EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

Incentives from assistance
No major assistance to trade negotiations was identified in the D.R. However, some
suspicion aroused around the ownership and role of the CRNM during the EPA
negotiations. This suspicion was highly fuelled by some CARICOM countries wanting to
delay the EPA agreement, and resulted in the integration of the CRNM within the
structure of the CARICOM secretariat.
Lessons
• Importance of involvement of private sector during negotiations
• Experience acquired in previous negotiations is key for successful negotiations
• The MFN clause included in the EPA for developed countries and countries with more
than 1% of world exports, has placed CARIFORUM’s EPA commitments as the most
likely ceiling for future market opening agreements.
5. Main Lessons of the case studies
This section concludes the case studies with the main lessons arising from the analysis.
Lack of human resources is a significant negotiating constraint
As expected, poorer countries faced larger resource constraints during the negotiations.
Specifically, two main gaps are identified. The first gap is the lack of trained trade
negotiators, especially regarding other trade related issues. This is a very significant in
the case of Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent for Nigeria. A second gap, and perhaps more
important, is the lack of capacity to conduct impact studies in both Ethiopia and Nigeria,
which affects the capacity to prepare negotiating positions.
Other trade negotiations may have better allocation of resources
Despite existing resource constraints some interesting elements emerged around the
allocation of relevant ministry staff. The most interesting resource allocation being
Nigeria, where most ministry staff dedicated to trade negotiations is allocated in the
WTO area. Also, Ethiopia allocates significant amount of staff to bilateral and trilateral
trade agreements. While these choices surely reflect domestic trade policy preferences,
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they do not necessarily imply more real commitment in these areas.
This has clear implications when considering the opportunity costs of negotiating these
agreements. While it may the case that the most qualified staff has been absorbed by
the EPA negotiations, it is also true that larger numbers of staff remain linked to other
trade negotiating processes, which are likely to have less impact on their respective
economies (i.e. staff for trilateral agreements in Ethiopia or for UNCTAD in Nigeria).
96 While Nigeria is a big and important developing country voice in the WTO, the allocation of
resources do not necessarily correspond with more WTO action, and with certainty it is not
associated with more commitment to multilateral liberalisation.
97 The fact that the EPAs are negotiated regionally implies a stronger role for regional secretariats
during the negotiations, and some countries may rely on secretariat staff to carry out some of the
negotiating tasks.
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