EPA Review Annex Documents - DFID

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Table 4 Main Differences in Provisions Between EPAs Cariforum CEMAC Ghana Cote d’Ivoire Export Tariffs Elimination in 3 years Trade in goods No new introduction increase or 29 No new introduction increase or No new introduction or increase Standstill provision No Yes Yes Yes New Rules of Yes No. Cotonou No. Cotonou No. Cotonou Origin applies applies applies MFN clause Yes. Yes Yes Yes Scope Some provisions. Services No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet Commitment to re enter negotiations MFN Clause in 5 years Yes. No applicable No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet if both parties Standstill clause agree No No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet PACP ESA Trade in goods EAC SADC minus Export Tariffs Elimated with No new No new No new exceptions. introduction or introduction or introduction or increase increase increase Standstill provision Yes. Only in Yes Yes Yes. Only in products liberalised products liberalised. New Origin Rules of Yes Yes Yes Yes MFN clause Yes. Escape Yes Yes Yes, except South clause Africa Scope No provisions yet. Services No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet MFN Clause No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet Standstill clause No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet No provisions yet Table 5 Schedule and Coverage of Concessions for the Interim EPAs Coverage Time frame EAC 82% 25 years Comoros 80.6% 15 years Madagascar 80.7% 15 years Mauritius 95.6% 15 years Seychelles 97.5% 15 years Zimbabwe 80% 15 years BNLS 86% 10 years Mozambique 80.5% 10 years Cameroon 80% 15 years Cote d’Ivoire 80.8% 15 years Ghana 80.5% 15 years CARIFORUM 86.9% 15 years Fiji 81% 15 years Papua New Guinea 88% 15 years
4. Final comments The EPA’s negotiation process has been long, complicated and is still open. The quantity of countries involved has imposed a major challenge in the negotiations that was not adequately addressed by the formation of the EPA negotiation groups. From one perspective, the EU is an established body with developed institutions and high levels of regional integration, the EPA negotiation groups have shown that the lack of integration and institutions have affected their possibility of reaching agreements within the groups, as a previous step to negotiate an agreement with the EU. From an alternative stance, the EPAs had great hopes of attaching these agreements to a commitment of higher levels of assistance from the EU in the form of development and adjustment aid. Constantly during the negotiations, EPA countries were demanding a strong commitment from the EU to assist them in the adjustment process. The EU, however, considered that the current mechanisms of aid were enough and no further provisions were necessary. The lack of precision and commitment from the EU in this aspect has slowed down negotiations or has impeded an agreement. The objective of using EPAs to boost or enhance the regional integration process has been hard to meet with some countries changing groups and negotiation groups that include more than one regional trade block. Moreover, some non-LDC countries were forced to sign interim agreements in order to not affect their current levels of access and this creates friction within the original negotiation groups. However, it was hard to synchronise the EPA liberalisation schedules with their regional ones. Finally, in the case of SADC, the superposition of several regional agreements with the necessity of including South Africa as an additional partner, has added more problems to the EPA negotiation process as well as the own regional integration process. Trying to adjust the EPAs to the WTO provisions has been extremely difficult. The idea of making concessions reciprocal, even with the flexibilities considered, has proved to be almost chimerical. The EPA countries considered that the flexibilities introduced (exclusions, differential implementation periods, etc.) were not enough considering the development, integration and institutional disparities that exist between the EU and the ACP countries. This has led them to feeling that they had to offer too much given their developing and LDC position. This notion was reaffirmed with the EU’s negative attitude to negotiate in some areas (particularly mode 4 in services) and the insistence on the inclusion of the MFN clause as well as the mentioned lack of precisions in terms of development aid. Finally, all these issues mentioned confirm that the forecast on the EPAs made before the negotiations began. While LDC countries have very little incentive to negotiate given the possibility of getting a similar level of access via EBA; non-LDC’s had to sign interim EPAs that they considered are not in line with their development objectives. In the process, regional integration was harmed and the development objective of EPA was not properly addressed. 30
Page 1 and 2: EPA Review Annex Documents by Insti
Page 3 and 4: Part Three: EPAs as Instruments for
Page 5 and 6: Part One: Literature Review 4
Page 7 and 8: countries demanded more precision a
Page 9 and 10: essential and fundamental of EPA (h
Page 11 and 12: EPA group. However, after phase II
Page 13 and 14: Disagreements also existed on other
Page 15 and 16: ules of origin as a basis for negot
Page 17 and 18: would not meet WTO provisions. Even
Page 19 and 20: is only just about to conclude an i
Page 21 and 22: The EC took almost nine months to a
Page 23 and 24: Caribbean The CARIFORUM EPA was the
Page 25 and 26: services, CARIFORUM countries commi
Page 27 and 28: 2006. Moreover, PACP countries cons
Page 29: Table 3 Main Problems and Divergenc
Page 33 and 34: creation) but can also lead to impo
Page 35 and 36: preferences and hence are likely to
Page 37 and 38: 3. Impact of the EPAs by Region One
Page 39 and 40: Cape Verde (loss of 4.1% of GDP) an
Page 41 and 42: SSA ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA EAC Table 2
Page 43 and 44: Perez (2005) CGE, 2001 base year 80
Page 45 and 46: Whilst most studies appear to agree
Page 47 and 48: 7. Annex Literature Countries Metho
Page 49 and 50: Hinkle and Schiff (2004) "Economic
Page 51 and 52: Milner, Morressey and McKay (2008)
Page 53 and 54: Karingi et al (2005) “Assessment
Page 55 and 56: Greenaway and Milner (2003) "a grim
Page 57 and 58: Perez, R (2005) “ Are the Economi
Page 59 and 60: Case Studies Lessons 1. Introductio
Page 61 and 62: trade relation and negotiation matt
Page 63 and 64: EPAs negotiation process is paralle
Page 65 and 66: • EPA team The EPA negotiating te
Page 67 and 68: - State Secretariat of Environment
Page 69 and 70: Technical Negotiation Group (TNG) m
Page 71 and 72: spent for these impact assessment s
Page 73 and 74: Other opportunity costs Another imp
Page 75 and 76: Since domestic constituencies tend
Page 77 and 78: Table 11 Negotiating Meetings and R
Page 79 and 80: • An estimated $214,000 in travel
Page 81 and 82:
The main expectation of the process
Page 83 and 84:
Commission was forced to take up th
Page 85 and 86:
Therefore, while negotiators could
Page 87 and 88:
System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 89 and 90:
Ethiopia - List of RNF meetings Amo
Page 91 and 92:
Nigeria Cost of EPA negotiation-rel
Page 93 and 94:
Dominican Republic Distribution of
Page 95 and 96:
1. Overview of existing resources f
Page 97 and 98:
The FTRD that was responsible for b
Page 99 and 100:
The support of the NDTPF and the ex
Page 101 and 102:
dedicated sessions during the year
Page 103 and 104:
Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagasc
Page 105 and 106:
3. Quantification of costs of count
Page 107 and 108:
Ethiopia took a clear stance from t
Page 109 and 110:
4. Perspectives on EPA negotiations
Page 111 and 112:
5. Qns: Had you had more resources,
Page 113 and 114:
) Basic knowledge on Cotonou Agreem
Page 115 and 116:
Council of ESA Ministers Committee
Page 117 and 118:
System Improvement & Human Resource
Page 119 and 120:
List of RNF meetings 118 ANNEX VII
Page 121 and 122:
EPA Review Study Nigeria December,
Page 123 and 124:
contains the quantification of cost
Page 125 and 126:
which appear to have crowded out ac
Page 127 and 128:
Table 3 Resource Detail of Intra-Af
Page 129 and 130:
Table 5 Capacity Building Programme
Page 131 and 132:
Table 7 Cost of EPA Negotiation-Rel
Page 133 and 134:
ADDRESSING THE LABOUR MARKET EFFECT
Page 135 and 136:
Table 9 Annual Cost of Nigeria Trad
Page 137 and 138:
Though the current negotiating stru
Page 139 and 140:
• The simultaneous application of
Page 141 and 142:
understand the changing environment
Page 143 and 144:
7. Summary of Findings and Main Les
Page 145 and 146:
opportunity cost could be quite sub
Page 147 and 148:
• There is adequate technical adv
Page 149 and 150:
5. Appendices Appendix Table 1 Rang
Page 151 and 152:
EPA Review Study Dominican Republic
Page 153 and 154:
c. Technical Level At a regional le
Page 155 and 156:
2) From the ministers of trade of C
Page 157 and 158:
The fact that the DR had previously
Page 159 and 160:
- State Secretariat of Foreign Rela
Page 161 and 162:
Table 1 Distribution of the Main Tr
Page 163 and 164:
Figure 2 CARIFORUM Dimensions Diffe
Page 165 and 166:
with the EU, in order to present a
Page 167 and 168:
Table 4 Average Monthly Salaries EP
Page 169 and 170:
In additional there were eight meet
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Per Diem Rate (US$) 500 A- Total of
Page 173 and 174:
5. Perspectives of EPA negotiations
Page 175 and 176:
usiness and political levels repres
Page 177 and 178:
expectation of increases in exports
Page 179 and 180:
8. Annexes Interviews Name Institut
Page 181 and 182:
MAY o 05-06: WTO TWG on NAMA, Barba
Page 183 and 184:
o 05-06: Joint Meeting of the Prime
Page 185 and 186:
o 10-13: 12 th Meeting of CARIFORUM
Page 187 and 188:
Trinidad & Tobago, 11-15 mayo 2007
Page 189 and 190:
Reviewing services negotiations in
Page 191 and 192:
Table 2 MMain differeences in serrv
Page 193 and 194:
3. Services coverage in the CARIFOR
Page 195 and 196:
In this exercise, it is important t
Page 197 and 198:
196 ANNEX Provisions of the agreeme
Page 199 and 200:
Tariff and Non-tariff barriers in E
Page 201 and 202:
products could be extended until ye
Page 203 and 204:
extended to the original partner. F
Page 205 and 206:
than the rate applied on the proces
Page 207 and 208:
RoO and the EPAs 1. Introduction Ru
Page 209 and 210:
Table 1 Similarity of EAC countries
Page 211 and 212:
that value added in ACP countries o
Page 213 and 214:
The EU has yet to deliver a simple
Page 215 and 216:
arrangements, are constrained by pr
Page 217 and 218:
and non-oil exporting countries wit
Page 219 and 220:
Common Market for Eastern and South
Page 221 and 222:
to be seen. The Ethiopia case study
Page 223 and 224:
fact that countries either export o
Page 225 and 226:
development assistance in the EPA.
Page 227 and 228:
References Bilal, S. and Stevens, C
Page 229 and 230:
SPS Issues in EPA Negotiations 1. B
Page 231 and 232:
The SPS committee provides an oppor
Page 233 and 234:
of equivalence. Clearly, the Econom
Page 235 and 236:
In the case of Ghana, where there i
Page 237 and 238:
which relevant entities within thei
Page 239 and 240:
Specific provisions While the final
Page 241 and 242:
‘.....In addition, the Parties sh
Page 243 and 244:
imparted to EPA signatories. In pra
Page 245 and 246:
of the EC Party when these products
Page 247 and 248:
So what have the EPA negotiations a
Page 249 and 250:
Region/Country Year Total 2002 2003
Page 251 and 252:
EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country Y
Page 253 and 254:
EAC CARIFORUM PACP Region/Country N
Page 255 and 256:
EAS SADC EAC Country/Region Mycotox
Page 257 and 258:
Country/Region West Africa CEMAC Co
Page 259 and 260:
Development Finance and EPAs 1. Int
Page 261 and 262:
evenues, one of the main sources of
Page 263:
References Braun-Munzinger, C. ( 20
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