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EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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3. Quantification of costs of counterfactual negotiations<br />

The EBA is a unilateral offer by the EU which does not hold any binding commitment. It is argued<br />

by some that the danger remains that if the EU withdraws the offer at any point and they could<br />

advise countries like Ethiopia (non-WTO members) to give prior attention in concluding the <strong>EPA</strong>.<br />

However, others argue that, though the EBA seems a unilateral offer, in reality it is the result of a<br />

multilateral commitment that all developed and developing countries including the EU, committed<br />

to extend Duty-Free-Quota-Free (DFQF) market access to all LDCs, whether WTO or non-WTO<br />

members. Therefore, withdrawal of the EBA seems remote. Moreover, there will be moral onerous<br />

on the EU if it tries to deny such preferences to poor LDCs like that of Ethiopia merely for not<br />

being WTO member.<br />

Second and most important is that, though not clearly stated as “EBA” in the Cotonou Agreement,<br />

Article 37 (9) offers similar preference like that of the EBA. 105 Therefore one can conclude that<br />

even though the EBA seems to be a unilateral offer, it is actually an offer provided as a result of<br />

an agreement.<br />

In fact for Ethiopia, the impact does not have any difference. Firstly, the duty of main export of<br />

Ethiopia to the EU are either already 0% or are covered under the GSP DFQF Preference.<br />

Secondly it is arguable that the EBA is covered under the Cotonou. Therefore, there was no<br />

specific pressure to negotiate the <strong>EPA</strong> or acceding to the WTO.<br />

However, Ethiopia voluntarily decided to rigorously negotiate the <strong>EPA</strong> with EC rather than<br />

entirely rely on the unilateral EBA/GSP offered at the goodwill of the EU.<br />

For Ethiopia, the motive and driving force to negotiate <strong>EPA</strong> (and continues to be) overriding<br />

trade and/or market access that they may get from this envisioned <strong>EPA</strong>, was the promise and<br />

potential benefits clearly stated on the Cotonou Agreement. Article 34-37 of the Cotonou<br />

Agreement clearly states the objectives, principles, modalities and procedures of the Economic<br />

Partnership Agreement.<br />

Box-1:- Objectives, Principles, Modalities and Procedures of the <strong>EPA</strong><br />

Article-34, Objectives states that;<br />

• … aim at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP States into<br />

the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and<br />

development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and<br />

contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries,<br />

• … to play a full part in international trade…. to participate actively in<br />

multilateral trade negotiations, … aim at enhancing the production, supply<br />

and trading capacity of the ACP countries as well as their capacity to attract<br />

investment.<br />

Under ARTICLE 35, Principles it is stated that;<br />

• … shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind<br />

that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP<br />

countries into the world economy,<br />

• … shall take account of the different needs and levels of development of the<br />

105 Article 37 (9) “…at the latest 2005 will allow duty free access for essentially all products from all LDC<br />

building on the level of the existing trade provisions … that apply to their exports”<br />

104

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