EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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changed structure, the role of the RNF was transferred to ESA senior officials and permanent secretaries and ambassadors residing in Brussels with the responsibility to give only policy guidance. Initially the spokespersons were ambassadors based in Brussels and the negotiation was conducted in six clusters; development, market access, agriculture, fisheries, trade related issues and services. For each cluster a Brussels based ambassador has been designated as spokesperson for the region. Two alternates were also designated in their capacity to negotiate with the EC representing the region and a team of ESA negotiators represented by group of senior experts or permanent secretaries was also formed to conduct the negotiations supported by subject specific technical. Before the restructuring of the ESA negotiation structure, Ethiopia was delegated as a spokesperson for the region on the development cluster negotiation at ambassadorial level and as alternate spokesperson on agriculture cluster at ministerial level. 1.2.2. Financial Resources For all regional negotiations related to the EPA, each ESA state including Ethiopia has been sponsored by the regional project managed by the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee- (IRCC) from the budget earmarked by the EC for the EPA negotiation. Each member state sent three negotiators for the RNF negotiation. For the purpose of continuity and institutional memory, the negotiation guideline requires same three people to attend all the negotiation processes. But, in practice countries were changing people when necessary. The RNF negotiations were held at least once every three months and in some instances more frequently, (especially during the beginning of the EPA negotiating process and in 2007 to meet to set the dateline for the WTO waiver). Ethiopia as most countries in the ESA region, do not have budget required for the EPA negotiation and therefore could not delegate more experts. This was evident in the circumstance of issues such as diversity and the need for expertise in each field when negotiating at the RNF level to develop the regional negotiating position. There was a shortage of budget so it was impossible to send necessary additional experts from the NDTPF members to the RNF negotiation. This was one of the challenges faced by Ethiopia. Before the any RNF takes place, a number of dedicated sessions were taking place to negotiate technical issues. For dedicated sessions two experts from each country were sponsored by the IRCC. Negotiations at dedicated sessions were the bases for all negotiations at RNF level and the negotiation with the EC. Since the start of the EPA negotiations until the end of 2007, the overall ESA EPA negotiating structure was composed of a number of organs. These include the RNF which was made up of three representatives from the capitals’ of each country participating in the ESA negotiations (public and NSAs); ambassadorial lead spokespersons from Brussels; and representatives from one or more regional NGOs involved in trade and development issues and representatives of the regional organisations involved in the negotiations. The secretariats of the regional organisations involved in the ESA-EPA negotiations (COMESA, EAC, IOC and IGAD) with COMESA taking the lead and co-ordinating role were also mandated to act as the secretariat for the RNF. After the restructuring of the regional negotiation structure, and because of budgetary constraint and limited resources at the secretariat level, only two negotiators per country were expected to attend and represent their countries at RNF negotiation session and only one expert at 99
dedicated sessions during the year 2008 and 2009. As indicated above, due to budget constraint at national level, sponsoring more experts for negotiation faced further challenges because of the reduced number of sponsored negotiators. Limiting the number of experts attending dedicated sessions where divers’ issues are discussed and real expertise negotiations were taking place has limited the participation and contribution of the countries like Ethiopia both at the RNF and dedicated sessions. Annexes III and IV shows the old and new ESA-EPA regional negotiation structures, respectively. 1.3. Other Budgetary support for negotiation and relation The Government of Ethiopia has been reserving Birr 200,000 on average every year for the last five years for bilateral trade relation and negotiations and for attending permanent and known regional meetings like; COMESA Trade & Customs Committee meeting, COMESA trade ministers, ESA Council, AU trade ministers, ACP trade ministers, and WTO Trade Ministerial meeting, etc…, The above budget was to cover all travel related costs. However, the budget was quite short and impacted the ability to effectively participate in all regional and bilateral negotiations and meetings. Trade negotiations normally took more time to conclude. The length of negotiation depends on the complexity of the negotiation and flexibility of the parties to reach an agreement. It is clear that if a particular negotiation is planned to be completed in a certain specific timeframe it requires the flexibility and understanding of the parties and sufficient budget. Therefore the annual budget for bilateral and regional negotiations will not be comparable with relatively substantial amount of budget allocated/spent for a negotiation planned to be completed within a certain timeframe like that of the EPA. In Ethiopia’s case the indicated budget was only for bilateral and regional negotiations and meetings. No budget was dedicated to the EPA related negotiation. However, NGOs like OXFAM GB and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung who work in trade related areas have supported the negotiation by attributing budget on a demand basis. Both OXFAM-GB and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung are working on trade related issues and they provide support in several ways when requested. 103 Although other institutions who are members of the NDTPF did not have budget saved specifically for the purpose of the EPA negotiation, they did fund the relevant experts (from their institutions). 103 The Government has been receiving technical and financial support from different donors. The EU through its Trade Capacity Building Project, the Commonwealth Secretariat through its Hub and Spokes Project, the COMESA Secretariat, the ACP Secretariat, OXFAM GB, Fredric Evert Eshtuting etc…, have supported the EPA negotiation process technically and by allotting financial budget. Moreover, the Government of the United States has supported and is still supporting the country’s WTO accession process through its “WTO Doha Project” and its successor project “WTO Accession plus Project”, through support extended under its USAID. 100
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
Page 49 and 50: Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
Page 51 and 52: Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
Page 53 and 54: Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
Page 55 and 56: Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
Page 57 and 58: Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
Page 59 and 60: Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
Page 61 and 62: trade relation and negotiation matt
Page 63 and 64: EPAs negotiation process is paralle
Page 65 and 66: • EPA team The EPA negotiating te
Page 67 and 68: - State Secretariat of Environment
Page 69 and 70: Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
Page 71 and 72: spent for these impact assessment s
Page 73 and 74: Other opportunity costs Another imp
Page 75 and 76: Since domestic constituencies tend
Page 77 and 78: Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
Page 79 and 80: • An estimated $214,000 in travel
Page 81 and 82: The main expectation of the process
Page 83 and 84: Commission was forced to take up th
Page 85 and 86: Therefore, while negotiators could
Page 87 and 88: System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 89 and 90: Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
Page 91 and 92: Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
Page 93 and 94: Dominican Republic Distribution of
Page 95 and 96: 1. Overview of existing resources f
Page 97 and 98: The FTRD that was responsible for b
Page 99: The support of the NDTPF and the ex
Page 103 and 104: Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
Page 105 and 106: 3. Quantification of costs of count
Page 107 and 108: Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
Page 109 and 110: 4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
Page 111 and 112: 5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
Page 113 and 114: ) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
Page 115 and 116: Council of ESA Ministers Committee
Page 117 and 118: System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 119 and 120: List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
Page 121 and 122: EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
Page 123 and 124: contains the quantification of cost
Page 125 and 126: which appear to have crowded out ac
Page 127 and 128: Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
Page 129 and 130: Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
Page 131 and 132: Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
Page 133 and 134: ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
Page 135 and 136: Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
Page 137 and 138: Though the current negotiating stru
Page 139 and 140: • The simultaneous application of
Page 141 and 142: understand the changing environment
Page 143 and 144: 7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
Page 145 and 146: opportunity cost could be quite sub
Page 147 and 148: • There is adequate technical adv
Page 149 and 150: 5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
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5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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usiness and political levels repres
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expectation of increases in exports
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8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
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MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
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o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
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Reviewing services negotiations in
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Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
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3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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In this exercise, it is important t
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196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
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products could be extended until ye
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extended to the original partner. F
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than the rate applied on the proces
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RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
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Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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that value added in ACP countries o
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The EU has yet to deliver a simple
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arrangements, are constrained by pr
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and non-oil exporting countries wit
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Common Market for Eastern and South
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to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
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fact that countries either export o
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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