FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

eforms should limit the influence of top politicians and their allies. Other efforts need to focus on
the bribe payers, especially global firms. Some of the same firms that engage in legal political
activities at home feel less constrained about violating laws on campaign funding and bribery in
developing and transitional economies. Thus considerable current effort has focused on encouraging
the international business community to develop norms of honesty and a lack of tolerance of bribery
by their employees. In addition to efforts that are essentially hortatory, the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions is in the
process of ratification and includes some follow-up monitoring. A number of Central European
countries have signed this treaty, and most of those have ratified it. The international movement to
limit corruption in international business spearheaded by the nonprofit Transparency International is
clearly an effort to change the level of honesty of global corporations.
e. Buying Judicial Decisions
Judges have power to affect the distribution of wealth through their decisions. Thus like any
public official with similar powers, they face corrupt incentives. Corrupt incentives are higher when
judges are underpaid and overburdened and have poorly equipped and understaffed offices. Even if
judges are not themselves corrupt, clerks in charge of assigning cases and advising judges may
demand or accept bribes. Payoffs can be a way to speed up decisions when delays and backlogs are
high. Bribes can also influence decisions in one‘s favor. Occasionally bidding wars have been
reported in which parties on opposing sides compete in making payoffs.
When the judiciary is viewed as corrupt, this introduces uncertainties into the business
climate. The law in the books may not mean much, and those with disputes will avoid bringing them
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before the courts unless they are certain to be the high bribers. Individuals with disputes find ways
to circumvent the court system by hiring private arbitrators and using other methods, such as the
protection provided by organized crime. In eastern Europe and Russia some murders of
businessmen and bankers appear to be execution-style killing that are part of a brutal private system
of ―dispute resolution.‖ Thus reform of the judiciary can have spillover effects for the level of
honesty and trust in other sectors of the economy. Thus it needs to be a priority although it cannot
be done in a vacuum. If substantive laws are poorly drafted and impose arbitrary constraints,
individuals and firms may avoid using the courts. If the police and prosecutors are understaffed and
corrupt themselves, then the courts will be of little help in reforming the criminal justice system.
f. Buying Political Influence and Buying Votes
Democratic political system must find a way to finance political campaigns without
encouraging the sale of politicians to contributors. Governments have drawn the line between legal
and illegal gifts in quite different ways, and legal frameworks vary greatly in the limits they place on
quid pro quo deals by politicians. This is not the place to debate the pros and cons of alternative
methods of campaign finance. All I want to do here is to suggest that campaign finance legislation
ought to be a priority for the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Even entirely legal contributions from wealthy interests are a source of concern. The worry
is favoritism. Groups that give funds to elected officials expect help in the legislative process. They
may also expect special treatment on individual problems in dealing with the bureaucracy or in
seeking privatizing firms and public contracts. The electoral process can discipline politicians to
represent the interests of their constituents, and voters may penalize candidates who seem too
deeply beholden to special interests. But voters cannot act unless they know both how their
representatives behave and who has given them money. Legal gifts can have a corrupting effect if
they need not be made public and if the quid pro quo is not itself obvious to voters.
Conflicts of interest are another problem that needs to be addressed. Potential conflicts exist
whenever a politician or a member of his or her family or staff has an ownership interest in a firm
that does business with the government or that can benefit from state policy. No corrupt payoffs or
campaign donations may occur, but the risk of favoritism is the same. Politicians may seek to
benefit businesses in which they have a financial interest. Conversely, they might use their influence
in a private business to further their political careers.
Self-dealing has only recently raised questions in some countries. In new democracies,