EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
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spent for these impact assessment studies and validation workshops. The cost of the<br />
studies was financed by the PMU.<br />
Table 7 Negotiating costs<br />
Type<br />
Calculation Estimated cost in<br />
USD<br />
Travel/Air ticket (number of meetings X<br />
estimated cost X number of participants)<br />
180x1500x2 $540,000<br />
Hotel (number of meetings X estimated<br />
cost X number of days X number of<br />
participants)<br />
180x100x4x2 $144,000<br />
Per Diem (number of meetings X 180 X 70 X 4 X 2 $100,800<br />
estimated cost X number of days X<br />
number of participants)<br />
Total estimate for non-RNF negotiations $784,800<br />
For RNF negotiation $78,480<br />
Grand estimate<br />
Source : Author’s own calculations<br />
$863,200<br />
Estimated total costs<br />
The estimated costs of <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations are around $1.2 million. These do not include<br />
the labour costs of preparing and participating in the negotiations.<br />
Cost-benefit analysis of counterfactual costs<br />
A proper account of the resources required for the <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations requires taking into<br />
consideration the expected benefits from the process, as well as the costs and benefits<br />
from alternative options. This is an extremely challenging task, since for some of the<br />
benefits and costs we have detailed calculations from existing evidence and the case<br />
studies, while for other elements such as the impact of liberalising services under <strong>EPA</strong>s<br />
or intangible elements such as enhancing or worsening regional integration<br />
quantification may be extremely complex. As a result, we aim to provide some indicative<br />
value of the expected benefits and costs for the different options, rather than a concrete<br />
figure. Despite the fact that trade policy decisions depend on a large number of factors,<br />
sometimes unrelated to the expected benefits, the cost-benefit exercise is extremely<br />
important because helps us to judge whether some of the trade policy decisions taken<br />
by negotiating <strong>EPA</strong>s or other agreements make economic sense.<br />
In the case of Ethiopia, the main counterfactual option to <strong>EPA</strong>s was to remain on EBA<br />
without further engaging in <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian government<br />
never considered this as a realistic option. This is despite the fact that in the contrast to<br />
other countries that were concerned about the uncertainty around EBA/GSP, the<br />
possibility of EBA removal was not seen as a credible threat by the Ethiopian<br />
government.<br />
Instead, the perception was that the lessons learnt from EBA and Lomé/Cotonou<br />
preferential access provisions indicated that the net impact on development had been<br />
insignificant overall. Therefore, it was expected that to make the <strong>EPA</strong> more attractive to<br />
the LDCs the EC would provide technical assistance and resources to enhance<br />
competitiveness of different sectors of ESA member countries. Accordingly, the<br />
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