EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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Cernat et al (2007) discuss these proposals and provide some quantitative effects of their effects using general equilibrium techniques. However, the discussion is still open given that negotiations at WTO have been halted or have suffered a significant delay. Therefore the issue of the coverage of the liberalisation schedule is still unresolved. It would be interesting to compare similar trade agreements and analyse what their interpretation from a similar perspective. While, in general, the agreements signed by the US with countries such as Chile, Jordan, Panama and CAFTA has full coverage; the Japan- Chile has a list of excluded goods. 135 Therefore, we see that the interpretation of this article has been wide. Moreover, if one considers that in the modalities for the general negotiations at the Doha Round, countries have asked for exclusions under sensitive or special products, particularly in the agriculture negotiations, the 100% coverage interpretation is excessive. Moreover, there exist provisions for SDT on a quantity of excluded products in the general agreement. In sub-paragraph C of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, it can be read: “...any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.” This is another source of wide and vague interpretation. It basically implies that the implementation period of an FTA should have reasonable length of time. Nevertheless, a general interpretation suggests that this period should only exceed ten years under exceptional circumstances. 136 However, a short review of some RTAs signed after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, suggest that the ten years interpretation is the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, it is still very unclear what should be a reasonable length of time but also if it is possible to have different implementation periods according to SDT. However, one could argue that given that in the market access negotiations at the general level there were and are different implementation periods under SDT, 137 this provision could be also applied on Article XXIV. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the coverage of the agreements. In the market access negotiations there are different levels of commitments for developed and developing countries. One possibility to explore with regards to the timing issue is analysing what the provisions are in other FTAs. It is hard to find other FTAs of similar magnitude (in terms of countries involved) of EPAs; however, it is possible to single out some FTAs between developed and developing countries which would make the issue clearer. For example, during the US-Jordan, US-Chile FTA, US-CAFTA 138 and Japan-Chile agreements it was agreed a common implementation period of 10, 12 , 20 and 16 years respectively. In the US-Panama FTA agreement, it was agreed a common 17 years implementation period; but Panama has some flexibility and their schedule for some 135 Notas Generales y Anexos del Acuerdo entre la República de Chile y Japón para una Asociación Económica Estratégica. Available at www.direcon.cl/documentos/japon/TLC/TLC_CHILE_JAPON_TEXTO_PRINCIPAL.pdf 136 WTO ’Understanding on the interpretation of article XXIV on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’ 137 In the Uruguay Round, developed countries had five years to adjust their bound tariffs while developing countries had eight years. Similar provisions were present in the different modalities during the Doha Round. 138 Agreements available at www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements 199
products could be extended until year 20. 139 Therefore, according to previous agreements, there is scope for SDT in terms of implementation periods. Taking the above into consideration, this paper will continue to analyse the schedules of reductions of the interim EPAs agreed so far. Given that no changes or agreement have been reached at the WTO to clarify or modify Article XXIV or, the Enabling Clause to date; this part will present different alternatives of the countries schedules that could come up against the wide and vague provisions of the WTO legislation. This contrasts with the approach taken by Onguglo and Ito (2003). In their report, the approach taken was what should be the modifications in the Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause that would have made the EPAs WTO compatible. Table 6 presents a summary of the liberalisation schedule of the different interim EPAs. Table 6 Summary of liberalisation schedules in the interim EPAs agreements Agreement starts % of excluded trade (based on imports) % of excluded trade (based on tariff lines) 200 Final year of liberalisation % of trade liberalised in the first basket (based on imports) % of trade liberalised in the first basket (based on tariff lines) Year of implementation first basket Cameroon 2010 21 24 2023 24.5 31.2 2013 N/A N/A Cote d'Ivoire 2009 20 11.3 2023 28.4 36.56 2013 16.7 5.7 Ghana 2008 25 19.1 2022 8.7 15.12 2013 8.7 13.9 EAC 2009 17.4 25.7 2033 65.4 35.9 2010 65.4 65.4 Comoros 2009 19.3 1.7 2022 21.5 27.9 2013 N/A N/A Madagascar 2009 19.3 10.5 2022 37 23.8 2013 N/A N/A Mauritius 2008 4.4 3.4 2022 24.5 25.9 2008 24.5 25.9 Seychelles 2009 2.5 2.3 2022 62.1 26.5 2013 N/A N/A Zambia 2010 20.4 6.9 2023 20.8 14.38 2014 48.9 BNLS 2009 5.8 2.6 2018 13.1 19.9 2012 74.2 74.2 Mozambique 2009 18.5 60.2 2023 70.5 39.2 2009 N/A N/A CARIFORUM 2008 13.1 9.3 2033 61.1 N/A 2018 N/A N/A Papua New Guinea 2009 12 18 2024 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Fiji 2009 18.5 20 2024 13 13 2014 24 N/A Note: BNLS will partially liberalised an additional 4.6% of their imports at the end of the implementation period. BNLS has been applying the TDCA liberalisation schedule. Source: Bilal and Stevens (2009) and ECPDM Trade Negotiation Insights. For example, looking at Cote d’Ivoire in Table 6, it is clear that its interim EPA has started in 2009 and that 21% of the value of their imports from the EU will be excluded (first column); 11.3% of the tariff lines will be excluded (second column); that the agreement should be fully implemented by 2023 (third column); 28.4% (fourth column) of the value of the imports from the EU will be liberalised by 2013 (fifth column). Furthermore, Cote d’Ivoire will immediately liberalise 16.7% and that 5.7% of their tariff lines are duty free before the agreement. 139 United States and Panama Promotion Agreement. Available at www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/panama/asset_upload_file146_12959.pdf % down payment % duty free lines
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
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Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
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Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
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Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
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Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
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Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
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Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
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trade relation and negotiation matt
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EPAs negotiation process is paralle
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• EPA team The EPA negotiating te
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- State Secretariat of Environment
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Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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Page 151 and 152: EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
Page 153 and 154: c. Technical Level At a regional le
Page 155 and 156: 2) From the ministers of trade of C
Page 157 and 158: The fact that the DR had previously
Page 159 and 160: - State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
Page 161 and 162: Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
Page 163 and 164: Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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Page 167 and 168: Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
Page 169 and 170: In additional there were eight meet
Page 171 and 172: Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
Page 173 and 174: 5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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Page 179 and 180: 8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182: MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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Page 185 and 186: o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Page 189 and 190: Reviewing services negotiations in
Page 191 and 192: Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
Page 193 and 194: 3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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Page 209 and 210: Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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Page 227 and 228: References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
Page 229 and 230: SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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Page 237 and 238: which relevant entities within thei
Page 239 and 240: Specific provisions While the final
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Page 247 and 248: So what have the EPA negotiations a
Page 249 and 250: Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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