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From Poverty to Power Green, Oxfam 2008 - weman

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5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDplanning. The same process, however, has also skewed budgets <strong>to</strong>wardspending on technical assistance. The high-priced consultants whopropose, moni<strong>to</strong>r, and evaluate aid programmes now pocket 20 centsof every aid dollar. 144 A study of technical assistance in Mozambiquefound that rich countries were spending $350m per year on 3,500technical experts, while the entire wage bill for Mozambique’s 100,000public sec<strong>to</strong>r workers was just $74m. 145 While technical assistancemay be helpful, for example in enabling governments <strong>to</strong> learn fromthe experiences of others, donors ought <strong>to</strong> place developing countriesin control of technical assistance funds, so that they can decidewhether <strong>to</strong> hire local or other consultants <strong>to</strong> undertake work that fitstheir own needs and priorities.Even when well-intentioned, the long shopping lists of ‘conditions’attached by donors undermines the essential task of building institutionsand policies rooted in local economic and social structures – the pathfollowed by all of <strong>to</strong>day’s successful economies. Of course, taxpayers inrich countries – and citizens of poor countries – are entitled <strong>to</strong> expectaid <strong>to</strong> be used <strong>to</strong> promote development and <strong>to</strong> be clearly accountedfor. However, many donors undermine quality by imposing their ownpreferred economic policy reforms. ‘Conditionality’ often obligespoor countries <strong>to</strong> implement policies based on dogma and ideology,rather than on evidence – for example, privatisation and liberalisationwhich, as discussed in Part 3, have a poor track record in triggeringgrowth or reducing poverty.Donor hubris can also erode state institutions. One insideraccount of Ghana’s attempt <strong>to</strong> adopt new policies after the 2000election of an energetic new president highlights the corrosive impac<strong>to</strong>n institutions of aid dependence. Aid donor staff were ideologicallyhostile <strong>to</strong> the president’s proposals <strong>to</strong> promote industry, and distrustedthe abilities of government staff <strong>to</strong> design such a programme. Theyinsisted that the government use ‘technical assistance’ <strong>to</strong> design itsflagship industrial policy and, desperate for resources, the governmentagreed. Soon the Ministry for Private Sec<strong>to</strong>r Development hadmore foreign consultants than civil servants. With policy backgroundsrooted in the international aid industry, the consultantsthemselves were sceptical of many of the government’s ideas. Insteadof aid backing a genuine effort <strong>to</strong> build an effective state, it bogged the365

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