Final Program - Society for Risk Analysis

tion, respectively. Therefore, the period-limited acceptable exposure levels were estimatedto be (0.39 x f[work,n=x,GSD=y]/0.0913) mg/m3 for healthy workers and(0.014xf[work,n=x,GSD=y]/0.107) mg/m3 for the general population. From theresults of risk assessment, it is considered that the risk of C60 is low in the workplaceand general environment.W3-F.4 Sides W, Hall IS; wena.sides@ltsbasset.co.ukLTSB Asset FinanceALIGNING RISK WITH REALITY - A CASE STUDY FROM THE UK FI-NANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRYThis paper uses a case study methodology to examine how a large UK FinancialServices organisation has successfully integrated two diverse risk cultures to align riskappetite and decision making across the wider organisation. It provides insights intohow risk assessment methodologies, and bodies of evidence from decision sciencecan be successfully combined with models from social science areas to drive changesin perception of risk and risk taking behaviour.T3-A.2 Siegrist M, Visschers VHM; msiegrist@ethz.chETH Zurich, SwitzerlandHOW THE ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA AFFECTED THE PUBLIC’SPERCEPTION OF NUCLEAR POWER: RESULTS OF A LONGITUDI-NAL SURVEYMajor nuclear accidents, such as the recent accident at Fukushima, Japan, havebeen shown to decrease the public’s acceptance of nuclear power. Only a few studieshave compared perceptions of nuclear power before and after a catastrophe. Littleis known, therefore, of how acceptance of nuclear power is influenced by a seriousaccident. We conducted a longitudinal mail survey among a representative sample ofthe Swiss population (N = 786). The first wave was in autumn 2010 (before the accidentin Fukushima), and the second started at the end of March 2011 (two weeksafter the accident in Fukushima). Trust, acceptance, perceived risks, and perceivedbenefits related to nuclear power stations were measured. In our model, we assumedthat benefit and risk perceptions determine acceptance of nuclear power. We furtherhypothesized that trust influences benefit and risk perceptions, and that trust is correlatedacross the two waves. The proposed model explains the data very well (CFI =.96). The results suggest that perceived benefits and risks in 2010 determined people’sacceptance of nuclear power stations in 2010. After the accident in Japan, perceivedbenefits and risks still explained a large amount of the variance in the acceptance ofnuclear power stations. Trust had a strong impact on perceived risks and benefits in2010, the impact was a bit lower in 2011. Trust in 2011 was strongly influenced bythe level of trust in 2010. Trust, acceptance and benefit perceptions were significantlylower and risk perceptions were significantly higher in 2011 compared with 2010. Oursurvey results suggest that even after a severe accident trust remains important for174people’s risk and benefit perception. Results are discussed in the framework of thetrust and confidence model.M4-A.2 Siegrist J, Ferson S, Luhmann C, Ginzburg L; jacksie@eden.rutgers.eduRutgers UniversityPROBABILITY PARADOXES EXPLAINED BY THE SECOND UNCER-TAINTY PROCESSORNeuroimaging evidence suggest that we have at least two uncertainty processorsin the multicameral human brain. One of these processors is devoted to risk calculationswhile the other handles detection and processing of epistemic uncertainty.The processors are localized in different parts of the brain and use different chemicalsystems that are separately activated by the format of sensory input. When bothprocessors fire, they can give conflicting resolutions, but the brain appears to oftengive priority to considerations of incertitude over variability. We explore how thesecompeting processors effect perception and cognition of uncertainty and suggestthat several famous paradoxes in probability and decision making arise because of theinterplay between these mental processors. These phenomena include the EllsbergParadox and ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, the two-envelopes paradox, hyperbolicdiscounting, the two-dimensionality of risk perception, and others. Although thesephenomena are usually presumed to be biases or cognitive illusions, we describe theadaptive significance of these phenomena in humans and other species and placethem in an evolutionary context where they do not appear to be failings of the irrationalhuman brain but rather adaptations. The psychological and neurological evidencesuggests that epistemic and aleatory uncertainty should not be rolled up intoone mathematical concept in risk assessment, but require a two-dimensional view thatrespects biological realities within the decision-maker.W3-E.3 Simon-Cornu M, Beaufort A, Gonze MA, Metivier JM, Mourlon C,Parache V; marie.simon-cornu@irsn.frANSES, Maisons Alfort, France, Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN),DEI, FranceCOLLECTING DATA TO ASSESS FOOD EXPOSURE: COMPARISONOF A 4-YEAR PROJECT (L. MONOCYTOGENES IN SMOKED SALM-ON) VERSUS A REAL-TIME ASSESSMENT AFTER FUKUSHIMA AC-CIDENT (RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS)Assessing human exposure to a food hazard requires an intensive data collection,relative to the emission of the hazard, the fate of the hazard from emission tothe food “as it is consumed”, and the consumption of the food. When collectingthese data for risk assessment, the time frame and the availability of resources maylead to different situations, as illustrated here by two extreme cases. The first caseis a 4-year research project led and self-funded by the French Food Safety Agency,assessing the fate of L. monocytogenes from production to consumption of cold-