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as well as strengthening governance and public administration through technical cooperation will be analyzed. Readings Bertucci, Guido and Elia Armstronga. United Nations' Involvement in Promoting Government Ethics, in: El-Ayouty, Yassin et al. (eds.) Government Ethics: Toward Global Guidelines. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 2000. United Nations, A/RES/51/59, Action Against Corruption, 1997. United Nations, A/RES/51/191, United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, 1997. United Nations, A/RES/52/87, International Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, 1998. United Nations, A/RES/50/225, Public Administration and Development, 1996. 1 http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/COURSES/2000-2001/u6460s.html VIII 172 Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari berkas http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp12.pdf. Google membuat versi HTML dari dokumen tersebut secara otomatis pada saat menelusuri web. Page 1 GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST CORRUPTION RESEARCH AND SCIENTIFIC SERIES An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts Vienna, May 2001 CICP-12 Centre for International Crime Prevention This paper has not been officially edited The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the United Nations Page 2 Page 3 An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the
Courts: a Governance-based Approach *_/ *_/ Prepared by Edgardo Buscaglia, Ph. D, Crime Research Expert, Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC), Centre for International Crime Prevention, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, United Nations Office at Vienna. Dr. Buscaglia is the Director of the International Law and Economic Development Center, University of Virginia School of Law and Fellow, Stanford University, Hoover Institution, He has written extensively on the economic impact of legal reforms in developing countries. This summary essay was published as a full draft in the International Review of Law and Economics (2001), Elsevier Science Press All inquiries may be addressed to: Edgardo.Buscaglia@cicp.un.or.at 173 Abstract The scientific approach to the study of public sector corruption needs empirically verifiable methodologies in order to develop reliable anti-corruption prescriptions. This paper presents empirical results while proposing the use of six objective explanatory variables to capture the effects of corrupt practices in the courts. The article also proposes an empirical model, which incorporates substantiveprocedural, market-related, and organizational explanatory variables tested within the judicial sectors of Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts 1 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 2 II. EMPIRICAL FACTS ABOUT JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES............................................................................................................................4 III. OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND ITS MAIN CAUSES: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL ....................................................................................................................................8 IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS............................................................................................ 10 V. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 20 VI. REFERENCES............................................................................................................. 22 Page 7 An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts 2 I. INTRODUCTION For a long time, economists have focused their attention on the effects that well-functioning legal and judicial systems have on economic efficiency and development. Adam Smith states in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that a factor that "greatly retarded commerce was the imperfection of the law and the uncertainty in its application...." (Smith, p. 528). Judicial corruption hampers economic development by undermining the stability and predictability in the interpretation and enforcement of the law (Buscaglia, 1997 and 1999). Rose-Ackerman (1997, p. 5) states that "widespread corruption is a symptom that the state is functioning poorly". In fact, the entrenched characteristic of official corrupt practices is rooted in poor governance practices within a state agency coupled by the lack of alternative channels to secure a service through either the private or public sector (Buscaglia, 1997, p. 277). Many scholars have provided path-breaking contributions to the economic analysis of corruption. Studies focusing on describing corrupt practices and on analyzing the impact of corruption on economic development are abundant. Low compensation and weak monitoring systems are traditionally considered to be the main causes of corruption (Becker and Stigler, 1974; and Klitgaard,1991). In Becker-Stigler (1974) and Klitgaard (1991), official corruption through bribery reduces expected punishment and thus deterrence. In this context, increasing the salaries of public enforcers and/or paying private enforcement agencies for performance will
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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Page 123 and 124: in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Page 131 and 132: In India, as we have seen, transfer
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Page 163 and 164: 163 gifts and tributes between loca
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