EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

Cernat et al (2007) discuss these proposals and provide some quantitative effects of their
effects using general equilibrium techniques. However, the discussion is still open given that
negotiations at WTO have been halted or have suffered a significant delay. Therefore the
issue of the coverage of the liberalisation schedule is still unresolved.
It would be interesting to compare similar trade agreements and analyse what their
interpretation from a similar perspective. While, in general, the agreements signed by the US
with countries such as Chile, Jordan, Panama and CAFTA has full coverage; the Japan-
Chile has a list of excluded goods. 135 Therefore, we see that the interpretation of this article
has been wide. Moreover, if one considers that in the modalities for the general negotiations
at the Doha Round, countries have asked for exclusions under sensitive or special products,
particularly in the agriculture negotiations, the 100% coverage interpretation is excessive.
Moreover, there exist provisions for SDT on a quantity of excluded products in the general
agreement.
In sub-paragraph C of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, it can be read:
“...any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and
schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a
reasonable length of time.”
This is another source of wide and vague interpretation. It basically implies that the
implementation period of an FTA should have reasonable length of time. Nevertheless, a
general interpretation suggests that this period should only exceed ten years under
exceptional circumstances. 136 However, a short review of some RTAs signed after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, suggest that the ten years interpretation is the exception
rather than the rule. Therefore, it is still very unclear what should be a reasonable length of
time but also if it is possible to have different implementation periods according to SDT.
However, one could argue that given that in the market access negotiations at the general
level there were and are different implementation periods under SDT, 137 this provision could
be also applied on Article XXIV. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the
coverage of the agreements. In the market access negotiations there are different levels of
commitments for developed and developing countries.
One possibility to explore with regards to the timing issue is analysing what the provisions
are in other FTAs. It is hard to find other FTAs of similar magnitude (in terms of countries
involved) of EPAs; however, it is possible to single out some FTAs between developed and
developing countries which would make the issue clearer.
For example, during the US-Jordan, US-Chile FTA, US-CAFTA 138 and Japan-Chile
agreements it was agreed a common implementation period of 10, 12 , 20 and 16 years
respectively. In the US-Panama FTA agreement, it was agreed a common 17 years
implementation period; but Panama has some flexibility and their schedule for some
135
Notas Generales y Anexos del Acuerdo entre la República de Chile y Japón para una Asociación
Económica Estratégica. Available at
www.direcon.cl/documentos/japon/TLC/TLC_CHILE_JAPON_TEXTO_PRINCIPAL.pdf
136
WTO ’Understanding on the interpretation of article XXIV on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994’
137
In the Uruguay Round, developed countries had five years to adjust their bound tariffs while
developing countries had eight years. Similar provisions were present in the different modalities
during the Doha Round.
138
Agreements available at www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements
199