FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

connected with a broader sense of fairness in society. When the government implements policies
which burden a majority of disadvantaged groups in society to the benefit of the wealthier
minority, it reduces the legitimacy of government and increases the perception of corruption. A
higher perception of corruption by itself, no matter how correlated with real corruption, has a
disruptive effect in society. It increases the perception of risk and reduces investment. It
decreases trust among strangers, reducing opportunities for business and distorting general
allocation of resources. It increases the perception of impunity, stimulating corruption by
reducing perceived risks of engaging in bribing and stealing of public funds. For those reasons,
the long term effects of high economic inequality on corruption might not be underestimated,
even in wealthy societies with efficient and well structured bureaucracies.
Latin America is characterized by the weakness of its institutions, as a result of its
colonization model, in which political and economic power was usually concentrated in the same
hands. Such a political system, with blurred lines separating public and private resources, can be
described as patrimonialistic.37).
The vicious circle between corruption and inequality which I described above is nothing but a modern
description of patrimonialism. Patrimonialism was initially described as a characteristic of pre-modern,
medieval societies, in which it was not possible to differentiate between the belongings of the lords and
those of the state. Such features
35).See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 22, at 33 (―Corruption also tends to distort the allocation of economic benefits,
favoring the haves over the have-nots and leading to a less equitable income distribution.‖
36) See Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer, supra note 34.
37). For an example of the evolution of patrimonialism in Latin America, and its relation with colonialism,
concentration of land, and slavery, see Raymundo Faoro, OS DONOS DOP : A FORMAÇÃO DO PATRONATO P
OLÍTICO BRASILEIRO (Globo, 1975).
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of patrimonialism would disappear with modernization. Industrialization would require efficient
bureaucracies and formal rules would separate public and private interests.38) Contemporary
Latin American societies proved that patrimonialism might survive modernization. Modern
bureaucracies and legal systems can operate to benefit a few, allowing constant transformations
of economic power into political power. Fighting corruption in the region requires more than
legal formalism. It requires efficient mechanisms to distribute political and economic power.
4. Political and Economic Transitions in Latin America
4.1. Elites‘ Pacts Theory and Political Transitions
The study of the transition from authoritarianism in Latin America gave rise to a new
approach to the theory of democracy, focused on the values of elites and suggesting that mass
behavior was secondary in the process of democratization. 39). I will briefly explain aspects of this
theory related to the political and economic transitions in Latin America in 1980s and 1990s, and
the consequences of the consolidation of what was called ―delegative democracy‖. The failures
of this transition are at the core of the present difficulties in fighting corruption and reducing
income inequality in the region. Among such failures, the maintenance of mechanisms of
―executive supremacy‖ is probably the most blatant examples.
The main argument of the theory was that the transition should have been based on series
of pacts among elites. It was recognized that such pacts were not democratic, since their
objectives would be to maintain the same political groups in power. However, they assumed that
such pacts would open opportunities for the achievement of more democratic outcomes in the
38). See Max Weber, E CONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-1005 (Bedminster Press, 1968) Page 18
17 future. The transition would have three moments: (i) a military moment; (ii) a political moment;
and (iii) an economic moment. 40
The military moment would be when the dictatorships turn
softer, or ―civilized‖, by means of pacts between the military and political elites. Such pacts
would not be sustainable in the long run, creating an opportunity for new pacts among political
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