EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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Despite an agreed joint roadmap at the launch of negotiation on 8 July 2004, the initial composition of SADC EPA configuration like the one in ESA was not without challenge and was unsustainable in terms of existing regional integration initiatives and unspecified role of South Africa. The complication of SADC EPA configuration lies in many aspects, including Angola, a post conflict situation; SDCU common external tariffs and tariff revenue sharing and the existing revenue sharing arrangement complicates the negotiation. This configuration itself undermines SACU. In the end, SADC EPA group was left with Mozambique which signed an interim EPA with the EU, SACU members BLNS singed an interim EPA with the EU and Angola opted out for an interim EPA. It is interesting to note that the SADC EPA signatories have a shorter liberalisation period than the signatories in other EPA groups because its four SACU members needed to align their liberalisation schedules with the de facto one for SACU CET. South Africa, a fifth member of SACU, had previously established this liberalisation schedule when negotiating its TDCA. The BLNS each had its own list of imports schedules from the EU further increasing the tension around the SACU CET; which is already a great obstacle to regional trade integration (Bilal and Steven, 2009). Central Africa EPA Group Central African EPA group consist of eight countries, six of them, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, are members of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) as well as Sao Tome Principe and Democratic Republic of Congo. Sao Tome and Principle and DRC joined the CEMAC for EPA negotiations, but were not involved in any membership of CEMAC. Five countries in this EPA configuration, three members of CEMAC and Sao Tome Principe and Democratic Republic of Congo are LDCs with EBA market access to the EU. CEMAC was created in 1994 as a customs union. Weak or non-implementation by the member countries of the agreed custom union regime highlights a need for renewed political commitments to regional integration. The CET in CEMAC ranges from 5% to 30%, with un-weighted average tariff rate of 19%. The CEMAC Secretariat overseeing compliance with the agreed trade regime lacks the means and authority for carrying out its role. Some key measures such as limiting tariff exemptions, phasing out remaining surcharges and tariff reduction with or without EPAs are needed to improve compliance with requirements for a custom union should be adopted at regional at national level. The export performance in this region has been primarily dominated by the oil sector which is reflected in the increase in the volume and share of oil export in total exports. Since 1997, there has been decline of non-oil exports to GDP, though it began to pick up again in 2005 (table or graph here to show the region trade?). FDI inflows to oil and related sectors in CEMAC have been steadily increasing. There are substantial similarities in nature resources (natural comparative advantages); their production and trade patterns among CEMAC members, like the other regional RTA in Africa, results in limited scope for intra-CEMAC trade. Oil is the main export for many central African countries; other exports are related to wood products and cotton. There is little diversification especially in manufacturing, of six members of CEMAC, only Cameroon has some kind of industrial base. Given its natural resource, production and trade structure, the greatest boost to this region trade in the short to medium term may come from strengthening their domestic supply response and promoting trade with the rest of the world. CEMAC started its EPA discussions with the EU in 2003, Sao Tome, Principle and Democratic Republic of Congo joined CEMAC in the preparation of an EPA, but was not involved in the membership of CEMAC. CEMAC EPA negotiations with the EU made little progress due to divergences in their trade structures, policies and interests. Also given the 221
fact that countries either export oil or have EBA market access, there was little incentive to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement with the EU, which required opening up their markets to the EU exporters. Cameroon, which could lose significant trade preferences if it converts to GSP, is the only country in this EPA configuration has signed its own free-standing country-specific interim EPA with the EU in December 20007. Gabon, another non-LDC, reportedly was also looking to make a similar agreement. On the other hand, Congo and the other LDCs did not consider an interim agreement as an option. All these have made it hard to find a common regional position in the central African region and have impacted the entire regional integration process, which so far, has very limited impact on intra-regional trade. By April 2008, Central Africa was trying to accelerate the process of regional integration by signing a new treaty to improve power of the community law courts, increasing the participation of civil society and transfer some national decision making power to regional level. It is expected but remains to be seen, whether this will have any impacts on accelerating the EPA negotiation process and regional integration. West Africa EPA group The West Africa EPA group consists of the members of ECOWAS, of which eight members also belong to West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) was created between 1996 and 2000 as part of the initiative to boost regional integration and policy effectiveness after the CFA franc was devalued in 1994. Among eight members of the WAEMU, Cote d’Ivoire is the only oil exporting member; Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo are mainly cotton exporters, have been very active in pursuing reform agenda in the WTO negotiations. Their cotton exports have suffered from developed countries subsidies for cotton production as well as increased competition from Brazil and China. Substantial differences in factor costs between WAEMU countries have led to the introduction of NTBs within the WAEMU. These NTBs arise from national trade regulations that are not consistent and in many cases conflict with WAEMU rules. Other sticky issues include landlocked versus coastal; transportation costs and differences in taxes on oil products. WAEMU countries apply the CET to imports from other ECOWAS countries which are not members of WAEMU, as a result these countries apply country-specific tariffs to imports from WAEMU. Like in the Central Africa EPA configuration, the West Africa EPA has a large number of LDCs - 12 out of 16 and many oil-exporting countries, both have little to gain in the near future to enter trade agreements with the EU. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire which are not LDCs, are the only two ECOWAS countries that have signed interim EPA with the EU. None of the 12 LDCs in the ECOWAS have signed an interim EPA, nor has Nigeria or Cape Verde. During the EPA negotiations between the ECOWAS and EU, it shows the internal divergence in terms of interest between LDCs and non-LDCs, oil and non-oil exporting countries, and the finalisation and completion of ECOWAS common external tariffs as the establishment of a custom union. There are several barriers with regards to the establishment of common external tariff within the ECOWAS. Currently there are four bands in the WAEMU, 0%, 5%, 10% and 20%. Nigeria, the biggest economy in the region demands the establishment of fifth band at 50% to protect its own pharmaceutical industry. By August 2009, little progress had been made with regards to the scope of ECOWAS common external tariffs. The CARIFORUM EPA The CARIFORUM adopted a different approach to regional trade integration to the African region. The incentives facing CARIFORUM countries when they negotiated their EPA were very different from African countries. Most participants of CARIFORUM are not LDCs, and are actually much more developed and with much higher incomes than African counterparts. They also have relatively strong incentives to enter into EPA to preserve preferential market 222
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
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Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
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Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
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Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
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Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
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Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
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Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
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trade relation and negotiation matt
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EPAs negotiation process is paralle
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• EPA team The EPA negotiating te
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- State Secretariat of Environment
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Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Page 173 and 174: 5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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Page 177 and 178: expectation of increases in exports
Page 179 and 180: 8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182: MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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Page 185 and 186: o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Page 189 and 190: Reviewing services negotiations in
Page 191 and 192: Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
Page 193 and 194: 3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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Page 197 and 198: 196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Page 205 and 206: than the rate applied on the proces
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Page 209 and 210: Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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Page 215 and 216: arrangements, are constrained by pr
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Page 221: to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
Page 225 and 226: development assistance in the EPA.
Page 227 and 228: References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
Page 229 and 230: SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
Page 231 and 232: The SPS committee provides an oppor
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Page 239 and 240: Specific provisions While the final
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Page 243 and 244: imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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Page 247 and 248: So what have the EPA negotiations a
Page 249 and 250: Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
Page 251 and 252: EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
Page 253 and 254: EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
Page 255 and 256: EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
Page 257 and 258: Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
Page 259 and 260: Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
Page 261 and 262: evenues, one of the main sources of
Page 263: References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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