EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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was been little impact on revenue resources because of the EPA implementation. This contrasts with the important fiscal reform and institutional changes required after negotiation the DR-CAFTA in 2005. c. Interview results Interviews were conducted in three levels: public official, private business leaders, and independent consultants. Overall there is a very positive perception regarding the outcome of the negotiations. The specific results of some of the responses are presented in different sections of this case study. The sections focus primarily on the administrative arrangements and resources allocated during the negotiations, as well as the challenges of the process that required negotiating on a regional level, through a regional body. On the annex of this report is the list of persons interviewed, with the name of the institutions that they represent. 6. Analysis of cost and benefits from EPAs a. Primary Results From a defensive point of view, the EPA with the commitments to exclude key sensitive production from trade liberalisation, and achieving a long phase off schedules, ranging from 15 to 25 years, represented an important asset for the DR. The EPA represented a new presence in a trade agreement. This assisted in socialising the results with civil society, primarily to the business sector, both in agricultural and industrial sub-sectors. From an offensive perspective, DR exporters obtained duty free quota free access to the EU market on immediate bases, with some exceptions for rice and sugar. Furthermore, it improved market access in apparel, due to the flexibilities in the rules of origin. For the DR, apparel exports have been historically important. Also, they gained access for exporting sugar, this was important as the DR was excluded from the former Sugar Protocol since becoming a member in the Lome Convention. With regards to goods, the DR achieved a very satisfying balance, obtaining access to the EU market, while protecting domestic sensitivities. In services it also obtained additional market access. As a complement, the EPA with its “regional preference” clause has the potential of strengthening regional integration among CARIFORUM countries in areas of goods and services. After signature of the EPA in October 2008, ratification by the Dominican Congress was done at record pace. Both chambers ratified the agreement in less than a week, promulgated by the President days after. The whole process took two weeks. The different chambers of businesses, including the CONEP requested to congressional leaders the prompt ratification of the EPA agreement. 126 This broad support at the 126 http://www.elnuevodiario.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=125387 173
usiness and political levels represents is the best example of the wide ranging support of the results of the negotiations. b. The Cost of a NO-EPA Scenario Although the DR was aware of the potential benefits of achieving an EPA agreement, it also understood the costs of a non-agreement. On one side there was a lack of sensitivities towards market opening due to the changes that took place after the negotiation of the DR-CAFTA. On the other side there was the pressure to reach an agreement so as to impact the exporting sector of the country. Although prior the starting the negotiations only about 10% of Dominican exports were directed to the EU, it represented significant levels for specific subsectors. For some sectors, such as the banana and rum producers, the EU market was the primary market of exports. During 2005, DR exports to EU totalled 472 million Euros, basically all received preferential treatment (0 rated duty) under Cotonou. However, 42% these exports enjoyed preferential access due to Cotonou, and were not covered under the GSP scheme. Because of this there was an important contingency for DR exporters, particularly to banana, cigars, rum, textiles, footwear, cocoa and vegetables producers, if an agreement was not reached before 31 December 2007, when the WTO waiver concluded. This contingency affected 198 million Euros of exports. This was also a big incentive in achieving a desirable agreement by the end of 2007. As the below table shows, the percentage of CARIFORUM not covered by GSP varied significantly from country to country, which presented different levels of local pressures to close a deal before the end of 2007. At the end of the negotiations solidarity among CARICOM members played an important part in reaching a comprehensive agreement. The progress made during these two years regarding other areas of the agreement (services, investment, trade related issues and legal and institutional framework), alongside the political will from key CARICOM members pushed the region to achieve a full EPA. http://www.hoy.com.do/el-pais/2008/11/2/253751/Conep-resalta-los-beneficios-del-APA-asectores-de-negocios 174
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
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Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
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Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
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Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
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Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
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Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
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Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
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trade relation and negotiation matt
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EPAs negotiation process is paralle
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• EPA team The EPA negotiating te
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- State Secretariat of Environment
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Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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Page 133 and 134: ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Page 151 and 152: EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
Page 153 and 154: c. Technical Level At a regional le
Page 155 and 156: 2) From the ministers of trade of C
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Page 163 and 164: Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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Page 167 and 168: Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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Page 179 and 180: 8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182: MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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Page 189 and 190: Reviewing services negotiations in
Page 191 and 192: Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
Page 193 and 194: 3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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Page 197 and 198: 196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Page 205 and 206: than the rate applied on the proces
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Page 209 and 210: Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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