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Table 1 African EPA Country Groups in Relation to Existing Regional Trade Areas West Africa: Central Africa: Eastern and Southern Africa: Southern Africa: ECOWAS EPA-Group (16) 1 CEMAC-EPA Group (8) ESA EPA-Group (11) SADC EPA Group(7) ECOWAS FTA CEMAC Customs Union ESA (COMESA) 3 Signed EPAs Signed EPAs Signed EPAs Signed EPAs Ghana Cameroon Comoros (L) Mozambique (L) Not signing EPAs Not signing EPAs Madagascar (L) Not signing EPAs Cape Verde Central African Republic (L) Mauritius Angola (L) Gambia (L) 2 Chad (L) Seychelles Guinea (L) Republic of Congo Zimbabwe SACU Liberia (L) Gabon Not signing EPAs 4 Nigeria Equatorial Guinea (L) Djibouti (L) Signed EPAs Sierra Leone (L) Eritrea (L) Botswana Other Central Africa Ethiopia (L) Lesotho (L) UEMOA Malawi (L) Namibia Not signing EPAs Sudan (L) Swaziland Signed EPAs Sao Tome and Principe (L) Zambia (L) Not signing EPAs Cote d'Ivoire D.R. Congo (L) South Africa 6 Not signing EPAs Eastern and Southern Africa: Benin (L) EAC EPA-Group (5) Burkina Faso (L) Guinea-Bissau (L) EAC Mali (L) Niger (L) Signed EPAs Senegal (L) Kenya Togo (L) Rwanda (L) Uganda (L) Other West Africa Burundi (L) Tanzania (L) Not signing EPAs Mauritania (L) 1 Number of countries in EPA-Group. 2 "(L)" denotes a Least Developed Country. 3 Other COMESA members not participating in the ESA EPA group: Angola (L), Egypt, Libya, Namibia, Swaziland, D.R. Congo (L). 4 Somalia (the 48th country in SSA) is not participating in EPA negotiations but, as an LDC, is eligible for the EU's EBA program. 5 Other SADC members not participating in the SADC EPA group: D.R. Congo (L), Madagascar (L), Malawi (L), Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia (L), Zimbabwe. 6 South Africa has an existing free trade agreement with the EU -- the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). NOTE: These classifications reflect the situation as of January 2008. 227 SADC 5
SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. Background The ACP countries have variously benefitted from unilateral preferential access to EU markets under various trade agreements, including the Lomé Convention/Cotonou Agreement and the “Everything but Arms” initiative. There are concerns, however, that many of these countries have been unable to exploit fully the preferential access to EU markets that they enjoy, notably for agricultural and food products. In part, this is due to their limited ability to meet regulatory and/or market requirements with respect to food safety and quality, and also plant and animal health (Chemnitz and Gunther, 2006). Within the EU, food safety regulations have been reformed and enhanced, including the oversight of imports from Third Countries. 155 At the same time, private food safety standards have evolved, in part as a response to ongoing regulatory reform, adding a new layer to the requirements that agricultural and food imports must satisfy (Henson and Humphrey, 2009). In stark contrast, food safety and plant and animal health controls in many ACP countries are weak and fail to meet even minimum international norms. It is argued that such capacity weaknesses are a critical constraint to the efforts of these countries to enhance their exports to the EU, while recognising that some ACP countries have managed to establish appreciable positions in EU markets despite of (or even because of) the strict food safety and other requirements with which they must comply. There is mounting evidence that the costs of compliance faced by developing countries in general can act to preclude market access and/or erode competiveness. Indeed, some suggest that the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures faced by developing countries are now of greater concern that traditional barriers to trade such as tariffs (Doherty, 2003). This has stimulated significant flows of donor assistance to both the public and private sectors aimed at capacity enhancement, positing the trade performance of the ACP countries as essentially an issue of compliance (World Bank, 2005). It has also served to focus attention on the legitimacy of the food safety and plant and animal health controls implemented by the EU in the context of the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the so-called ‘SPS Agreement). We also observe that bilateral trade agreements between the EU and a number of developing countries have made efforts to address the potential trade barriers associated with SPS measures, for example by establishing arrangements for addressing disputes over SPS measures outside of the WTO (Rudloff and Simons, 2006). It is thus, perhaps, not unsurprising that the negotiations surrounding the EPAs between the ACP states and EU have, to varying degrees, touched on SPS issues. 2. Evidence that SPS measures are a problem for ACP countries There is a great deal of commentary (and indeed a considerable amount of rhetoric) that suggests the ACP countries are impeded in their ability to benefit from the preferential access they have to EU markets because of the SPS measures that are applied. While there are periodic accusations that these measures are unjustified, although not always in the context of the rights and obligations afforded by the SPS Agreement, the predominant focus of the debate is on overcoming the obstacles faced by developing countries. Thus, there are calls for ‘special and differential treatment’ as called for in the SPS Agreement, including additional time in which to achieve compliance, requests for technical assistance, etc. Much of the discourse on problems faced by ACP countries in complying with SPS measures on exporting to the EU revolves around country and/or sector-specific case 155 For example, through the enactment of Regulation (EC) 882/2004. 228
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EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
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Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
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Part One: Literature Review 4
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countries demanded more precision a
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essential and fundamental of EPA (h
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EPA group. However, after phase II
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Disagreements also existed on other
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ules of origin as a basis for negot
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would not meet WTO provisions. Even
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is only just about to conclude an i
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The EC took almost nine months to a
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Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
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services, CARIFORUM countries commi
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2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
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Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
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4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
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creation) but can also lead to impo
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preferences and hence are likely to
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3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
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Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
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SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
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Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
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Whilst most studies appear to agree
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7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
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Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
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Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
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Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
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Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
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Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
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Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
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trade relation and negotiation matt
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EPAs negotiation process is paralle
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• EPA team The EPA negotiating te
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- State Secretariat of Environment
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Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
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5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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usiness and political levels repres
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Page 179 and 180: 8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182: MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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Page 185 and 186: o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Page 189 and 190: Reviewing services negotiations in
Page 191 and 192: Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
Page 193 and 194: 3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
Page 195 and 196: In this exercise, it is important t
Page 197 and 198: 196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
Page 199 and 200: Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
Page 201 and 202: products could be extended until ye
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Page 205 and 206: than the rate applied on the proces
Page 207 and 208: RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
Page 209 and 210: Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
Page 211 and 212: that value added in ACP countries o
Page 213 and 214: The EU has yet to deliver a simple
Page 215 and 216: arrangements, are constrained by pr
Page 217 and 218: and non-oil exporting countries wit
Page 219 and 220: Common Market for Eastern and South
Page 221 and 222: to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
Page 223 and 224: fact that countries either export o
Page 225 and 226: development assistance in the EPA.
Page 227: References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
Page 231 and 232: The SPS committee provides an oppor
Page 233 and 234: of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
Page 235 and 236: In the case of Ghana, where there i
Page 237 and 238: which relevant entities within thei
Page 239 and 240: Specific provisions While the final
Page 241 and 242: ‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
Page 243 and 244: imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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Page 247 and 248: So what have the EPA negotiations a
Page 249 and 250: Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
Page 251 and 252: EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
Page 253 and 254: EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
Page 255 and 256: EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
Page 257 and 258: Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
Page 259 and 260: Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
Page 261 and 262: evenues, one of the main sources of
Page 263: References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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