FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

elationship can be overcome or even significantly reduced. But the point is that the
potential for corruption is extraordinarily high. Perhaps the UK's handing over of Hong
Kong to China was nothing other than an instance of corruption of the institution of
democracy in Hong Kong, given a majority of the people living in Hong Kong did not
wish to return to Chinese rule, and given the triadic power relationship that existed
between China, the UK and Hong Kong.
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Page 14
Paper given at the international conference, Civil Society, Religion & Global Governance:
Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1–2 September 2005, Canberra Australia
14
The general point to be made about corruption arising from interaction in the context of
lop-sided power relationships is as follows. We have already identified a range of
conditions conducive to corruption that obtain in trans-cultural interaction but not
elsewhere. Trans-cultural interaction that takes place in the context of a lop-sided power
relationship between the institutional actors is, therefore, likely to be even more
conducive to corruption than in other contexts.
V
Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth:
Author Info
Angeletos, George-Marios
Kollintzas, Tryphon
A Simple Model
Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):
George-Marios Angeletos
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking
and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where
entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The
latter are defined by the following properties: (i) their internal effect is positive; (ii) their
external effect is negative; and (iii) they use real resources. Our formulation may be
viewed as a parable for theft and fraud; organized crime; industrial espionage; lobbying
and policy influence; misgovernance, institutional inefficiency, tax evasion, etc. The
economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth.
Agents' perceptions about the external effects of rent seeking, and the complementarity or
substitutability of intermediate inputs, are crucial. Contrary to conventional wisdom,