FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

have little incentive to do their jobs well, given official pay scales and the level of internal
monitoring. (3) Private firms and individuals seek to reduce the costs imposed on them by
governments in the form of taxes, customs duties, regulations.(4) Governments frequently transfer
large financial benefits to private firms through procurement contracts, privatization, and the award
of concessions. (5) The judiciary has the power to impose costs and transfer resources between
litigants. (6) Elected politicians can accept illegal payoffs both to fund their campaigns and to enrich
themselves. They may, in turn, pay off voters.
a. Payments that equate supply and demand
Governments frequently provide goods and services for free or sell them at below market
prices. In modern welfare states, including the post-Socialist countries, these services include such
basic services as health care and education. Corruption of this type has several possible efficiency
consequences. First, the goals of a program may be undermined if the services are provided only to
those with the highest willingness to pay, excluding the needy or the well-qualified. Corruption in
health care and subsidized housing provide two good examples. Second, corrupt markets are likely
to differ from open competitive ones. Because of the illegality of bribery, information about
bribe-prices will not be well publicized, and prices may be sticky because of the difficulty of
communicating market information. Some potential participants may refuse to enter the market
because of moral scruples and fear of punishment, and public officials may themselves limit their
dealing to insiders and trusted friends. A corrupt system may be not only less competitive but also
more uncertain than a legal market.
Furthermore, many officials can exercise monopoly power by determining the quantity of
services provided. The corrupt official, like a private monopolist, may seek to supply less than the
officially sanctioned level or seek to provide an increased supply if the government has set the
supply below the monopoly level. Officials may have sufficient monopoly power to create scarcity
even when the service is not scarce, either by delaying or withholding benefits unless paid bribes.
Finally, bribes are frequently paid to permit unqualified people and firms to obtain a benefit.
Students might pay to alter the results of university admission tests, or people might pay doctors to
declare them eligible for disability payments. Andre Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993: 601) call this
case ―corruption with theft‖. Clearly, the unqualified will often have the highest willingness to pay
since they have no legal way to obtain the service.
Incentive-based reforms in this area would involve the elimination of policies with no
justification based on efficiency or distributive justice, the streamlining of other programs to limit
discretion, and the introduction of legally-imposed fees to allocate scarce benefits where allocation
to high bidders will not undermine program goals. Sometimes the administrative system can be
reorganized to limit the monopoly power of officials and give citizens more choices.
24
Alternatively,
24
These ideas are developed in more detail in Rose-Ackerman (1999:39-52)
100
Page 20
20
corruption may arise because the government‘s commitments, to universal health care, for example,
are inconsistent with the level of funding it provides. The state must either cut back its stated
commitments or increase spending at the same time as it reform the delivery system.
b. Bribes as incentive payments for bureaucrats
Bribes can be incentive payments for good service. Firms and individuals may pay to avoid
delay. Payoffs to those who manage queues can be efficient since they give officials incentives both
to favor those who value their time highly and to work quickly. The corruption of tax collectors
may be efficient so long as the government can impose a binding overall revenue constraint. But the
conclusion that the routine corruption of those who manage queues and collect taxes can be
tolerated is extremely problematic. First, the result only follows if officials have limited discretion.
Second, noncorrupt alternatives exist that avoid the costs of illegal payment systems. Queues can be
managed through a set of differential fees. Revenue collection offices are sometimes permitted to
retain a portion of the taxes they collect.