FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

Propositions 1 and 2 showed how social integration can facilitate
coordinated complaints against corrupt officials. To see more clearly
how this will be reflected in transfer frequency, we must return to the
model and allow for incomplete information (so that transfers due to
coordinated complaints will sometimes occur on the path of play).
Model (Incomplete Information)
When faced with a pair of clients, an official does not necessarily know
the nature of the relationship between them. In the context of our
model, officials may not be certain whether two individuals are in fact
members of the same network. So, we will now modify the model of
section 3 by assuming that at the start of a briber‟s dilemma game, the
official receives a signal which indicates whether the clients with whom
he is dealing are members of the same network, and that this signal is
incorrect with probability µ > 0 (as a result, officials will sometimes
make mistakes on the path of play).
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“(D)epartments take advantage of every procedure to delay inquiries, investi-
gations, and prosecutions . . . [officials have] two codes of conduct, two allegiances
if you will, one to the group of departmental colleagues, the other to the adminis-
tration as a whole.” (Palmier 1985:111-2)
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Wade (1982:311; 1989:77,95); de Zwart (1994:8,71,130)
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After the signal is observed, play proceeds as in section 3. First, the
official chooses whether to demand bribes (d), or not (h). If he chooses
h, each client expects to receive, on average, half the rent (
R
2
). If he
chooses d, the two clients (x and y) receive fractions r
x
and (1 − r
x
)
of the rent respectively, where r
x
is given by (1). The clients then
simultaneously choose whether to complain (at a cost c), or bribe the
official, and if they bribe, how much to pay. Simultaneously, they play
the “trade” games within their respective networks. Assume that the
number of networks, N, is common knowledge, and that N ≥ 2.
We continue to assume that the only way the government monitors
officials is by punishing them in response to coordinated complaints
from clients (Assumption 1). We can now interpret this punishment
as a transfer to another post. An official who is transferred suffers a
disutility T.
To see how social integration, corruption, and transfer frequency will
be related in this model, we define the following variables:
Definition. The level of corruption, γ, is the expected proportion of
briber‟s dilemmas in which bribery occurs.
Definition. Transfer frequency, λ, is the expected probability that an
incumbent official is transferred in any period.
Consider the following “linked” strategy for the clients:
• If a member of one‟s own network cheats another member in either
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