- Page 1 and 2: FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
- Page 3 and 4: o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
- Page 5 and 6: justified by recourse to some princ
- Page 7 and 8: We can conclude that the various cu
- Page 9 and 10: pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
- Page 11 and 12: er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
- Page 13 and 14: suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
- Page 15 and 16: pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
- Page 17 and 18: and compromised in a corrupt and in
- Page 19 and 20: corruptor (as we have defined corru
- Page 21 and 22: to, a large corporation who steal f
- Page 23 and 24: including the moral characters of t
- Page 25 and 26: disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
- Page 27 and 28: penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
- Page 29 and 30: corruption — although it might se
- Page 31 and 32: yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
- Page 33 and 34: Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
- Page 35 and 36: case they would occasionally make e
- Page 37 and 38: analogies lead to bad conclusions,
- Page 39 and 40: Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
- Page 41 and 42: Indicates the frequency of attempts
- Page 43 and 44: Population Public officials . Not e
- Page 45: 4. Corruption expectations Populati
- Page 49 and 50: as corruption within international
- Page 51 and 52: wrath is seen as directed at our ow
- Page 53 and 54: Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
- Page 55 and 56: studies, for example, Watergate. In
- Page 57 and 58: Corruption is widely recognised to
- Page 59 and 60: Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
- Page 61 and 62: Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
- Page 63 and 64: phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
- Page 65 and 66: Definition of Institutional Corrupt
- Page 67 and 68: The third and final thesis to be di
- Page 69 and 70: A final point about social groups.
- Page 71 and 72: espect of the moral weight to be at
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- Page 75 and 76: elationship can be overcome or even
- Page 77 and 78: Related research VI Page 1 The Role
- Page 79 and 80: esources are embezzled from the sec
- Page 81 and 82: sentiments and when the rule of sys
- Page 83 and 84: Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
- Page 85 and 86: monitor it) and in a context in whi
- Page 87 and 88: 5 capital have received considerabl
- Page 89 and 90: Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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137 edastic-consisten t t-statistic
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139 erage of log of n um b er of co
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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no incentive to refrain from corrup
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children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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international donor organizations p
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19th Century Sweden - how corruptio
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civil servant to receive income fro
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159 The first is that "agents are n
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161 Science Assocition. Rothstein,
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163 gifts and tributes between loca
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165 corrupt acts in society. Global
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167 bring together the media, polit
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Transparency International, Corrupt
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Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
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Courts: a Governance-based Approach
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indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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(judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
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same kind of administrative and pro
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at a low expected cost and, therefo
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Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
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0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58
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community-based institutions in Per
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Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
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191 2)Even the institutional reform
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UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (U
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20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
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connected with a broader sense of f
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of