EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

The fact that the DR had previously negotiated an important trade agreement with the
United States, which included all the market opening topics covered by the EPA, gave it
also a certain degree of tolerance to a regional approach, particularly taking into account
that for many issues, such as services, investments, government procurement, and
fiscal concerns regarding market opening in goods, the CARIFORUM overall position
tended to be more conservative than the DR’s.
The CRNM played a key function in every step of the negotiations. During the initial
stages by creating the foundation and awareness, and the middle by supplying technical
expertise to assist in drafting regional positions, offers and counteroffer, and the end by
maintaining the momentum and articulating technical responses to political concerns at
the different levels within CARIFORUM.
Despite its instrumental role in all the stages the CRNM was dismantled and transformed
as the Office the Trade Negotiations (OTN) of the secretary of CARICOM after
culminating the EPA negotiations. The CARICOM is an institution that has been a
sceptical critic of both the process and the outcome of the negotiations.
Since the beginning the CRNM was established as a technical arm of CARICOM to
coordinate trade negotiation on a regional base. In this endeavour the DR was invited to
participate. Its leadership shadowed in some aspects the CARICOM secretariat ambit on
regional negotiations. Therefore, on an institutional base, there existed overlapping of
responsibilities, which generated rivalries.
The CRNM however worked very closely with the main trade ministers of CARICOM
(and CARIFORUM) and it had direct access to head of states in the region. During the
EPA negotiations, Ambassador Richard Bernal served as chief negotiator. Prior to this,
he gained regional recognition during the FTAA negotiations, particularly in the quest to
defend the notion of differential treatment for small and vulnerable economies. Although
the CRNM did not have a legal chapter, its well founded structure, gave direct access to
senior officials and head of states of CARICOM/CARIFORUM countries without having
to channel it through the CARICOM secretariat.
CRNM funds were allocated through direct international donors, CARICOM secretariat
(U.E funds), and by direct contributions of member states.
At the end of the negotiating process of the EPA, there were two distinct groups of
countries in CARIFORUM, those that wanted to meet the deadline of 31 December 2007
achieving a full EPA, and those that wanted to wait, gain time, and possibly more
flexibility by the EU, coordinating this approach with the other ACP negotiating regions.
At the end, the countries that pushed for a full EPA got their way, however not without
the resentment of some CARICOM member states. This regional disagreement at the
end played a key role in the transformation of the CRNM to the OTN. In retrospect the
political trade-off to maintain CARICOM regional cohesion, was to forfeit the CRNM. This
was to offset the discontentment of some member states that wanted to approach the
end of the negotiation on an ACP level. The indirect outcome of this was the
strengthening of the CARICOM secretariat on its role regarding trade negotiations.
The CARICOM countries did want to maintain the CRNM, but at the end it became a
negotiating chip for balancing CARICOM trade interest. Aside from the institutional
aspect of conducting trade negotiations, the signing of the EPA CARICOM fostered a
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