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If a serviceable definition of the concept of a corrupt action is to be found — and specifically, one that does not collapse into the more general notion of an immoral action — then attention needs to be focussed on the moral effects that some actions have on persons and institutions. An action is corrupt only if it corrupts something or someone — so corruption is not only a moral concept, but also a causal or quasi-causal concept. [13] That is, an action is corrupt by virtue of having a corrupting effect on a person's moral character or on an institutional process or purpose. If an action has a corrupting effect on an institution, undermining institutional processes or purposes, then typically — but not necessarily — it has a corrupting effect also on persons qua role occupants in the affected institutions. Jika suatu definisi [yang] dapat diperbaiki konsep suatu jahat tindakan (diharapkan) untuk ditemukan- dan secara rinci, apa yang itu tidak roboh ke dalam dugaan [yang] semakin umum dari suatu tindakan mesum- kemudian perhatian perlu untuk dipusatkan pada [atas] efek moral yang beberapa tindakan berakibat pada para orang dan institusi. Suatu tindakan adalah jahat hanya jika [itu] merusak sesuatu (yang) atau seseorang- maka korupsi tidaklah hanya suatu konsep moral, tetapi juga suatu menyebabkan atau quasi-causal concept.[13] Itu adalah, suatu tindakan adalah merusak berdasarkan atas mempunyai;nikmati suatu merusak efek pada [atas] karakter moral seseorang atau pada [atas] suatu proses kelembagaan atau bermaksud. Jika suatu tindakan mempunyai suatu merusak efek pada [atas] suatu institusi, penggangsiran proses kelembagaan atau tujuan, kemudian secara khas- tetapi tidak harus- [itu] mempunyai suatu merusak efek juga pada [atas] para orang sebagai penghuni peran di (dalam) institusi yang di/terpengaruh [itu]. In relation to the concept of institutional corruption, the second hypothesis states (as a necessary condition) that an action is corrupt only if it has the effect of undermining an institutional process or of subverting an institutional purpose or of despoiling the character of some role occupant qua role occupant. This hypothesis asserts the causal character of corruption. In this regard, note that an infringement of a specific law or institutional rule does not in and of itself constitute an act of institutional corruption. In order to do so, any such infringement needs to have an institutional effect, e.g., to defeat the institutional purpose of the rule, to subvert the institutional process governed by the rule, or to contribute to the despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant qua role occupant. In short, we need to distinguish between the offence considered in itself and the institutional effect of committing that offence. Considered in itself the offence of, say, lying is an infringement of a law, rule, and/or a moral principle. However, the offence is only an act of institutional corruption if it has some effect, e.g., it is performed in a courtroom setting and thereby subverts the judicial process. [14] Dalam hubungan dengan konsep [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan, negara hipotesis yang kedua ( sebagai kondisi perlu) bahwa suatu tindakan adalah jahat hanya jika [itu] mempunyai efek menggangsir suatu proses kelembagaan atau menumbangkan suatu tujuan kelembagaan atau merampas karakter beberapa penghuni peran sebagai penghuni peran. Hipotesis ini menyatakan karakter korupsi yang menyebabkan. Mengenai ini, catat bahwa suatu pelanggaran suatu hukum spesifik atau aturan kelembagaan tidak di (dalam) dan [tentang] [dirinya] sendiri [mendasari/membuat] suatu tindakan [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan. Dalam rangka melakukannya, manapun . seperti (itu) pelanggaran harus mempunyai suatu efek kelembagaan, e.g., untuk mengalahkan tujuan yang kelembagaan aturan, untuk menumbangkan proses yang kelembagaan yang diatur oleh aturan, atau untuk berperan untuk rampasan karakter moral suatu penghuni peran sebagai penghuni peran. Singkatnya, kita harus membedakan antara penyerangan [itu] mempertimbangkan dengan sendirinya dan efek yang kelembagaan melakukan yang penyerangan. yang dipertimbangkan Dengan sendirinya penyerangan, kata[kan, berbaring adalah suatu pelanggaran suatu hukum, aturan, dan/atau suatu prinsip moral. Bagaimanapun, penyerangan hanya suatu tindakan [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan jika [itu] mempunyai beberapa efek, e.g., [itu] dilakukan [adalah] 12
suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan dan dengan demikian menumbangkan process.[14 yang hal tentang pengadilan] A further point to be made here is that an act that has a corrupting effect might not be a moral offence considered in itself. For example, the provision of information by a corporate officer to an investor that will enable the investor to buy shares cheaply before they rise in value might not be a moral offence considered in itself; in general, providing information is an innocuous activity. However, in this corporate setting it might constitute insider trading, and do institutional damage; as such, it may well be an act of corruption. A final point concerns the alleged responsibility for corruption of external non-institutional actors in contexts in which there are mediating internal institutional actors. In general, an act performed by an external non-institutional actor is not an act of institutional corruption if there is a mediating institutional actor who is fully responsible for the institutional harm. Consider an accountant who is besotted with a woman with expensive tastes. His obsession with the woman causes him to spend money on her that he does not have. Accordingly, he embezzles money from the company he works for. There is a causal chain of sorts from her expensive tastes to his act of embezzlement and the consequent institutional harm that his act in turn causes. However, she is not an institutional corruptor; rather he is. For he is fully responsible for his act of embezzlement, and it is this act — and this act alone — that constitutes an act of institutional corruption. It does so by virtue of the institutional harm that it does. Suatu titik lebih lanjut untuk dibuat di sini adalah bahwa suatu tindakan yang mempunyai suatu merusak efek tidak sampai suatu penyerangan moral mempertimbangkan dengan sendirinya. Sebagai contoh, ketetapan informasi oleh seorang petugas [perseroan/perusahaan] [bagi/kepada] suatu investor yang akan memungkinkan investor [itu] untuk membeli [bagian;saham] [yang] dengan murah [sebelum/di depan] mereka naik nilai tidak sampai suatu penyerangan moral mempertimbangkan dengan sendirinya; secara umum, menyediakan informasi adalah suatu aktivitas tidak bahaya. Bagaimanapun, di (dalam) [perseroan/perusahaan] ini pengaturan itu bisa [mendasari/membuat] orang dalam [yang] berdagang, dan lakukan kerusakan kelembagaan; sedemikian, mungkin baik jadilah suatu tindakan korupsi. Suatu titik akhir berhubungan dengan tanggung jawab yang dituduh untuk korupsi [dari;ttg] para aktor tidak kelembagaan eksternal di (dalam) konteks di mana ada sedang menengahi para aktor kelembagaan internal. Secara umum, suatu tindakan yang dilakukan oleh suatu aktor [yang] tidak kelembagaan eksternal bukanlah suatu tindakan [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan jika ada suatu menengahi aktor kelembagaan [siapa] yang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk kejahatan yang kelembagaan [itu]. Pertimbangkan seorang akuntan [siapa] yang adalah mabuk/ gila dengan seorang perempuan dengan rasa mahal. Obsesi nya dengan perempuan menyebabkan dia untuk membelanjakan uang pada [atas] nya bahwa ia tidak mempunyai. Maka, ia menggelapkan uang dari [perusahaan/ rombongan] [yang] ia bekerja untuk. Ada suatu rantai sort;jenis [yang] menyebabkan dari rasa [yang] mahal nya kepada tindakan korupsi nya dan kejahatan kelembagaan yang sebagai akibat yang tindakan nya pada gilirannya menyebabkan. Bagaimanapun, dia bukanlah suatu koruptor kelembagaan; melainkan ia adalah. Karena ia [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan korupsi nya, dan [itu] adalah tindakan ini- dan tindakan ini sendiri- itu [mendasari/membuat] suatu tindakan [dari;ttg] korupsi kelembagaan. [Itu] mengerjakan sangat berdasarkan atas kejahatan yang kelembagaan bahwa itu mengerjakan. It might be argued that while she did not corrupt any institutional process or purpose, she nevertheless corrupted him qua role occupant, e.g., by undermining his disposition to act honestly. But she has done no such thing. Rather his disposition to act honestly has been undermined by himself, and specifically by his desire to please her coupled with his lack of commitment to the ethical and institutional requirements of his institutional role 13
Page 1 and 2: FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
Page 3 and 4: o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
Page 5 and 6: justified by recourse to some princ
Page 7 and 8: We can conclude that the various cu
Page 9 and 10: pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
Page 11: er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
Page 15 and 16: pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
Page 17 and 18: and compromised in a corrupt and in
Page 19 and 20: corruptor (as we have defined corru
Page 21 and 22: to, a large corporation who steal f
Page 23 and 24: including the moral characters of t
Page 25 and 26: disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
Page 27 and 28: penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
Page 29 and 30: corruption — although it might se
Page 31 and 32: yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
Page 33 and 34: Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
Page 35 and 36: case they would occasionally make e
Page 37 and 38: analogies lead to bad conclusions,
Page 39 and 40: Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
Page 41 and 42: Indicates the frequency of attempts
Page 43 and 44: Population Public officials . Not e
Page 45 and 46: 4. Corruption expectations Populati
Page 47 and 48: . that it is a successful practice
Page 49 and 50: as corruption within international
Page 51 and 52: wrath is seen as directed at our ow
Page 53 and 54: Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
Page 55 and 56: studies, for example, Watergate. In
Page 57 and 58: Corruption is widely recognised to
Page 59 and 60: Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
Page 61 and 62: Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
Page 63 and 64:
phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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137 edastic-consisten t t-statistic
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139 erage of log of n um b er of co
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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no incentive to refrain from corrup
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children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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international donor organizations p
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19th Century Sweden - how corruptio
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civil servant to receive income fro
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159 The first is that "agents are n
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161 Science Assocition. Rothstein,
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163 gifts and tributes between loca
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165 corrupt acts in society. Global
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167 bring together the media, polit
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Transparency International, Corrupt
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Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
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Courts: a Governance-based Approach
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indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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(judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
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same kind of administrative and pro
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at a low expected cost and, therefo
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Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
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0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58
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community-based institutions in Per
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Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
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191 2)Even the institutional reform
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UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (U
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20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
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connected with a broader sense of f
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of
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