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PRESIDENTIALISM AND CORRUPTION IN LATIN
AMERICA: A TALE OF MISLEADING ASSUMPTIONS AND
DISRUPTIVE PERCEPTIONS
Carlos Portugal Gouvêa
Cambridge, March 2005
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
3. CORRUPTION AND PRESIDENTIALISM
3.1.EALIST THEORIES OF CORRUPTION
3.2. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF CORRUPTION
3.3. EQUITY THEORY OF CORRUPTION
3.4. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
4 1. ELITES ‘PACT THEORY AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
4.2. ELITES ‘ PACT THEORY AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS
5. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE IN LATIN AMERICA
6. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY BY LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY
6.1. INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL T OLERANCE TO UNFAIR
ECONOMIC REFORMS
6.2. LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT UNFAIR
ECONOMIC POLICIES
APPENDIX I. SCATTER DIAGRAM OF CORRUPTION AND INCOME
INEQUALITY
APPENDIX II. REGRESSION – CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY
APPENDIX III. TABLE – CPI, GINI, CL, PR, AND GDP
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1. Introduction
This paper will discuss the general assumption that presidential systems in Latin
America, characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of presidents, are prone to
corruption. A common argument of contemporary development theories is that such
concentration of discretionary authority generates corruption because the executive can freely
negotiate rent-seeking opportunities. Hence, a simplistic view of this problem would be that
reducing the power of the executive would reduce corruption. My objective here is not to prove
that such statement is wrong, but only to highlight some misleading assumptions surrounding
this question, particularly some suppositions which informed the process of political and
economic liberalization in Latin America during the last two decades of the 20 th century.
I will discuss in some detail three of such assumptions. The first assumption was that
Latin American political culture was inclined to authoritarianism and tolerant to corruption.
This would explain why most Latin American countries have systems characterized by
―executive supremacy‖, with strong presidents, and why levels of perception of corruption are
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