FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

trade liberalization; (6) liberalization of foreign direct investment; (7) privatization; and (8)
deregulation. 44) Those reforms were highly unpopular, particularly because of their negative
distributive effects.45) They needed a political theory to guide and justify their implementation.
Such theory might be described as the ―bitter pill‖ theory.46). Such theory proposed that it would be better
to implement all reforms at once, and suffer all its consequences together, regaining the
path to economic development as soon as possible. The other option would be to implement
reforms gradually, and spread the effects of transition over the years, what would delay benefits
from global economic integration.47). here are two practical reasons which would justify such radical
approach. First was the idea that, once implemented, such reforms would become irreversible. Second was
the hope that such reforms could be implemented during the term of a supportive president, avoiding
possible reversals caused by the election of opposing groups. 48). The model described above as
―delegative democracy‖ came in handy for this task. 49).
44). Id. at 324. The original proposition also included redirection of public expenditures towards improving income
distribution and policies to reduce informal economy. However, such policies were not implemented in the region in
the first moment in conjunction with the other economic liberalization reforms.
45). All policies had indirect redistributive effects, resulting from increases on unemployment, lower social investment
by the government; or increases in prices of public utilities. Maybe the most direct redistributive effect resulted
from tax reforms. Most reforms in the region were direct towards reduction on income taxes and increases in
consumption taxes, with a clear regressive character. See Samuel A. Morley, Distribution and Growth in Latin
America, 66 Trade and Macroeconomics Division Discussion Paper (International Food Policy Research Center,
2001).
46). Also called ―shock therapy‖ by economists, in similar contexts.
47). See ADAM PRZEWORSKI , DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET : POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
163 (Cambridge University Press 1991).
As described by the OECD at the time, ―while a gradualist approach may cause lesser social tensions, a long period of
moderate reforms entails the danger that both reformers and the population will ‗become tired of reforms‘, as they do
not seem to bring visible changes. Also during long period reforms various anti-reform and other lobbies may mobilize
their forces and gradually strangle the reform process‖. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMAND TO
M ARKET E CONOMY 9 (OECD, 1990).
49). As described by O‘Donnell, the technicians implementing economic reforms ―must be politically protected by the
President against the manifold resistances of society. (…) The President [then] isolates himself from most existing
political institutions and organized interests, and bears sole responsibility for the successes and failures of ―his‖
policies. [Popular opposition to reforms] further increases the political isolation of the President, his difficulties in
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My argument is that such theoretical approaches misevaluated the costs of such reforms
for disenfranchised groups and overrated the political capacity of such groups to oppose those
policies. The costs were imagined only in terms of lower economic growth. However, lower
economic growth cumulated with increases in economic inequality generated social disruptions
which costs have not yet been accounted for. Maybe the costs of the ―bitter pill‖ reached a
―tipping point‖ in which the levels of institutional degradation, social violence, lack of trust in
government, and corruption will impair those countries from recovering for a much longer
time.
That is what a responsive political system should have avoided. But there was not such a
system in place. Instead, ―deliberative democracy‖ shielded incumbents from facing the reaction
from already powerless groups burdened by reforms, while maintaining its permeability to the
influence of economic elites.
5. Executive Authority to Legislate in Latin America
Constitutional authority of the president to legislate by decree became a feature of Latin
American politics after the transition from authoritarianism. Its ―constitutionalization‖ was
demanded to implement economic reforms once it was believed that parliaments would not act
fast enough and would not have the technical tools necessary to fight financial crises. The chaos
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