FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

president would have to expose the possible costs inherent to economic and financial policies,
and identify winners and losers. Not only it would reduce informational asymmetries, but it
would also increase transparency, as groups benefiting directly from reforms would have to
demonstrate how those benefits would be to the advantage of society as a whole. The
distributive analysis would also represent a social compact, in which the government would
present an assessment of efficiencies created by reforms, its costs, benefits, and possible
compensations for damaged groups. Misleading distributive analysis would also invite scrutiny
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in the future, creating checks on governmental activities based on forward-looking assessments
revealing possibly hidden winners and losers.
Another benefit of such mechanism would be to slowdown the process of economic
reforms. Many recent economic analyses demonstrated that there is an inner virtue on gradual
reforms. Not only they are more democratic, giving dissenting groups an opportunity to present
alternative policies, but they are also more prone to generate sustainable economic growth, once
such policies are usually based on broader social compacts. 60).
Economic policies implemented based on thin popular support might lead to reversals, creating many
unnecessary costs for poor
countries with very limited resources.
Requiring distributive analysis might also be beneficial by itself. Some governments
possibly already apply distributive analyses to most of their policies. However, it is more likely
that most incumbents simply do not request comprehensive distributive analyses while
evaluating economic policies. As discussed above, the outcome of implementing economic
reforms without due regard for their distributive consequences could be very unpleasant.
Requiring such analyses might lead governments to reformulate their policies, even before
making them public, leading to sounder police making.
Another important element of this proposal is the creation of a Council of Social and
Economic Development with constitutional status. The main objective of the Council is to
require the government to engage in a public dialogue with representatives of civil society,
creating an opportunity for disfranchised groups to negotiate possible compensatory policies
with representatives of the government. To achieve this objective, the Council should be
60). Dani Rodrik, NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89-95 (Johns Hopkins University
Press,1999).
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compounded by an equal number of representatives of government and civil society.61).
As mentioned, the Council would not have the authority to modify or veto proposed bills and
decrees. It should be responsible for making sure that distributive analyses for such projects are
sensible. This process would also have the benefit of increasing publicity over such assessments,
including public hearings. This structure should increase transparency in the process of
economic reforms, reducing the perception of corruption. It might also reduce the ―delegative‖
character of Latin American political systems, requiring presidents to engage in a continuous
dialogue with civil society at large, and not only the elites.
This program is not only a program for institutional reform. It is also a program for the
direction of Latin American legal scholarship. The distributive impact of economic and financial
reforms in the region has not occupied the research agenda of Latin American legal scholars with
the required intensity. Considering that the region has the highest levels of income inequality in
the world, and also considering how economic distribution is relevant for political stability and
institutional legitimization, such concern should be central, at least for every scholar dedicated to
constitutional aspects of economic and social policies. 61).
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