EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID
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Karingi et al<br />
(2005)<br />
“Economic<br />
and Welfare<br />
Impacts of<br />
the EU-Africa<br />
<strong>EPA</strong>s”<br />
Sub-Saharan<br />
Africa as<br />
group and<br />
individuals.<br />
CGE (GTAP 1997) v5<br />
• Scenario 1: SSA reciprocation of EU pref Tariff (all tariff<br />
reduced to EU level).<br />
• Scenario 2: SSA liberalisation. Deeper reg integration<br />
without reciprocity (S-S integration only for supply capacity<br />
building before reciprocation).<br />
• Scenario 3: Full trade liberalisation. EU-SSA <strong>EPA</strong> (all<br />
barriers fully eliminated).<br />
PE (WITS/SMART) 6-digit<br />
• Only looks at reciprocity (i.e. scenario 1). Hence effects of<br />
ACP countries liberalising to EU levels and no lib from EU.<br />
• Standard Armington assumption (imperfect substitutes).<br />
•Export supplies are perfectly elastic.<br />
• Benchmark is 2001-2003.<br />
•SADC treated as SADC and SACU (as BLNS entity).<br />
47<br />
CGE results<br />
• Scenario 1:<br />
SSA: GDP (-0.013%), M (+4.48%), X (+2.3%), ToT(-<br />
0.54%), BoT(-1868$mln), EV(-564)<br />
• Scenario 2:<br />
SSA: GDP (0.5 %), M (+2.41%), X (+1.3%), ToT(0.3%),<br />
BoT(-629.8$mln), EV(1204.3)<br />
•Scenario 3:<br />
SSA: GDP (3.4 %), M (+18.24%), X (+8.8%), ToT(1.8%),<br />
BoT(-5484.3$mln), EV(8028.8)<br />
PE Results<br />
ESA:<br />
•Trade creation largely outweighs trade diversion in all<br />
countries � expanded EU trade (this comes at cost of<br />
less efficient domestic production and regional imports).<br />
•Revenue implications (in absolute terms): strongest for<br />
Kenya, Sudan, Mauritius, Ethiopia, DRC and Seychelles<br />
•Net: trade creation outweighs both TD and revenue<br />
losses<br />
ECOWAS:<br />
•Net trade creating (but loss of intra-regional trade<br />
through trade diversion)<br />
• Revenue implications: strongest for Nigeria and<br />
Ghana.<br />
CEMAC:<br />
•Net trade creating (intra regional trade is low hence little<br />
trade diversion from the region).<br />
• Revenue implications: strongest for Cameroon, Congo<br />
and Gabon<br />
SADC:<br />
• Net trade creating but some loss in intra regional trade<br />
through TD<br />
• Revenue implications: more serious for non SACU<br />
members<br />
Counterfactual<br />
scenario uses<br />
Cotonou<br />
preferences<br />
rather than<br />
possible<br />
enabling<br />
clause<br />
preferences.<br />
PE results<br />
presented in<br />
absolute terms<br />
hence hard to<br />
determine net<br />
effects in the<br />
economy.<br />
PE only looks<br />
at SSA<br />
liberalisation<br />
hence effects<br />
concentrated<br />
on increased<br />
EU market<br />
access and<br />
not SSA<br />
country MA<br />
into the EU.