EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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Despite the progress, the signing of a full EPA will depend on the EAC’s own integration process and the solution of the differences within them. Southern Africa When negotiations were launched in December 2004, South Africa was not part of the SADC EPA negotiation group since its commercial relations with the EU were covered by the South African-EU Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). The SADC, since the beginning, took the stance that the TDCA would have implications on the SADC-EU EPA negotiations. The EC felt that individual countries could only be a member of a single trading arrangement with the EC. This would imply that some countries would have to make difficult choices given the complexity of overlapping regional bodies in the South African region. As a consequence, it was considered that the reciprocal tariff elimination of the TDCA would constitute the basis for any SADC-EU EPA and that was not designed with its neighbours needs in mind. This problem (partially solved with the inclusion of South Africa as a negotiation party in the SADC-EU EPA) would have important implications in the negotiation process. 42 The negotiation process started with the preparation of several studies to serve as a basis for negotiations. It was agreed that the SADC EPA should include development dimensions and regional integration; SPS and TBTs; market access (agriculture, fisheries and non-agricultural goods); rules of origin; trade facilitation and customs cooperation; safeguards, antidumping and countervailing measures; TRIPs; services; and other aspects such as national security and dispute settlement. By the end of 2005, the EU asked South Africa to be more involved in the negotiation process, but still it was only an observer. The EC also asked to have a CET by 2008; however the SADC agenda scheduled one for 2010. SADC wanted, on the contrary, to conclude EPA’s before the establishment of the CET. 43 SADC indicated the difficulty of negotiating on issues where common policies did not exist in SADC and for which there were no modalities at the WTO. The EC proposed to cover topics such as competition policy, investment, government procurement, environment and labour standards in the negotiations while SADC considered that those trade related issues should not be negotiated. 44 The configuration of the negotiating group remained problematic during 2006. However, SADC presented its proposal for the negotiation framework in February 2006. It asked that all member states of the South African Customs Union (SACU) should be involved in both the EPA negotiations and the TDCA review. This meant that South Africa would be a negotiating party in the EPA. Also, that the EU should grant full EBA market access to all SADC members states and for LDCs to be exempt from providing market access to the EU. Rules of origin should be simplified and allow for full cumulation in SADC, other ACP countries and all other regions that had trade agreements with the EU. Finally, it demanded specific commitments in terms of financial support and capacity building to address supply constraints, compensation of fiscal losses and increase competitiveness. 42 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2004. 43 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2006. 44 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2006. 19
The EC took almost nine months to answer to this proposal. During that time, there was very little progress. The reason for this delay was that this proposal may have had complex political and economic issues. Moreover, a change in the EU mandate was required to include South Africa as a negotiating partner. Eventually, South Africa was accepted in the SADC EPA. The EC rejected SADC’s request that EBA be considered on a non-reciprocal basis in the EPA since it would not be WTO compatible. The LDCs could remain EBA beneficiaries and be associated to the EPA only on the basis on non-tariff provisions. On the other hand, to preserve the coherence of the SADC region with separate EU trade regime, a system of control for rules of origin and autonomous safeguard mechanism to protect EU markets would be designed. Eventually, renegotiations were re-launched in February 2007. However, modifications to the roadmap were required, delaying negotiations even more. 45 SADC continued to request a development chapter that would provide a legally binding commitment for the provision of EU development support. The EC insisted that the level of support would be determined by the level of commitment taken in the EPA and that there was no need for further commitments. It was agreed to establish a regional EPA fund to finance EPA related development and adjustment needs. On the overlapping memberships within regional communities, SADC considered that Lesotho’s status as an LDC needed to be considered in negotiations. Moreover, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania were individual customs territories that should make separate market access offers to the EU. In terms of services, with the exception of South Africa, SADC members were willing to treat the issue given the crucial development role the sector could play in their economies. This generated tensions between members given the reluctance of South Africa to negotiate broadly in this issue The changes in the configuration of the EPA made the negotiations harder. SADC, SACU but also Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania needed to prepare their offers. The SACU offer generated some tensions given the difficulty to accommodate all parties. Particularly key was the problem of the sensitivities of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BNLS) in an offer that was influenced by the TDCA. By mid 2007, Tanzania left SADC and join EAC negotiation group. 46 In market access, Angola faced problems to prepare their offer and preferred to keep EBA. Agricultural products and fisheries remained to be the most problematic areas in preparing the market access offers. Moreover, services generated frictions in the block. SADC proposed to exclude South Africa from the commitments in services while the EU considered that it should be included. Furthermore, when the time of the deadline was approaching and interim EPAs were proposed, South Africa showed some concern that at some point it would need to make commitments on TRI. 47 Eventually Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique initialled interim EPAs and South Africa opted out. They eventually, continued accessing the EU through TDCA. 45 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2007. 46 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 6, No. 4, August 2007. 47 Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol.6, No. 7, December 2007. 20
Page 1 and 2: EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
Page 3 and 4: Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
Page 5 and 6: Part One: Literature Review 4
Page 7 and 8: countries demanded more precision a
Page 9 and 10: essential and fundamental of EPA (h
Page 11 and 12: EPA group. However, after phase II
Page 13 and 14: Disagreements also existed on other
Page 15 and 16: ules of origin as a basis for negot
Page 17 and 18: would not meet WTO provisions. Even
Page 19: is only just about to conclude an i
Page 23 and 24: Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
Page 25 and 26: services, CARIFORUM countries commi
Page 27 and 28: 2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
Page 29 and 30: Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
Page 31 and 32: 4. Final comments The EPA’s negot
Page 33 and 34: creation) but can also lead to impo
Page 35 and 36: preferences and hence are likely to
Page 37 and 38: 3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
Page 39 and 40: Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
Page 41 and 42: SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
Page 43 and 44: Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
Page 45 and 46: Whilst most studies appear to agree
Page 47 and 48: 7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
Page 49 and 50: Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
Page 51 and 52: Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
Page 53 and 54: Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
Page 55 and 56: Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
Page 57 and 58: Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
Page 59 and 60: Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
Page 61 and 62: trade relation and negotiation matt
Page 63 and 64: EPAs negotiation process is paralle
Page 65 and 66: • EPA team The EPA negotiating te
Page 67 and 68: - State Secretariat of Environment
Page 69 and 70: Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
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spent for these impact assessment s
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Other opportunity costs Another imp
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Since domestic constituencies tend
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Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
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• An estimated $214,000 in travel
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The main expectation of the process
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Commission was forced to take up th
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Therefore, while negotiators could
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
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Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
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Dominican Republic Distribution of
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1. Overview of existing resources f
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The FTRD that was responsible for b
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The support of the NDTPF and the ex
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dedicated sessions during the year
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Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
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3. Quantification of costs of count
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Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
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4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
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5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
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) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
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Council of ESA Ministers Committee
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System Improvement & Human Resource
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List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
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EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
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contains the quantification of cost
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which appear to have crowded out ac
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Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
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Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
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Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
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ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
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Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
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Though the current negotiating stru
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• The simultaneous application of
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understand the changing environment
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7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
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opportunity cost could be quite sub
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• There is adequate technical adv
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5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
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EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
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c. Technical Level At a regional le
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2) From the ministers of trade of C
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The fact that the DR had previously
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- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
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Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
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Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
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with the EU, in order to present a
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Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
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In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
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5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
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usiness and political levels repres
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expectation of increases in exports
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8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
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MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
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o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
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o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
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Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
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Reviewing services negotiations in
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Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
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3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
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In this exercise, it is important t
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196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
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Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
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products could be extended until ye
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extended to the original partner. F
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than the rate applied on the proces
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RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
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Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
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that value added in ACP countries o
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The EU has yet to deliver a simple
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arrangements, are constrained by pr
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and non-oil exporting countries wit
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Common Market for Eastern and South
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to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
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fact that countries either export o
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development assistance in the EPA.
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References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
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SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
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The SPS committee provides an oppor
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of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
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In the case of Ghana, where there i
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which relevant entities within thei
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Specific provisions While the final
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‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
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imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
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of the EC Party when these products
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So what have the EPA negotiations a
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Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
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EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
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EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
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Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
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Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
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evenues, one of the main sources of
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References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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