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188 Becker, Gary (1993), "Nobel Lecture: The Economic way of Thinking About Behavior" Journal of Political Economy, 108: 234-267. Buscaglia, Edgardo (1997), Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, Policy Studies Journal, Vol 17, No 4. Buscaglia, Edgardo (1997) "An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Practices within the Judiciary in Latin America" in Essays in Law and Economics V, Kluwer Press. Buscaglia, Edgardo (1995), Stark Picture of Justice in Latin America, The Financial Times, March 21, p. A 13. Buscaglia, Edgardo and Valeria Merino Dirani (2000), Estudio Empirico sobre las Condicionantes Institucionales para la Transparencia en la Justicia de Ecuador. Quito, Ecuador: CLD and Transparency International. Buscaglia, Edgardo and William Ratliff (2000) Law and Economics in Developing Countries Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Buscaglia, Edgardo and Maria Dakolias (1996), A Quantitative Analysis of the Judicial Sector: The Cases of Argentina and Ecuador. World Bank Technical Paper No 353, Washington DC: The World Bank. Buscaglia, Edgardo and Maria Dakolias (1999), An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary”, Technical Papers, Legal Department, Washington DC; The World Bank. Buscaglia, Edgardo, William Ratliff, and Maria Dakolias (1995). Judicial Reform in Latin America: A Framework for National Development in Essays in Public Policy., Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Buscaglia, Edgardo and Thomas Ulen (1997) "A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America" in International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No 2, New York, NY: Elsevier Science. Bussani, Mauro and Ugo Mattei (1997), "Making the Other Path Efficient: Economic Analysis and Tort Law in Less Developed Countries" in Law and Economics of Development, Buscaglia, Edgardo, William Ratliff, and Robert Cooter (eds.), Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Cooter, Robert and Nuno Garoupa (2000) “A Vicious Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes” Paper presented at the European Law and Economics Association. Ghent, September, 2000. Cooter, Robert (1996), "The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development", in Buscaglia, Edgardo, Ratliff, William, and Cooter, Robert (eds) Law and Economics of Development, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. de Soto, Hernando (1989), The Other Path, New York: Harper and Row. Gambetta, Diego (1993), The Sicilian Mafia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Langseth, Petter (2000), Integrated vs Quantitative Methods, Lessons Learned; Paper Presented at NORAD Conference, Oslo, 21 October 2000. Langseth, Petter and Oliver Stolpe (2001), “Strengthen the Judiciary Against Corruption” International Yearbook for Judges. Australia. Leiken, Robert S. (1996), "Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic" Foreign Policy 5, pp. 55-73. Klitgaard, Robert (1991), Adjusting to Reality: Beyond State versus market in Economic Development, San Francisco, ICS Press. Lui, Francis T. (1985), “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery” Journal of Political Economy 93, (4) 760-781. Macrae, J. (1982), "Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach" World Development 10 (8), pp. 677-687. Marselli, Riccardo and Marco Vannini (1997), Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No 1: pp. 89-113. Mauro, Paolo (1995), "Corruption and Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: pp. 681-711 Ratliff, William and Edgardo Buscaglia (1997), "Judicial Reform: The Neglected Priority in Latin America," Annals of the National Academy of Social and Political Science, 1996. Rose Ackerman, Susan (1978), "Corruption: A Study in Political Economy", New York: Academic Press. Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1997), "Corruption and Development" Manuscript (Draft # 3, ABCDE CONF.). Shleifer, A and Vishny, R. W. (1993), "Corruption" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108: 599-617. Smith, Adam (1978), Lectures on Jurisprudence, Oxford, Oxford University Press. VIII
Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari berkas http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA2006/papers/Carlos%20Gouvea%20_English_.pdf. Google membuat versi HTML dari dokumen tersebut secara otomatis pada saat menelusuri web. Page 1 PRESIDENTIALISM AND CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA: A TALE OF MISLEADING ASSUMPTIONS AND DISRUPTIVE PERCEPTIONS Carlos Portugal Gouvêa Cambridge, March 2005 1. INTRODUCTION 2. PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 3. CORRUPTION AND PRESIDENTIALISM 3.1.EALIST THEORIES OF CORRUPTION 3.2. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF CORRUPTION 3.3. EQUITY THEORY OF CORRUPTION 3.4. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 4 1. ELITES ‘PACT THEORY AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 4.2. ELITES ‘ PACT THEORY AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS 5. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE IN LATIN AMERICA 6. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY BY LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY 6.1. INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL T OLERANCE TO UNFAIR ECONOMIC REFORMS 6.2. LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT UNFAIR ECONOMIC POLICIES APPENDIX I. SCATTER DIAGRAM OF CORRUPTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY APPENDIX II. REGRESSION – CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY APPENDIX III. TABLE – CPI, GINI, CL, PR, AND GDP Page 2 1. Introduction This paper will discuss the general assumption that presidential systems in Latin America, characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of presidents, are prone to corruption. A common argument of contemporary development theories is that such concentration of discretionary authority generates corruption because the executive can freely negotiate rent-seeking opportunities. Hence, a simplistic view of this problem would be that reducing the power of the executive would reduce corruption. My objective here is not to prove that such statement is wrong, but only to highlight some misleading assumptions surrounding this question, particularly some suppositions which informed the process of political and economic liberalization in Latin America during the last two decades of the 20 th century. I will discuss in some detail three of such assumptions. The first assumption was that Latin American political culture was inclined to authoritarianism and tolerant to corruption. This would explain why most Latin American countries have systems characterized by ―executive supremacy‖, with strong presidents, and why levels of perception of corruption are 189
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o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
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justified by recourse to some princ
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pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
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er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
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suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
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pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
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and compromised in a corrupt and in
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
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Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
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case they would occasionally make e
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analogies lead to bad conclusions,
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Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
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Indicates the frequency of attempts
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Population Public officials . Not e
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4. Corruption expectations Populati
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. that it is a successful practice
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as corruption within international
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wrath is seen as directed at our ow
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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Page 187: community-based institutions in Per
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Page 205: The debate about the composition of
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