FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

Let us now reiterate the hypothesis of the Personal Character of Corruption. The
hypothesis is that, to be corrupt, an action must involve a corruptor who performs the
action or a person who is corrupted by it. Of course, corruptor and corrupted need not
necessarily be the same person, and indeed there need not be both a corruptor and a
corrupted; all that is required is that there be a corruptor or a corrupted person.
If a serviceable definition of the concept of a corrupt action is to be found – and
specifically, one that does not collapse into the more general notion of an immoral
action – then attention needs to be focussed on the moral effects that some actions have
on persons and institutions. An action is corrupt only if it corrupts something or
someone – so corruption is not only a moral concept, but also a causal or quasi-causal
concept.
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That is, an action is corrupt by virtue of having a corrupting effect on a
person‟s moral character or on an institutional process or purpose. If an action has a
corrupting effect on an institution, undermining institutional processes or purposes, then
typically – but not necessarily - it has a corrupting effect also on persons qua role
occupants in the affected institutions.
In relation to the concept of institutional corruption, the second hypothesis states (as a
necessary condition) that an action is corrupt only if it has the effect of undermining an
institutional process or of subverting an institutional purpose or of despoiling the
character of some role occupant qua role occupant. This hypothesis asserts the Causal
Character of Corruption.
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In fact there is an important exception to this that I discuss elsewhere. Note also that the corrupted are
not necessarily morally responsible for being corrupted. I discuss these issues in detail in Miller “Concept
of Corruption” op.cit.
8
This kind of account has ancient origins, e.g., in Aristotle. See Barry Hindess (2001).
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Paper given at the international conference, Civil Society, Religion & Global Governance:
Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1–2 September 2005, Canberra Australia
6
In this regard, note that an infringement of a specific law or institutional rule does not in
and of itself constitute an act of institutional corruption. In order to do so, any such
infringement needs to have an institutional effect, e.g., to defeat the institutional purpose
of the rule, to subvert the institutional process governed by the rule, or to contribute to
the despoiling of the moral character of the role occupant qua role occupant. In short,
we need to distinguish between the offence considered in itself and the institutional
effect of committing that offence. Considered in itself the offence of, say, lying is an
infringement of a law, rule, and/or a moral principle. However, the offence is only an
act of institutional corruption if it has some effect, e.g., it is performed in a courtroom
setting and thereby subverts the judicial process.
A further point to be made here is that an act that has a corrupting effect might not be a
moral offence considered in itself. For example, a corporate officer who provides
information that will enable an investor to buy shares cheaply before they rise in value
might not a moral offence considered in itself. However, in this corporate setting it
might constitute insider trading, and do institutional damage; as such, it may well be an
act of corruption.