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Review of 'Corruption in Asia' Corruption, collusion and nepotism: … the problems [are] not confined to a single nation … . Now creditors, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, are demanding better accountability and legal governance. … the 11 senior legal, business and policy academics who collaborated on this volume take a dissenting view. … [They see] that the governance push, like its law and democracy antecedent, is doomed because of its implicit pro-Western capitalist agenda and its failure to address the real issue - namely, that corruption has flourished because it delivers results. In this study, after examination of the underlying frameworks under consideration, focus falls on two countries - Indonesia and Vietnam . This is a significant, thought-provoking, perhaps even iconoclastic work …" The Australian, Wednesday 7 August 2002, p 35 Anti-corruption agencies have been set up to fight [corruption, collusion and nepotism].… Multilateral agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Transparency International have also tried (to combat corruption). So why have all their attempts failed? Are the adversaries that strong? Are we going in the wrong direction? Is the legal framework inadequate? Is something lacking in the implementation? If we read this book, edited by Tim Lindsey and Howard Dick, we must admit that there is a mound of reasons why all these efforts have come to nothing, and how tightly immersed they are in our present culture and governmental system. In this book, experts from legal, economic and social sciences backgrounds rethink corruption and focus on it from different angles. The book presents not only methods to eradicate corruption but also precedes it with an observation of the conditions that make corruption hard to distinguish from other cultural aspects. … More books like this must be written. More importantly, however, this book is a mustread for leaders and experts of multilateral agencies seeking to provide assistance. Tempo Interaktif (Indonesia), 9 August 2002 … provide[s] excellent theoretical and empirical material for rethinking the governance paradigm and, by extension, the role of international financial and development institutions. It is a timely contribution to a debate that must be had. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol 38 No 2, 2002 VII Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari berkas http://law.anu.edu.au/nissl/smiller.pdf. Google membuat versi HTML dari dokumen tersebut secara otomatis pada saat menelusuri web. Page 1 Paper given at the international conference, Civil Society, Religion & Global Governance: 60
Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1–2 September 2005, Canberra Australia 1 DRAFT ONLY – NOT TO BE QUOTED Corruption and Trans-Cultural Interaction Prof Seumas Miller 1 Charles Sturt University and The Australian National University This paper is concerned with corruption in trans-cultural contexts. My concern is only with some of the philosophical or ethico-theoretical issues raised by corruption in trans- cultural interaction. In the first section I provide a theoretical, or quasi-theoretical, account of corruption. In the second section I focus on trans-cultural corruption in particular. Corruption 2 Varieties of Corruption The causes and effects of corruption, and how to combat corruption, are issues that are increasingly on the national and international agendas of politicians and other policymakers. For example, the World Bank has relatively recently come around to the view that economic development is closely linked to corruption reduction (World Bank 1997). By contrast, the concept of corruption has not received much attention. Existing conceptual work on corruption consists in little more than the presentation of brief definitions of corruption as a preliminary to extended accounts of the causes and effects of corruption and the ways to combat it. Moreover, most of these definitions of corruption are unsatisfactory in fairly obvious ways. Consider one of the most popular of these definitions, namely, ‘Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private gain.’ 3 (Nye, 1967: 417). No doubt the abuse of public offices for private gain is paradigmatic of corruption. But when a bettor bribes a boxer to „throw‟ a fight this is corruption for private gain, but it need not involve any public office holder; the roles of boxer and bettor are usually not public offices. One response to this is to distinguish public corruption from private corruption, and to argue that the above definition is a definition only of public corruption. But if ordinary citizens lie when they give testimony in court, this is corruption; it is corruption of the criminal justice system. However, it does not involve abuse of a public office by a public official. And when police fabricate evidence out of a misplaced sense of justice, this is corruption of a public office, but not for private gain. In the light of the failure of such analytical-style definitions it is tempting to try to sidestep the problem of providing a theoretical account of the concept of corruption by simply identifying corruption with specific legal and/or moral offences. 1 Seumas Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University and the Australian National University (joint position) and Director of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (an Australian Research Council funded Special Research Centre). 2 This section is taken from my paper “The Concept of Corruption” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming). An earlier version appeared in Seumas Miller et al (Corruption and Anti-Corruption, 2005: Chapter 1). 3 For one of the most influential statements of the abuse of public office for private gain definitions see 61
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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137 edastic-consisten t t-statistic
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139 erage of log of n um b er of co
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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no incentive to refrain from corrup
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children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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international donor organizations p
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19th Century Sweden - how corruptio
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civil servant to receive income fro
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159 The first is that "agents are n
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161 Science Assocition. Rothstein,
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163 gifts and tributes between loca
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165 corrupt acts in society. Global
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167 bring together the media, polit
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Transparency International, Corrupt
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Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
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Courts: a Governance-based Approach
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indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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(judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
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same kind of administrative and pro
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at a low expected cost and, therefo
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Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
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0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58
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community-based institutions in Per
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191 2)Even the institutional reform
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UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (U
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20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
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connected with a broader sense of f
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of
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