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1 Uslaner (2004) linked trust with inequality and corruption, arguing that inequality erodes trust and that distrust increases corruption. However, he does not look at the adverse effect of corruption on social trust. VIII Anti-Corruption – A Big Bang Theory Bo Rothstein This is very much work in progress – please handle with care QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2007:3 THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science Göteborg University Box 711 SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG May 2007 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2007 by Bo Rothstein. All rights reserved. To be presented at the Conference on Corruption and Democracy organized by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Insitutions, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, June 8-9, 2007. Anti-Corruption – A Big Bang Theory Bo Rothstein QoG Working Paper Series 2007:3 May 2007 ISSN 1653-8919 Bo Rothstein The Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science, Göteborg University Box 711 SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden bo.rothstein@pol.gu.se 146 Page 1 Page 3 1. Prologue – searching for the keys In January 2005, my colleague Sören Holmberg and I were approached by the CEO of one of the major funding agencies for research in Sweden - The Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research. The reason was that he had heard about our new research initiative - The Quality of Government Institute - and wondered whether we would be interested in working out a ―greenish‖ research program that they could fund. He envisioned ―big money‖, but the proposal came with a string attached. Our research had to become ―user-friendly‖ and, In order to ensure this goal, we had to work under the direction of a board made up of potential users not only for the eventual research program, but also (and to my surprise) in preparing the application. As head of the board he appointed Mr. Sven Sandström, who had just retired
147 from his position as vice-president of the World Bank. In our subsequent meetings, Mr. Sandström repeatedly stated two arguments. One was the need for a specific time-table for when we would deliver the results that anti-corruption organizations (such as the World Bank) could make use of - what was called ―deliverables‖. The second argument was whether we could specify the nature of the ―keys‖ for curbing corruption that he thought our research would produce. He envisioned that such ―keys‖ would come in the form of specific institutional devices that could be put in place and that would set in motion an incentivedriven change that would lead a country (or a certain sector in a region, like the forest industry) out of corruption. My arguments that this could not be done because the very reason you conduct this type of research is that you don‘t know what you may find and you also don‘t know if your results will be useful for policies, were not well received by Mr. Sandström. Needles to say, this collaboration did not end in a friendly mood (and I came to detest the word ―deliverables‖). 1 However, Mr. Sandström is not alone in having this idea about corruption research. Most scholars who venture into research on corruption and present their ideas to policy people, students and colleagues outside this research field experience similar things. After having explained why corruption is an interesting topic for research, how you think corrupt practices work and its (devastating) consequences for many areas, the question about ―what to do‖ quickly comes up. Most people, not least other social scientists (not to speak of students), 1 See my op-ed in the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter 05-06-2006. It is not that I‘m against policy relevant research – on the contrary I would very much like for my research to be useful for policy. Instead, it is the idea that you beforehand can know what you will find. Page 4 have this idea about ―keys‖. Their idea seems to be that there are some kinds of buttons you can press that will set in motion an incremental process of change that will function like a path that step-by-step leads a society away from systemic corruption. It seems as if many colleagues in the social sciences are nowadays inclined to understand social changes in a path-dependent, incremental way. Whatever state of affairs a society has reached, this has started from some ―critical juncture‖ or ―formative moment‖ that took place a long time ago. Some sort of minor institutional change has in such a situation set in motion a kind of ―feed-back mechanism‖ or ―auto-correlation‖ that leads to a virtuous (or vicious) causal circulation between two or more variables so that they reinforce one another over time and keep the society spinning on the ―chosen path‖. As Paul Pierson puts it, ―As feedback loops become central to the process that follows a critical juncture, it becomes impossible to delineate clear causes and effects; instead, a set of factors mutually reinforce one another.‖ (Pierson 2004, p. 95) He also states that: Initial steps in a particular direction may encourage further movement along the same path. Over time, roads not chosen may become increasingly distant, increasingly unreachable alternatives. (Pierson 2004, p. 64). In this line of thinking, analyses about curbing corruption are geared towards finding those ―initial steps‖, this magical ―key‖ in the form of a small institutional device that will make a country start spinning on a new path that leads out of systemic corruption. A typical instance of this thinking can for example be found in the World Bank‘s report about policy measures to combat corruption in ―transition countries‖. For the successful implementation of anti-corruption policies, the report states that the challenge is to find ―an appropriate entry point for anticorruption work‖. Moreover, the report states that ―it is critical to begin at a point where the goals are feasible and tangible results can be realized within a time frame that builds support for further reforms. Small gains can provide essential levers to sway public and official opinion.‖ (World.Bank 2000, p. 75). Thus, if we could only find this magic key (the ―entry point‖), and change this institutional device, we would be able to advise policy-makers Page 5 on this important topic. If large differences start out with small changes, we need to find this small thing because huge (society wide) things like systemic corruption are otherwise hard to change. The argument in this paper/thought piece is that this is the wrong way to think about possible policies for curbing corruption. There is no magic key or simple institutional device – instead what is needed in order to change the nature of corruption and its related practices is a ―big-bang‖ change. Moreover, ―key-type‖ small changes are likely to worsen the problem and make corruption and similar practices even more ingrained.
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of
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