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160 Hechter, Michael. 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems." Rationality and Society 4:33-40. Helliwell, John F. 2006. "Well-being, social capital and public policy: What's new?" Economic Journal 116:C34-C45. Hodess, Robin, Jessie Banfield, and Toby Wolfe. 2001. "Global Corruption Report 2001." Berlin: Transparency International. Johnston, Michael. 2005. Syndromes of corruption : wealth, power, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. —. 2006. "From Thucydides to Mayor Daley: Bad Politics, and a Culture of Corruption." P.S. Political Science and Politics 39:809-812. Karklins, Rasma. 2005. The system made me do it : corruption in post-communist societies. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. Levi, Margaret. 2006. "Why we need a new theory of government " Perspectives on Politics 4:5-19. Lichbach, Mark I. 1997. The Co-operator's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mauro, Paola. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:681-712. McMillan, John, and Pablo. Zoido. 2004. "How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18:69-92. Montinola, Gabriella R., and Robert W. Jackman. 2002. "Sources of Corruption. A Cross-Country Study." British Journal of Political Science 32:147-170. Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2006. "Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment." Journal of Democracy 17:86-99. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. Neild, R. R. 2002. Public corruption : the dark side of social evolution. London: Anthem. North, Douglass C. 1998. "Where have we been and where are we going?" Pp. 491-508 in Economics, Values and Organization, edited by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 2006. "What is missing from political economy." in Handbook of Political Economcy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2006. "A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorden Human History." Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Offe, Claus. 2004. "Political Corruption. Conceptual and Practical Issues." Pp. 77-99 in Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition, edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and János Kornai. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan. Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Reveiw 92:1-23. Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in time : history, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Robert, Harris. 2003. Political Corruption in and Beyond the Nation State. London: Routledge. Rodrik, Dani. 1999. "Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them." in International Monetary Fund: Conference on Second Generation Reform. Washington D. C. Root, Hilton R. 1996. Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 2004. "Governance and Corruption." in Global Crises, Global Solutions, edited by Bjørn Lomborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rothstein, Bo. 1998. "State Building and Capitalism: The Rise of the Swedish Bureaucracy." Scandinavian Political Studies 21:287-306. —. 2003. "Social Capital, Economic Growth and Quality of Government: The Causal Mechanism." New Political Economy 14:67-87. —. 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rothstein, Bo, and Daniel Eek. 2006. "Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach." Philadelphia: Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Rothstein, Bo, and Dietlind Stolle. 2008. "The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust." Comparative Politics (forthcoming). Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2005. "What is Quality of Government: A Theory of Impartial Political Institutions." Washington D. C.: Annual Meeting of the American Political
161 Science Assocition. Rothstein, Bo, and Eric M. Uslaner. 2005. "All for All. Equality, Corruption and Social Trust." World Politics 58:41-73. Schelling, Thomas C. 1996. Social Mechanisms and Social Dynamics. Stockholm:Department of Sociology. Sung, Hung-En. 2004. "Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison." Crime Law and Social Change 41:179-194. UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002 - Bosnia and Herzegovina. New York: United Nation Development Program -. Uslaner, Eric M. 2008 (forthcoming). The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law. Corruption, Inequality and Trust. New York: Cambridge University Press. Warren, Mark E. 2004. "What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?" American Journal of Political Science 48:328-343. World.Bank. 2000. "Anti-Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate." Washington D. C.: The World Bank. You, Jong-Sung. 2006. "A Comparative Study of Income Inequality, Corruption and Social Trust: How Inequality and Corruption Reinforce Each Other and Erode Social Trust (Ph. D. Diss.)." Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Kennedy School of Goverment. Young, H. Peyton. 1998. Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. VII Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari berkas http://www.kun.edu.stockholm.se/pdfdoc/Corruption%20- %20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Incentives%20and%20Solutions%20av%20Alexander %20Jtmaa.pdf. Google membuat versi HTML dari dokumen tersebut secara otomatis pada saat menelusuri web. Page 1 Corruption An Introduction to the Incentives and Solutions Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Aim and research questions 3. Definition 4. Method 5. Three different theories The Historic The Individualistic , The Macroeconomic, In Brief 6. Comparison: Sweden – Zambia 7 Swedish International Development Cooperation (Sida) 8. Transparency International (TI) 9. Result 10. Discussion 11. Evaluation of sources 12. Bibliography 13 Introduction
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FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
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o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
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justified by recourse to some princ
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We can conclude that the various cu
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pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
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er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
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suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
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pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
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and compromised in a corrupt and in
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
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Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
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case they would occasionally make e
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analogies lead to bad conclusions,
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Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
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Indicates the frequency of attempts
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Population Public officials . Not e
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4. Corruption expectations Populati
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. that it is a successful practice
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as corruption within international
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wrath is seen as directed at our ow
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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Page 123 and 124: in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Page 127 and 128: Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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Page 131 and 132: In India, as we have seen, transfer
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Page 167 and 168: 167 bring together the media, polit
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Page 189 and 190: Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
Page 191 and 192: 191 2)Even the institutional reform
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Page 203 and 204: that create deprivation face little
Page 205: The debate about the composition of
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