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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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‘The Parties will apply the principle of zoning or compartmentalisation when<br />

defining import conditions, taking into account international standards. Zones<br />

or compartments of defined sanitary or phytosanitary status may also be<br />

identified and proposed jointly by the Parties, on a case by case basis,<br />

wherever possible, in order to avoid disruption to trade.’<br />

This does not appear to go beyond the existing commitments of WTO Members, but rather<br />

simply recognises the potential role that regionalisation might play in facilitating trade and<br />

reiterates the commitments of the signatories. Note that there is no reference to<br />

regionalisation in the final CARIFORUM agreement or the interim agreement between the<br />

EU and the Pacific states; this concept is not relevant to small islands states.<br />

The ability of most countries participating in the <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations to undertake pest risk<br />

assessments (PRAs), to define and/or maintain pest- or disease-free areas and to<br />

demonstrate the status of these area is extremely limited. For example, the Phytosanitary<br />

Capacity Evaluation (PCE) tool of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in<br />

more than 60 developing countries indicates widespread weaknesses in controls on plant<br />

pests and diseases (Day et al, 2006). This suggests that most of the signatory countries will<br />

struggle to take advantage of the regionalisation provision of the SPS Agreement, and of the<br />

related provisions in the <strong>EPA</strong> agreements.<br />

Transparency and information exchange<br />

All of the final and interim agreements put great emphasis on transparency between the<br />

parties in terms of current and proposed SPS measures. In a large part, the related<br />

provisions simply restate and reaffirm the transparency obligations and procedures of the<br />

SPS Agreement. Thus, Article 45 Part 2 of the interim agreement between the EC and<br />

Central Africa states:<br />

‘The parties reaffirm their obligations under the WTO SPS and TBT<br />

Agreements to inform each other of changes to the relevant standards or<br />

technical regulations through the mechanisms established by the agreement.’<br />

The SPS Agreement requires that WTO Members establish a National Enquiry Point and<br />

National Notification Authority for the purposes of providing notifications of proposed new<br />

SPS measures and a channel through which further information about these proposed<br />

measures can be solicited from other WTO Members. It is evident from<br />

Table 9 that a number of parties to the <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations that are WTO Members have not<br />

complied with this obligation. Further, as noted above, parties to the <strong>EPA</strong> negotiations that<br />

are not currently WTO Members commit themselves to these obligations. Thus, the first<br />

step for a number of ACP countries will be establishing the necessary WTO-compliant<br />

transparency mechanisms.<br />

A number of the final and interim agreements, however, appear to envisage more direct and<br />

active channels of communications on SPS matters than those provided by the SPS<br />

Agreement. Thus, Article 57 of the final agreement between the EC and CARIFORUM<br />

states:<br />

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