EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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SADC Fontagne et PACIFI C CARIBBEAN ECA (2005) PE Fontagne et al (2008) PE (6-digits) Keck and Piermartini (2008) CGE Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year al (2008) PE (6-digits) Scollay (2002) CA Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year fontegne et al (2008) PE (6-digits) Gasiorek and Winters (2004) CA Gasiorek et al (2006) CA, PE, GM Greenaway and Milner (2003) PE • Net trade creating but some loss in intra regional trade through TD. Export cost of losing Cotonou: (-1.8%) Long run effects of EPA: X(+7%), M(+11%) • Average effects Vol of X: + 3.6% Vol of M: +11.4% GDP: +0.12% • Small fall in GDP for Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania • EU-MERCOSUR agreement would significantly lower the gains 80-100 liberalisation with EU RoSADC: GDP (-0.07%), ToT (-0.01%), BoT (- 130), Welfare (-24) Export cost of losing Cotonou: (-8.2%) Long run effects of EPA: X(+37%), M(+0%) 80-100 liberalisation with EU ACP Pacific: GDP (-0.17%), ToT (-0.65%), BoT (- 97), Welfare (-134) Export cost of losing Cotonou: (-9%) Long run effects of EPA: X(+25%), M(+27%) Stronger scope for trade diversion over trade creation. Strong scope for trade diversion, existence of trade re-orientation and creation but in smaller magnitudes. PE: Average change in tot imports: • reciprocity: 2.7% •extended reciprocity (with US): 9% • full multilateral liberalisation: 13.4% • Revenue implications: more serious for non SACU members. Tariff revenue loss : -22%, or -16% if revenue loss is to be minimised. 41 Counterfactual is Cotonou preferences. N/A Scenario full reciprocal liberalisation EU-SADC (includes SA) Reciprocity (% GDP loss) 50% � 0.1% 80% � 0.4% 100% �1.4% Tariff revenue loss : -8%, or - 8% if revenue loss is to be minimised Reciprocity (% GDP loss) 50% � 1.2% 80% � 1.6% 100% �2.1% Tariff revenue loss: -16%, or - 13% if revenue loss is to be minimised. Reduction in Revenue of 22% Average revenue effects •Reciprocity: -72.9% Extended reciprocity exacerbates this and full liberalisation entails complete loss of tariff revenue. Base year is 1997. 9 CARICOM countries. Granting full reciprocity implies forsaking Customs duty on EU imports and on diverted Fiscal Adjustment: 340 Export Diversification: 261 Employment adjustment: 217 Skills/prod. Enhancement: 255 Total Adjustment costs: 1073 Fiscal Adjustment:210 Export Diversification:175 Employment adjustment:82 Skills/prod. Enhancement: 175 Total Adjustment costs: 642 Fiscal Adjustment: 375 Export Diversification: 199 Employment adjustment: 140 Skills/prod. Enhancement: 210 Total Adjustment costs: 924
Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80-100 liberalisation with EU GDP (0%), ToT (-0.22%), BoT (249), Welfare (- 81) Source: Author’s own elaboration Reciprocity (% GDP loss) 50% � 0.1% 80% � 0.2% 100% �0.5% 42 dutiable sources.
Page 1 and 2: EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
Page 3 and 4: Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
Page 5 and 6: Part One: Literature Review 4
Page 7 and 8: countries demanded more precision a
Page 9 and 10: essential and fundamental of EPA (h
Page 11 and 12: EPA group. However, after phase II
Page 13 and 14: Disagreements also existed on other
Page 15 and 16: ules of origin as a basis for negot
Page 17 and 18: would not meet WTO provisions. Even
Page 19 and 20: is only just about to conclude an i
Page 21 and 22: The EC took almost nine months to a
Page 23 and 24: Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
Page 25 and 26: services, CARIFORUM countries commi
Page 27 and 28: 2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
Page 29 and 30: Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
Page 31 and 32: 4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
Page 33 and 34: creation) but can also lead to impo
Page 35 and 36: preferences and hence are likely to
Page 37 and 38: 3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
Page 39 and 40: Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
Page 41: SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
Page 45 and 46: Whilst most studies appear to agree
Page 47 and 48: 7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
Page 49 and 50: Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
Page 51 and 52: Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
Page 53 and 54: Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
Page 55 and 56: Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
Page 57 and 58: Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
Page 59 and 60: Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
Page 61 and 62: trade relation and negotiation matt
Page 63 and 64: EPAs negotiation process is paralle
Page 65 and 66: • EPA team The EPA negotiating te
Page 67 and 68: - State Secretariat of Environment
Page 69 and 70: Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
Page 71 and 72: spent for these impact assessment s
Page 73 and 74: Other opportunity costs Another imp
Page 75 and 76: Since domestic constituencies tend
Page 77 and 78: Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
Page 79 and 80: • An estimated $214,000 in travel
Page 81 and 82: The main expectation of the process
Page 83 and 84: Commission was forced to take up th
Page 85 and 86: Therefore, while negotiators could
Page 87 and 88: System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 89 and 90: Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
Page 91 and 92: Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
Page 93 and 94:
Dominican Republic Distribution of
Page 95 and 96:
1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
Page 103 and 104:
Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
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5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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usiness and political levels repres
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expectation of increases in exports
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8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
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MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
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o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
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Reviewing services negotiations in
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Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
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3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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In this exercise, it is important t
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196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
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products could be extended until ye
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extended to the original partner. F
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than the rate applied on the proces
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RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
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Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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that value added in ACP countries o
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The EU has yet to deliver a simple
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arrangements, are constrained by pr
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and non-oil exporting countries wit
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Common Market for Eastern and South
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to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
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fact that countries either export o
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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