m calculations quickly, ledIRSN to rely only on publically available sources. Collected data used as inputs <strong>for</strong> thesimulations included <strong>for</strong> example: the land use (derived from remote-sensing processingof a Landsat scene), or the contamination of soil and surface water. Many crudeassumptions were made when no trustworthy in<strong>for</strong>mation was found (e.g. concerninganimals’ feed). The Japanese ministries also made available measures <strong>for</strong> thousandsof samples (edible and non edible plants, other foods), that were used <strong>for</strong> model-datacomparison.P.37 Simon-Cornu M, Beaugelin-Seiller K, Calmon P, Mourlon C, NicoulaudV, Garcia-Sanchez L, Gonze MA; marie.simon-cornu@free.frInstitut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), DEI, Cadarache, FranceCONDUCTING UNCERTAINTY AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES INRADIOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT WITH THE PROBABILISTICDATABASEOF SYMBIOSESymbiose is a simulation plat<strong>for</strong>m assessing the fate of radioactive hazards inenvironmental systems, and their impact on humans. The main concern is to promotea scientific and software approach that is flexible enough to deal with a wide rangeof situations, from simplified generic studies to more realistic spatially-distributedand site-specific assessments, <strong>for</strong> assessing risks induced by radioactive releases fromnuclear facilities under accidental, decommissioning or normal operating conditions.Environmental models in Symbiose address media such as atmospheric, terrestrial,freshwater and marine systems, as well as major transfer processes at their interfaces.Equations and default parameters (modifiable by the user) are proposed on the basisof multiple sources (refereed literature, grey literature, own datasets) to account <strong>for</strong>hundreds of components and interactions, most of which are modeled using a mechanisticapproach (i.e. with physically-based parameterisation). A calculation engineoffers various numerical solvers dealing with possibly complex system dynamics, andfunctioning in either a deterministic or probabilistic mode (Monte Carlo). On thebasis of an International Atomic Energy Agency report, log-normal and log-uni<strong>for</strong>mprobability distribution functions (PDF) were added to account <strong>for</strong> uncertainty onkey inputs when modelling transfer of radioactive substances in continental environments:liquid-solid interactions in rivers and soils, root uptake by plants, transfer toanimals, storage of foods... Rules to trans<strong>for</strong>m available data into log-normal andlog-uni<strong>for</strong>m PDF were applied as a function of the scarcity of data and taking intoaccount (spatial, temporal‚...) variability issues. When per<strong>for</strong>ming uncertainty and/or sensitivity analyses, this probabilistic database can be used either as such or as adefault basis to be completed. This offers promising perspectives in a field where suchanalyses are claimed to be necessary but still rarely applied.T4-G.3 Skinner DJC, Rocks SA, Drew GH, Pollard SJT; d.j.skinner@cranfield.ac.ukCranfield UniversityIDENTIFYING UNCERTAINTIES WITHIN ENVIRONMENTAL RISKASSESSMENTSUncertainties in environmental risk assessments (ERAs) must be addressed ifthe results are to be communicated with a high level of confidence. Current typologiesof uncertainties are difficult to implement1. This research introduces an evidencebasedsystem to help identify uncertainties in ERAs in order to resolve this problem.Previously, the different types of uncertainties present in ERAs were identified andthe relationships between them and other aspects of the assessments were analysed.The resulting uncertainty typology and statistical analyses are applied to case studiesconsisting of peer-reviewed articles from the fields of genetically modified higherplants, air quality, and chemicals. These research areas have large evidence bases fromwhich observations can be drawn, involve an array of assessment processes, and containwell-documented uncertainties. The collated articles were reviewed <strong>for</strong> instancesof uncertainty, and the strengths of the previously highlighted relationships wereinvestigated further. An analysis of the collected data enabled the development ofthree field-specific identification systems, centred on the strong relationships betweenthe uncertainties and the different types of evidence employed in the ERA. These distinctsystems were then adapted into a transferrable generic tool. Testing of this toolis ongoing, and focuses on the emerging risk area of engineered nanomaterials andpreliminary results are presented. It is intended that this research will be of use in the<strong>for</strong>mative stages of ERAs and uncertainty assessments, and that it will promote anunderstanding of the potential failings. Furthermore, it will help practitioners designand per<strong>for</strong>m assessments with these uncertainties in mind. This work is funded byCranfield University/Defra/EPSRC/ESRC/NERC under grant EP/G022682/1. 1Klinke et al, 1999, European Science and Technology Observatory: Sevilla, 19056/EN/2.175
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M2-C.1 Abraham IM, Henry S; abraham
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serious accident of the Tokyo Elect
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W1-C.1 Goble R, Hattis D; rgoble@cl
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P.122 Hosseinali Mirza V, de Marcel
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