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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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that value added in ACP countries often falls well below the thresholds of the EU RoO<br />

regimes. Whilst the results may be driven by an aggregation bias given that the threshold is<br />

applied at the product and firm level and not at the industry level, the results remain striking<br />

and raise important development concerns.<br />

Another often argued problem with the VA rule is that countries may suffer from exchange<br />

rate volatility effects. These may affect the VA calculation of foreign inputs and hence<br />

endanger the application of preferences. A country may meet the VA criteria in one year, but<br />

may not do so the following. To avoid such problems, the rules generally take into account<br />

average VA during a period of three years, but this does not completely eliminate the<br />

problem. This example underlines the need to go further in the application of RoO if<br />

development concerns are to be tackled. From this perspective, it is not obvious what an<br />

ideal RoO would look like. This is explicitly recognised in TAXUD (2007:2) where they<br />

conclude that the impact assessment carried out does “not demonstrate that a single method<br />

is indispensible to simplification or development-friendliness”. Harris (2008) argues that both<br />

lax and strict RoO have similar effects on development. If the goal is to increase productive<br />

capacity in developing countries, then too lax a rule is likely to make preferential countries<br />

transhipment hubs where little industrial production occurs. Alternatively, if the rule is very<br />

strict, then the developing country is not likely to be able to benefit from the preferences<br />

granted. It is therefore clear that, in the case of a VA rule, a low value added will serve as<br />

little as a high value added threshold. It follows that the threshold should be within a range.<br />

However, even if we assume that it is possible to find the appropriate range for a given<br />

country it may be farfetched to assume that this threshold level would serve other countries<br />

party to the same RoO regime. In addition, critics of the VA rule argue that it requires firms to<br />

engage in accounting procedures that may be costly.<br />

5. Differences Across EU RoO regimes<br />

Leaving aside the intrinsic difficulties of finding a fully development-friendly rule governing<br />

the attribution of origin, and given that an econometric assessment is well beyond the scope<br />

of this study, some implications for development are drawn by looking at the changes in time<br />

and across RoO regimes. For ACP countries there are three major regimes that apply.<br />

These are the GSP, the Cotonou and the <strong>EPA</strong> regimes. Whilst the GSP RoO regime has<br />

been around the longest (since 1993), the Cotonou (2000) and the <strong>EPA</strong> (2008) regimes<br />

remain, in essence, very similar (Naumann, 2008). Since 2000, ACP countries have<br />

benefited from Cotonou RoO which had provisions for full cumulation across all ACP<br />

countries. However, since 2008, ACP countries are subject to either the GSP or the <strong>EPA</strong><br />

regimes. According to Naumann (2008), the <strong>EPA</strong> regime brings minimal changes in the<br />

general RoO legislation. The main changes occur in the annexes and are to do with<br />

simplifications and concession for agricultural products and textiles and clothing. ‘Wholly<br />

obtained’ definitions are redefined, and lists of insufficient processing operations are<br />

expanded. RoO on fisheries are also significantly revised with important simplifications of<br />

conditions relating to vessels. Where cumulation is concerned, countries that have signed or<br />

initialled the <strong>EPA</strong>s/I<strong>EPA</strong>s can cumulate with each other but not with countries that have not<br />

signed. Hence to a certain degree, the change in conditions is a worsening of the terms that<br />

applied with Cotonou. It is not directly clear what the implications are for countries which<br />

have not initialled the <strong>EPA</strong>/I<strong>EPA</strong>s but they are likely to fall under the GSP RoO. However,<br />

the EC has, during the last five years, been reviewing its RoO practice in view of simplifying<br />

it and using it as a tool for development. In this respect, the similarity of rules across the<br />

Cotonou and <strong>EPA</strong> regimes marks the little progress that has been made in finding an<br />

appropriate regime that allows countries to utilise the preferences granted. This is why the<br />

<strong>EPA</strong>/I<strong>EPA</strong> agreements include a clause that foresees a review of the RoO in a pre-<br />

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