FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

2
+ c ≤ S(u,z,δ) + p(
δ
1 − δ
)
R
2
(3)
10
Proof: Consider a grim trigger strategy according to which defection in the
briber‟s dilemma, or cheating in trade, is punished by Nash reversion
in both games. With this enforcement regime, an individual would
prefer to defect in both games simultaneously than in either alone. A
player would therefore be willing to defect unless
R+(2u+z)+
δ
1 − δ
(u) ≤
R
2
−c+(u+z)+
δ
1 − δ
[(u+z)]+
δ
1 − δ
[
pR
2
]
The right-hand side shows the one-shot payoffs from defection in both
games, plus the stream of payoffs from the trade game following Nash
reversion. The left-hand side shows the value of the expected payoff
stream from cooperation in both games after an official has chosen d,
assuming the other player also cooperates. This inequality simplifies
to (3).
Proposition 1 shows that strategic linkage relaxes the incentive con-
straints in the briber‟s dilemma. In particular, although bribery is
inevitable in a one-shot briber‟s dilemma without strategic linkage, a
non-corrupt equilibrium can nevertheless be sustained if the slack in the
trade game, S(u,z,δ), is sufficiently large. Since the role of strategic
linkage in overcoming bribery is most sharply defined for the case of a
one-shot briber‟s dilemma, and for the sake of expositional simplicity,
in the remainder of the paper we will focus on this case - that is, we
will assume that p = 0.
3 Social Structure and Corruption
So far we have dealt with a population of just two clients, and have seen
that they may be able to enforce a non-bribery agreement, if they are
able to sanction each other in another game. In this section, we analyze
a more general situation in which there there may be many potential
clients embedded in a larger society, in order to see how different kinds
of social structure may affect the level of corruption.
In a larger population, the likelihood of any particular pair of indi-
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