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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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Since domestic constituencies tend to care more about adjustment costs over trade<br />

creation, a key issue in the short run for policy makers is the impact on exports from<br />

losing Cotonou. This is difficult to calculate because it depends on the amount of exports<br />

that were effectively using Cotonou and that could not export without using the<br />

preference. At the same time the gains from GSP+ depend on the impact of reducing<br />

tariffs on those products that used preferences. Regarding GSP+, publicly available data<br />

from COMEXT suggests that only 3.5% of exports used preferences in 2007, and,<br />

therefore, the improvement of preferences would impact mainly these products by<br />

having better access. 94 More concretely, the case study reflects the specific interest in<br />

improved access via GSP+ of producers of: textiles, tuna, cocoa, cocoa product6s, hides<br />

and skins of goats and lambs, shrimps and prawns, crabs, leather and rubber. In<br />

addition, COMEXT data suggests that while exports increased substantially for Nigeria<br />

from 2007 to 2008, they did so for products with zero MFN rates, and the share of<br />

exports under preferential access was reduced to 1.9%. Therefore there has been a<br />

reduction in exports under preferential access of around €65 that may be partly<br />

associated to the loss of Cotonou preferences. Regarding exports under <strong>EPA</strong>s,<br />

Fontagne et al (2008) estimate from ECOWAS an increase in 4% of the volume of<br />

exports compared to GSP. This would be a substantial benefit of <strong>EPA</strong> that would add to<br />

trade creation. Overall, the potential benefits arising from <strong>EPA</strong>s are much larger than<br />

any other options, especially when compared with the costs of staying only with GSP.<br />

Table 10 Counterfactual costs (millions)<br />

<strong>EPA</strong> GSP + GSP<br />

Negotiating costs a<br />

$0.287 0 0<br />

Impact on exports d<br />

(+4% of export<br />

volume) b<br />

(+3.5% of<br />

€65<br />

exports)<br />

Trade creation b<br />

($617) 0 0<br />

Revenue loss c<br />

€155 0 0<br />

Employment<br />

€100 0 0<br />

Adjustment c<br />

Other issues (trade,.) Potentially large<br />

benefits especially in<br />

services<br />

0 0<br />

Source : a Own calculations, b Karingi et al (2005), c Miner (2006) d Fontagne et al. (2007)<br />

Comparison with WTO<br />

Nigeria has certainly allocated more resources to the WTO than to <strong>EPA</strong> process. The<br />

costs for 2009 of maintaining the office in Geneva, considering all costs was $2.4<br />

million, which is several times the amount that has been spent on the <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations<br />

so far. Directly comparable to the <strong>EPA</strong> costs is the personnel cost which is $787,027.9,<br />

also many times more than the <strong>EPA</strong> costs so far. 95<br />

94 It is possible that a better preference margin under GSP+ may create exports of new products;<br />

however, this is impossible to clarify with the existing data.<br />

95 The differential in the costs has been a sensitive and worrisome issue for Nigeria’s<br />

parliamentarians in particular with the extreme position canvassed that Nigeria should pull out of<br />

the WTO not only because of the high annual budgetary provision but also for the reason that the<br />

benefits cannot be tangibly perceived. Despite the public dislike of WTO, as is with the <strong>EPA</strong>,<br />

Nigeria is more committed to the WTO and believes the WTO will offer more trade gains than the<br />

74

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