EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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three processes were going on simultaneously, process of reaching within-region consensus, process of West Africa-EU EPA negotiations itself, and harmonisation of policies to ensure the smooth take off of EPA. The first and the last are coordinated by the ECOWAS Commission but the Nigerian negotiators believe that ECOWAS lack the capacity to engage in all of these activities, in particular, with few professional staff in the Department of Trade (about two or three) while others are non-permanent staff that work on contract basis and sometimes funded by the EU. One main objective of the EPA is to promote sustainable development. It remains an instrument of development but some of the prerequisites of the Cotonou agreement, for instance article 37 paragraph 3, which talked about capacity building before the conclusion of the negotiations, were not met. Capacity building in the private sector to make sure that supply side constraints can be removed is not forthcoming yet. Therefore, EPA could be an instrument of development but could also be a disaster for Nigeria. If it is negotiated properly by appropriate manoeuvring, or calibration, for example by protecting sensitive products that are critical drivers of domestic growth, EPA will at the end allow progress and development to be made. But if those critical areas are exposed to undue competition by too rapid liberalisation, development would be undermined as factories close down, workers become jobless and poverty deepens. But if through EPA, they are protected and EPA resources are additionally used to revitalise weak firms through infrastructure and management support, development will likely follow such an approach. The selection of sensitive products at the national level should go a long way in achieving such protection. However aggregation is ongoing at the regional level and at the end of which, some products selected by Nigeria may be compromised to reach regional consensus. Market access, development and the rule regarding dispute settlement aspects have been particularly difficult to negotiate. The nature, institutional framework, evaluation, and compensation mechanisms etc. have not been defined. Specifically, the main divergences are: • The exclusion of the UEMOA Community Solidarity Levy (CSL) and of ECOWAS Community Levy (CL) from the tariff liberalisation process (WA position).The WA region and the EU are searching for a constructive solution to ensure the regional organisations' revenues continues; with joint legal analysis to be carried out. • The possibility for WA region to review the liberalisation timetable initially agreed in the framework of the supporting measures for the development of agricultural and industrial policies (WA position). The text of the article is nearly agreed; however, when it comes to this decision the role of the EPA Joint Council in this decision is yet to be agreed. • The definition of customs duties in the EPA; a joint text has been agreed. • The elimination of WA export taxes (EC position); a joint text has been agreed. • The period for the implementation within WA of the free practice regime in order to facilitate the free movement of goods (EC Position); a joint text has been agreed. • The MFN clause which would oblige WA region to automatically grant to the EC all future benefits offered to third countries, including some emerging countries considered as major commercial partners, (EC position); The senior officials in Dakar had a general debate on senior officials level, on the basis of chief negotiators discussions, opening a way to a more structured debate by experts. • The elimination of all export subsidies and substantial and speedy reduction of internal support which are likely to create distortions in terms of trade in the WA region (WA position); discussions ongoing (particularly the impact of these subsidies in trade with WA). 137
• The simultaneous application of anti-dumping and compensatory measures on the same products especially when one of the measures is not sufficient to repair the damage caused (WA position); A joint text on trade defence instruments has been agreed. • The elimination of the need for clearing agents and pre-boarding inspection (EC position); the parties have agreed to respect the WTO Agreement on pre-shipment inspections. The Parties recognise the desirability of moving towards the elimination of all requirements relating to pre-shipment or destination inspections and will tackle this question in the special committee on customs and trade facilitation. This is not an issue anymore. • The mutual obligation to prevent exports of prohibited products (due to standard and safety reasons) to the other party’s territory, except when the relevant authorities of the importing party otherwise allows (WA position); the text on SPS – TBT has already been agreed between the parties. • Application of the principle of asymmetry in the rules conferring originating status and the possibility to cumulate with all developing countries (WA position); this is an area of disagreement. However, substantial progress was made in Rules of Origin in the last negotiating session in Dakar. • The inclusion of a non-execution clause that introduces a link between the issues related to trade and political dialogue (EC position); this is an area where there is yet an agreement. • The treatment for investment and competition which for WA should be limited to provision on cooperation with the view to reinforce capacities in the region (WA position); the chief negotiators decided in June 2009 to adopt a two-phase approach to the negotiations. These should be carried out as follows: an intensive phase of negotiation with a view to reaching agreement by October 2009 on a regional EPA covering trade in goods, EPA-related development cooperation and certain trade-related issues; a phase initiated no later than January 2010 with a view to broaden the negotiations in order to cover the remaining topics which will complete the regional EPA. The Chief negotiators also recognised the importance of trade-related rules in the regional integration context, as an instrument for the modernisation of the business environment, for improving economic governance, and for attracting investment capital. Investment and competition will then be considered in the second stage. • Taking into account infrastructures in the EPA framework for the development of RIP 10 th EDF (WA position); Infrastructure is one of the five main axes of the EPA Development Program, and that is what the EC is using as its basis to support the EPA. While it may seem sensible for services negotiation and the Singapore issues to remain at the multilateral level so that it would be easier to negotiate and look forward to a “goods only” agreement rather than group together certain issues like competition, intellectual property, services, which make negotiations complex, it may be right to simultaneously negotiate all EPA issues from the development and not a trade perspective. The enthusiasm for EPA as a viable development instrument that has anti-poverty and human focus is a situation whereby economic liberalisation could fast track development. This is particularly in relation to what countries in the West African region can do for themselves to benefit and cut off the dependency syndrome by replacing aid with trade. The stronger and more economically independent countries there are in the region the more benefits for all the countries in the region. Therefore, a more holistic negotiating agenda such as currently structured is more development-friendly than ‘goods only’ EPA. Nonetheless, it will naturally take more time to complete negotiations the more issues there are to negotiate. There is adequate technical advisory capacity on all the issues in Nigeria, e.g. technical advisory committee on services, on WTO, etc., but it is the lack of political will to appropriately use this capacity that is problematic. Nigeria in turn, has the ability to drive ECOWAS to reduce the time constraint. 138
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
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Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
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Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
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Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
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Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
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Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
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Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
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trade relation and negotiation matt
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EPAs negotiation process is paralle
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• EPA team The EPA negotiating te
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- State Secretariat of Environment
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Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
Page 87 and 88: System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 89 and 90: Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
Page 91 and 92: Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
Page 93 and 94: Dominican Republic Distribution of
Page 95 and 96: 1. Overview of existing resources f
Page 97 and 98: The FTRD that was responsible for b
Page 99 and 100: The support of the NDTPF and the ex
Page 101 and 102: dedicated sessions during the year
Page 103 and 104: Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
Page 105 and 106: 3. Quantification of costs of count
Page 107 and 108: Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
Page 109 and 110: 4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
Page 111 and 112: 5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
Page 113 and 114: ) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
Page 115 and 116: Council of ESA Ministers Committee
Page 117 and 118: System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 119 and 120: List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
Page 121 and 122: EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
Page 123 and 124: contains the quantification of cost
Page 125 and 126: which appear to have crowded out ac
Page 127 and 128: Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
Page 129 and 130: Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
Page 131 and 132: Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
Page 133 and 134: ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
Page 135 and 136: Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
Page 137: Though the current negotiating stru
Page 141 and 142: understand the changing environment
Page 143 and 144: 7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
Page 145 and 146: opportunity cost could be quite sub
Page 147 and 148: • There is adequate technical adv
Page 149 and 150: 5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
Page 151 and 152: EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
Page 153 and 154: c. Technical Level At a regional le
Page 155 and 156: 2) From the ministers of trade of C
Page 157 and 158: The fact that the DR had previously
Page 159 and 160: - State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
Page 161 and 162: Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
Page 163 and 164: Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
Page 165 and 166: with the EU, in order to present a
Page 167 and 168: Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
Page 169 and 170: In additional there were eight meet
Page 171 and 172: Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
Page 173 and 174: 5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
Page 175 and 176: usiness and political levels repres
Page 177 and 178: expectation of increases in exports
Page 179 and 180: 8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182: MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
Page 183 and 184: o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
Page 185 and 186: o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
Page 187 and 188: Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
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Reviewing services negotiations in
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Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
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3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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In this exercise, it is important t
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196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
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products could be extended until ye
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extended to the original partner. F
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than the rate applied on the proces
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RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
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Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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that value added in ACP countries o
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The EU has yet to deliver a simple
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arrangements, are constrained by pr
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and non-oil exporting countries wit
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Common Market for Eastern and South
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to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
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fact that countries either export o
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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