EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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CARIFORUM also expressed some concern about the EC inserting binding commitments on sustainable development and good governance was not matched by the non existence of binding commitments on trade capacity building support on the EU side. The EC maintained that issues of sustainable development and good governance were relevant and fundamental to EPA’s. 57 The development dimension of EPA’s was a sticky point during mid 2006 in negotiations. The Caribbean wanted the EC to translate their positions on development dimensions on particular policies. The Caribbean requirement that some countries be excluded from liberalisation commitments to reduce the impact on fiscal revenues was rejected by the EC. 58 In contrast to other regions, the EC accepted that CARIFORUM would need periods of up to 25 years for sensitive products. Despite progress in the development chapter, there was, however, at the beginning of 2007 disagreements about how to make operational the cooperation activities for EPA’s implementation. Also, the Caribbean insisted that an EPA should include a legally binding non-execution clause. In light of this, if promised EU development cooperation is not delivered, the Caribbean would suspend concessions in other areas. This was ultimately rejected by the EC. 59 Despite the progress exhibited (which was more important than any other ACP region), they struggled to prepare the CARIFORUM market access offer. Diverging views within Caribbean existed in reciprocal trade and its impact on fiscal revenue; the amount of trade sectors to be covered and excluded from EPA’s. Also, the EC market offer in terms of sugar, rice and bananas was not what the Caribbean counties would have liked. 60 The fact that the Caribbean was not a Customs Union complicated the negotiations on market access. The proposal of national exclusions lists was rejected by the EC. Moreover, some members were not willing to accept a full reciprocity given the sizes of their economies. It was agreed, on the other hand, that each Caribbean country would be recognised by international law as a party to EPA’s. This would exempt CARIFORUM from exposure of collective sanctions. The market access negotiations remained to be complicated during the last months of 2007. Eventually, the Caribbean presented its market access offer. However, divergences continued in product coverage, transition periods, MFN and issues of governance. In the first two weeks of December 2007, the agreement was closed. The CARIFORUM market access offer was made on 1 st December. The original offer considered 25 years implementation period. This was rejected by the EU. On 7 th December the Caribbean heads of government met. They decided to reduce the implementation period to 15 years in a race to not lose the preferences on sugar, bananas, rum and rice. A week later, the full EPA was initialled. 61 Finally, CARIFORUM agreed to liberalise 82.9% of their trade over a period of 15 years (with a moratorium of three years). The MFN clause was also part of the agreement. In 57 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2006. 58 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 5, No. 5, October 2006. 59 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2007. 60 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 6, No. 4, August 2007. 61 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 6, No. 8, December 2007. 23
services, CARIFORUM countries committed to a 65% (75% S&D) sectoral coverage with a standstill clause and commitments for future liberalisation. CARIFORUM also secured a transitional TRQ in sugar, additional to the sugar protocol. Finally, CARIFORUM members in entertainment services would have access without any restriction to all EU member states. After the agreement was initialled, some concerns were raised. Guyana’s president claimed that it was the only choice and that the signing was no more than a capitulation to EU pressure. Moreover, Guyana expressed serious concerns about the agreement and later asked to postpone the signature of the agreement. 62 However, the Director General of the CNRM (the body responsible for negotiating the deals) declared that the accord was not a panacea, but it represented the best trade agreement the region could enter at that time. 63 The implementation of the agreement began with the Caribbean RPTF translating the development needs into operational programmes. To do this, it conducted feasibility studies to identify needs, coordinate funding and quantify costs. 64 Also, it was agreed with the EC by May 2008 that the EDF will support EOA implementation and regional integration. Despite the fact that the agreement was initialled, there were still several issues to address. Bahamas, for example, did not put forward its services liberalisation offer until mid 2008. However, by August 2008 the CARICOM Development Fund was established. On September 2008, Guyana informed that it would not sign a full EPA but was prepared to sign a “goods only” agreement. The EC informed that it did not have a mandate to negotiate a separate agreement with Guyana. It highlighted that signing and implementing EPA was the best way to ensure additional EPA financial support from other donors. Eventually, the EPA was signed on October 2008. 65 The beginning of 2009 saw Caribbean countries working in addressing the necessities of implementation at the national level. A problem appeared since Dominican Republic rejected any mandate be granted for EPA coordination to CARICOM unless it enjoys equal rights with the rest of the CARICOM member states. As a consequence, an urgent legal and institutional reform was needed in this institution. 66 By mid 2009, the Caribbean was focusing on the functioning of various EPA institutions at both the regional and national levels as well as working on the implementation roadmap which sets out the legislative and administrative actions. It is interesting to see how fast the CARIFORUM and the EC agreed on market access and what eventually lead to the full EPA. The discussion in services, as well as other topics, was fast and without major disagreements. The possibility of losing preferences in key products made CARIFORUM countries keener to improve their market access offer in a matter of days. Moreover, despite continuously claiming specific commitments on finance for the adjustment process, its requirement was not as persistent as the rest 62 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 7, No. 6, August 2008. 63 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 7, No. 2, March 2008. 64 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 7, No. 5, June 2008. 65 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 7, No. 8, October 2008. 66 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 2009. 24
Page 1 and 2: EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
Page 3 and 4: Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
Page 5 and 6: Part One: Literature Review 4
Page 7 and 8: countries demanded more precision a
Page 9 and 10: essential and fundamental of EPA (h
Page 11 and 12: EPA group. However, after phase II
Page 13 and 14: Disagreements also existed on other
Page 15 and 16: ules of origin as a basis for negot
Page 17 and 18: would not meet WTO provisions. Even
Page 19 and 20: is only just about to conclude an i
Page 21 and 22: The EC took almost nine months to a
Page 23: Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
Page 27 and 28: 2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
Page 29 and 30: Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
Page 31 and 32: 4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
Page 33 and 34: creation) but can also lead to impo
Page 35 and 36: preferences and hence are likely to
Page 37 and 38: 3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
Page 39 and 40: Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
Page 41 and 42: SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
Page 43 and 44: Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
Page 45 and 46: Whilst most studies appear to agree
Page 47 and 48: 7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
Page 49 and 50: Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
Page 51 and 52: Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
Page 53 and 54: Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
Page 55 and 56: Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
Page 57 and 58: Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
Page 59 and 60: Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
Page 61 and 62: trade relation and negotiation matt
Page 63 and 64: EPAs negotiation process is paralle
Page 65 and 66: • EPA team The EPA negotiating te
Page 67 and 68: - State Secretariat of Environment
Page 69 and 70: Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
Page 71 and 72: spent for these impact assessment s
Page 73 and 74: Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
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5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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usiness and political levels repres
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expectation of increases in exports
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8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
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MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
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o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
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Reviewing services negotiations in
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Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
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3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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In this exercise, it is important t
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196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
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products could be extended until ye
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extended to the original partner. F
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than the rate applied on the proces
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RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
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Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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that value added in ACP countries o
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The EU has yet to deliver a simple
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arrangements, are constrained by pr
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and non-oil exporting countries wit
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Common Market for Eastern and South
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to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
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fact that countries either export o
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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