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as an accountant. Summing up, the second hypothesis states a necessary condition for an action being an instance of institutional corruption and, indeed, for its being an instance of corruption at all. This second hypothesis has turned out to be correct. Itu bisa berargumentasi bahwa [selagi/sedang] dia tidak merusak manapun proses kelembagaan atau tujuan, dia meskipun demikian merusak dia sebagai penghuni peran, e.g., dengan penggangsiran disposisi nya untuk bertindak terus terang. Tetapi dia telah melakukan tidak benar. Melainkan disposisi nya untuk bertindak terus terang telah digangsir sendiri, dan secara rinci oleh keinginan nya untuk menyenangkan nya menggabungkan dengan komitmen ketiadaan nya kepada kebutuhan [yang] kelembagaan dan yang etis [dari;ttg] peran [yang] kelembagaan nya sebagai suatu akuntan. Menjumlahkan, negara hipotesis yang kedua suatu kondisi perlu untuk suatu tindakan menjadi kejadian [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan dan, tentu saja, untuk/karena asalnya suatu kejadian korupsi sama sekali. Hipotesis [yang] kedua ini telah ternyata adalah benar. Third Hypothesis: The Moral Responsibility of Corruptors The third hypothesis states that an action is corrupt only if the person who performs it either intends or foresees the harm that it will cause — or, at the very least, could and should have foreseen it. Let us say that this further necessary condition expresses the moral responsibility of corruptors. [15] As noted above, there is one important exception to the moral responsibility of corruptors hypothesis. The exception is that sub-class of corruptors who are: (a) corrupt, but not morally responsible for being so, and; (b) whose actions are an expression of their corrupted characters and also have a corrupting effect. Negara Hipotesis yang ketiga yang suatu tindakan adalah jahat hanya jika orang [siapa] yang melaksanakan ia/nya baik berniat maupun meramalkan kejahatan [itu] bahwa itu akan menyebabkan- atau, paling sedikit, bisa dan [perlu] sudah meramalkan itu. Mari kita kata[kan bahwa . ini kondisi perlu lebih lanjut menyatakan tanggung jawab moral corruptors.[15 [itu]] Seperti dicatat di atas, ada satu perkecualian penting kepada tanggung jawab moral hipotesis koruptor. Perkecualian adalah bahwa sub-class koruptor [siapa] yang adalah: ( a) merusak, tetapi tidak [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk menjadi maka, dan; ( b) tindakan siapa adalah suatu ungkapan [dari;ttg] karakter [yang] dirusak mereka dan juga mempunyai suatu merusak efek. We need to invoke our earlier distinction between acts of institutional corruption and acts of institutional corrosion. An act might undermine an institutional process or purpose without the person who performed it intending this effect, foreseeing this effect, or indeed even being in a position such that they could or should have foreseen this effect. Such an act may well be an act of corrosion, but it would not necessarily be an act of corruption. Consider our magistrates example involving a diminution over time in the quality of the adjudications of these magistrates. Neither the government and other officials responsible for resourcing and training the magistracy, nor the magistrates themselves, intend or foresee this institutional harm; indeed, perhaps no-one could reasonably have foreseen the harmful effects of these shortcomings in training and failure to respond to increased workloads. This is judicial corrosion, but not judicial corruption. [16] Kita harus memohon pembedaan [yang] lebih awal [kita/kami] antar[a] tindakan [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan dan tindakan [dari;ttg] karatan kelembagaan. Suatu tindakan mungkin mengikis suatu proses kelembagaan atau bermaksud tanpa orang [siapa] yang melakukan ia/nya berniat efek ini, meramalkan efek ini, atau tentu saja genap yang sedang sanggup . seperti (itu) bahwa mereka bisa atau [perlu] sudah meramalkan ini mempengaruhi. Tindakan seperti itu boleh sungguh suatu tindakan karatan, tetapi [itu] tidak akan perlu jadilah suatu tindakan korupsi. Pertimbangkan contoh hakim [kita/kami] [yang] menyertakan suatu pengurangan dari waktu ke waktu di [dalam] mutu putusan hakim [dari;ttg] hakim ini. [Bukan/Tidak] pemerintah dan lain pejabat yang bertanggung jawab untuk resourcing dan 14
pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku UU, maupun hakim diri mereka, berniat atau meramalkan kejahatan kelembagaan ini; tentu saja, barangkali tak seorangpun bisa layak sudah meramalkan efek yang berbahaya [dari;ttg] kekurangan ini di (dalam) pelatihan dan kegagalan untuk bereaksi terhadap beban kerja ditingkatkan. Ini adalah karatan hal tentang pengadilan, tetapi bukan corruption.[16 hal tentang pengadilan] Because persons who perform corrupt actions (corruptors) intend or foresee — or at least should have foreseen —the corrupting effect their actions would have, these persons typically are blameworthy, but not necessarily so. For there are cases in which someone knowingly performs a corrupt action but is, say, coerced into so doing, and is therefore not blameworthy. So on this view it is possible to perform an act of corruption, be morally responsible for performing it, and yet remain blameless. Moreover, we earlier distinguished between two species of corruptor. There are those corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt actions. And there are those corruptors who are not responsible for their corrupt character, but whose actions are: (a) an expression of their corrupted character, and; (b) actions that have a corrupting effect. Sebab para orang [siapa] yang melaksanakan tindakan jahat ( koruptor) berniat atau meramalkan- atau sedikitnya [perlu] sudah meramalkan - merusak efek tindakan mereka ingin mempunyai, para orang ini [yang] secara khas adalah blameworthy, tetapi tidak harus maka. Karena ada kasus di mana seseorang [yang] dengan sadar melaksanakan suatu tindakan jahat tetapi adalah, kata[kan, dipaksa ke dalam sangat melakukan, dan kemudian bukan blameworthy. Maka pada [atas] ini memandang ia/nya adalah mungkin untuk melaksanakan suatu tindakan korupsi, jadilah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk melakukan/menyelenggarakan itu, namun juga tinggal suci. Lebih dari itu, kita lebih awal membedakan dua jenis koruptor. Ada koruptor itu [siapa] yang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka. Dan di sana adalah koruptor itu [siapa] yang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk karakter jahat mereka, tetapi tindakan siapa adalah: ( a) suatu ungkapan [dari;ttg] karakter dirusak mereka, dan; ( b) tindakan yang mempunyai suatu merusak efek. Accordingly, we now have a threefold distinction in relation to corruptors: (1) corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt action and blameworthy; (2) corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt action and blameless; (3) corruptors who are not morally responsible for having a corrupt character, but whose actions are: (a) expressive of their corrupt character, and; (b) actions that have a corrupting effect. The existence of the third category of corruptors demonstrates that the third hypothesis is incorrect. Maka, kita sekarang mempunyai suatu pembedaan lipat tiga dalam hubungan dengan koruptor: ( 1) koruptor [siapa] yang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka dan blameworthy; ( 2) koruptor [siapa] yang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka dan suci; ( 3) koruptor [siapa] yang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk mempunyai;nikmati suatu karakter jahat, tetapi tindakan siapa adalah: ( a) ekspresif untuk karakter jahat mereka, dan; ( b) tindakan yang mempunyai suatu merusak efek. Keberadaan [dari;ttg] kategori koruptor yang ketiga mempertunjukkan [bahwa/yang] hipotesis yang ketiga adalah salah. Fourth Hypothesis: The Asymmetry between Corruptors and Those Corrupted. The fourth hypothesis concerns persons — in the sense of institutional role occupants — who are corrupted. The contrast here is twofold. In the first place, persons are being 15
Page 1 and 2: FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
Page 3 and 4: o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
Page 5 and 6: justified by recourse to some princ
Page 7 and 8: We can conclude that the various cu
Page 9 and 10: pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
Page 11 and 12: er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
Page 13: suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
Page 17 and 18: and compromised in a corrupt and in
Page 19 and 20: corruptor (as we have defined corru
Page 21 and 22: to, a large corporation who steal f
Page 23 and 24: including the moral characters of t
Page 25 and 26: disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
Page 27 and 28: penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
Page 29 and 30: corruption — although it might se
Page 31 and 32: yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
Page 33 and 34: Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
Page 35 and 36: case they would occasionally make e
Page 37 and 38: analogies lead to bad conclusions,
Page 39 and 40: Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
Page 41 and 42: Indicates the frequency of attempts
Page 43 and 44: Population Public officials . Not e
Page 45 and 46: 4. Corruption expectations Populati
Page 47 and 48: . that it is a successful practice
Page 49 and 50: as corruption within international
Page 51 and 52: wrath is seen as directed at our ow
Page 53 and 54: Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
Page 55 and 56: studies, for example, Watergate. In
Page 57 and 58: Corruption is widely recognised to
Page 59 and 60: Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
Page 61 and 62: Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
Page 63 and 64: phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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137 edastic-consisten t t-statistic
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139 erage of log of n um b er of co
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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no incentive to refrain from corrup
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children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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international donor organizations p
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19th Century Sweden - how corruptio
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civil servant to receive income fro
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159 The first is that "agents are n
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161 Science Assocition. Rothstein,
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163 gifts and tributes between loca
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165 corrupt acts in society. Global
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167 bring together the media, polit
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Transparency International, Corrupt
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Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
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Courts: a Governance-based Approach
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indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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(judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
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same kind of administrative and pro
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at a low expected cost and, therefo
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Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
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0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58
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community-based institutions in Per
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Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
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191 2)Even the institutional reform
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UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (U
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20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
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connected with a broader sense of f
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of
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