FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

that create deprivation face little political opposition. It might be argued that political reaction
will come when a critical mass is achieved. However, the incremental character of such losses
57). In this model, the concept of unfairness is derived from Rawl‘s second principle of justice. One formulation of the
principle is that ―social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open for all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity‖. See John Rawls, A T HEORY OF J
USTICE : REVISED EDITION 72 (Harvard University Press, 1999).
58). The red line represents the distribution of income before reforms. The blue line demonstrates the distribution after
reforms.
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might lead to a different kind of reaction: the silent process of social fragmentation based on
violence, distrust, and disenchantment. Conversely, in more equitable societies such as Society
2, similar policies would drive a much larger percentage of the population below the poverty
line. Supposing that both societies have similar gross domestic incomes, resulting in also similar
perceptual negative growths and total income losses, it is easy to perceive that the popular outcry
in more equitable society would be much more intense because a larger percentage of the
population would be driven towards deprivation, even it the final percentages of people under the
poverty line in both societies would be similar. 59).
Also, in more equitable societies the reaction to unfairness might take the form of public
demonstrations and political pressure which could slowdown such policies or demand
compensations for extreme deprivation. In unequal societies, reaction to unfairness takes the
form of distrust in political institutions, based on a generalized perception of corruption, and
increasingly low compliance with rules. In equitable societies, the tipping point is reached when
there are public demonstrations. In unequal societies, the tipping point is hard to identify, and
when it is reached, it is already too late to slowdown or reverse policies.
6.2. Limiting Presidential Authority to Implement Unfair Economic Policies
As discussed in the previous section, the executive authority to legislate is, in Latin
American constitutional systems, the main possible source of unfair economic policies. It is also
a very powerful mechanism to feed the vicious circle of corruption perception and income
inequality. To prevent such effects, Latin American constitutional systems should incorporate
59). This conclusion is based on the assumption that poverty also means powerlessness and deprivation of political
rights. For this reason, increases on poverty levels do not generate the same level of political opposition from those
already in poverty than from newcomers. See World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT : ATTACKING
POVERTY (The World Bank, 2001) (―poor people are active agents in their lives, but are often powerless to influence
the social and economic factors that determine their well-being‖).
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checks on executive authority to legislate in matters of economic policy. From the previous
discussion it was possible to conclude that reforms to strengthen political parties, to transfer
legislative authority from the executive to Congress, and formal mechanisms to fight corruption,
such as increasing penalties, can only be successful if articulated with reforms which distribute
political power to the disenfranchised groups.
My proposal is to require that every decree or proposed bill related to economic and
financial policies issued by the president should include a cost-benefit analysis focusing on their
distributive outcomes. Each department proposing the legislative piece would be responsible for
preparing the distributive cost-benefit analysis. Those studies would then be presented to a
―Council of Social and Economic Development‖, which would approve or not such assessments.
This process by the Council should include public hearings and analyses by independent
consultants.
The objective of such mechanism is to reduce the informational asymmetry between the
executive power and groups which might bear the costs of reforms, particularly disenfranchised
groups which risk enduring some form of deprivation as a result of economic reforms. The
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