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From Poverty to Power Green, Oxfam 2008 - weman

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2 POWER AND POLITICS I OWN, THEREFORE I AMurban residents from their homes in the capital city of Harare, affectingup <strong>to</strong> 2.4 million people overall. Bulldozers and demolition squadsrun by youth militia demolished self-help housing, while street vendorsand others operating in the informal economy were arrested and theirbusinesses destroyed. 83PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTThe notion of a ‘right’ <strong>to</strong> property is controversial. Property rights arenot included in human rights treaties, but the right is acknowledged inArticle 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyonehas the right <strong>to</strong> own property alone as well as in association with others.No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’Property rights are perhaps best seen as a means <strong>to</strong> an end – a way<strong>to</strong> reduce the vulnerability of the poor. Rich people have other ways <strong>to</strong>defend their property, as the razor wire and ‘armed response’ warningsigns outside the more opulent residences in South Africa suggest, butpoor people need legal protection from depredation. The absence ofproperty rights can stymie efforts <strong>to</strong> tackle inequality and exclusion.Many economists argue that secure property rights hold the key <strong>to</strong>broader development, encouraging investment in land or construction.The link between property rights and growth, however, is weak, 84and his<strong>to</strong>ry is full of counter-examples: most recently China hassuccessfully experimented with a complex mixture of private, public,and hybrid ownership patterns, often with relatively unclear propertyrights. Furthermore, the dispossession of some landholders (violatingcertain existing property rights) has in many cases been beneficial foreconomic development. For example, in rapid and far-reaching landreforms in South Korea and Taiwan beginning in 1949, all agriculturalland above a very low ceiling was compulsorily acquired by the state atbelow-market prices and sold <strong>to</strong> tenants at an artificially low price.By any account, such enforced transfers were not consistent with welldefinedproperty rights, but they set the stage for a broad expansion ofthe economy. 85Most recently, Peruvian economist Hernando de So<strong>to</strong> has becomesomething of a cause célèbre for his beguiling argument that propertyrights offer an escape route from poverty, enabling poor people <strong>to</strong>71

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