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on himself or externally on an institutional process or other person. In both cases, the action is the expression of a partially corrupt moral character. However, in the first, but not the second case the bribe-giver's action is corrupt by virtue of having a corrupt effect on himself. Di sini kita harus membedakan antara suatu tindakan jahat yang tidak punya efek pada [atas] suatu proses kelembagaan atau pada [atas] orang lain, tetapi yang berperan untuk korupsi karakter calon koruptor; dan suatu tindakan tidak merusak [yang] yang mana [adalah] suatu semata-mata ungkapan suatu karakter moral jahat tetapi yang tidak punya merusak efek baik di agen atau pada [atas] seseorang atau yang lain-lain. Di (dalam) koneksi ini mempertimbangkan dua sort;jenis calon bribe-givers uang suap siapa ditolak. Umpamakan bahwa kedua-duanya kasus tindakan mereka tidak punya merusak efek pada [atas] suatu proses kelembagaan atau lain orang. Sekarang mengira bahwa kasus yang pertama tindakan bribegiver's menawarkan uang suap tidak memperlemah disposisi nya untuk menawarkan uang suap; sehingga penawaran mempunyai suatu merusak efek pada [atas] karakter nya. Bagaimanapun, mengira bahwa di [dalam] kasus detik/second bribe-giver, usaha [yang] digagalkan nya untuk menyuap menghasilkan dia suatu [tidak/jangan] merasa malu dan suatu disposisi untuk menawarkan uang suap. Maka tindakan nya tidak punya merusak efek, baik di [sen]dirinya atau secara eksternal pada [atas] suatu proses kelembagaan atau lain orang. Di (dalam) kasus keduaduanya, tindakan adalah ungkapan suatu secara parsial merusak karakter moral. Bagaimanapun, di (dalam) yang dulu, tetapi bukan kasus tindakan bribe-giver's yang kedua adalah merusak berdasarkan atas mempunyai;nikmati suatu jahat mempengaruhi pada [atas] [sen]dirinya. I have argued that the corrupted are not necessarily morally responsible for being corrupted. I have also argued that typically corruptors are morally responsible for performing their corrupt actions. Accordingly, I have offered the hypothesis of an asymmetry between the corruptors and the corrupted. But what of those corruptors who are not morally responsible for their corrupt characters? Surely, at least in some cases, such people are not morally responsible for their corrupt actions, so strictly speaking — and contrary to our hypothesis — there is no asymmetry between the corrupted and the corruptors. This seems correct so far as it goes. However, some of those who are not morally responsible for having been corrupted are, nevertheless, morally responsible for not now trying to combat their corrupt characters. To that extent they might be held morally responsible for their corrupt actions, even if not for having been corrupted. Aku sudah berargumentasi bahwa yang dirusak tidaklah perlu [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk dirusak. Aku juga telah berargumentasi bahwa secara khas koruptor [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk melakukan/menyelenggarakan tindakan jahat mereka. [Yang] maka, aku sudah menawarkan hipotesis dari suatu asymmetry antar[a] koruptor dan yang dirusak. Hanyalah . apa [yang] koruptor itu [siapa] yang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk karakter jahat mereka? [Yang] sungguh pasti, sedikitnya dalam beberapa hal, . seperti (itu) orang-orang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka, maka pada hakekatnya- dan bertentangan dengan hipotesis [kita/kami]- tidak ada asymmetry antar[a] yang dirusak dan koruptor [itu]. Ini nampak benar sepanjang [itu] pergi. Bagaimanapun, sebagian dari mereka yang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk mempunyai;nikmati dirusak adalah, meskipun demikian, [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tidak sekarang berusaha untuk menyerang karakter jahat mereka. Untuk luas itu [yang] mereka boleh jadi dipegang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka, sekalipun bukan untuk mempunyai;nikmati dirusak. Further, there is a difference between an action which corrupts and which is an expression of a corrupt character, and an action which has a corrupting effect but which is in no sense under the control of the person who performed it, e.g. they did not intend to perform it or their intention to perform it was caused by some agent external to themselves. For one thing, the former action, but not the latter action, is the action of a 18
corruptor (as we have defined corruptors). Moreover, even if a person has a corrupt character and can do little about this, it does not follow that they have no control over the actions which are an expression of that character. Consider an official who finds it very hard to refuse bribes but who, nevertheless, tries to avoid opportunities in which he will be offered bribes. The upshot of this is that the hypothesis of an asymmetry between all corruptors and the corrupted may not hold up in anything other than an attenuated form. There is an asymmetry between the corrupted and those corruptors who are morally responsible for their actions, viz. the former are not necessarily morally responsible for being corrupted. However, some of those corruptors who are not responsible for being corrupted might not be responsible for their corrupt actions either. Accordingly, the fourth hypothesis is incorrect. Lebih lanjut, ada suatu perbedaan antar[a] suatu yang tindakan merusak dan yang mana [adalah] suatu ungkapan suatu karakter jahat, dan suatu tindakan yang mempunyai suatu merusak efek tetapi yang mana [adalah] di (dalam) tidak (ada) [perasaan/pengertian] di bawah kendali orang [siapa] yang melakukan itu, e.g. mereka tidak berniat untuk melaksanakan ia/nya atau niat mereka untuk melaksanakan ia/nya adalah disebabkan oleh agen beberapa di luar diri mereka. Untuk satu hal, tindakan yang terdahulu, tetapi bukan tindakan yang belakangan, adalah tindakan suatu koruptor ( ketika kita sudah menggambarkan koruptor). Lebih dari itu, sekalipun seseorang mempunyai suatu karakter jahat dan dapat melakukan [kecil/sedikit] sekitar ini, [itu] tidak mengikuti bahwa mereka tidak punya kendali (di) atas yang tindakan adalah suatu ungkapan (menyangkut) karakter itu . Pertimbangkan suatu pejabat [siapa] yang temukan ia/nya sangat susah untuk menolak uang suap tetapi [siapa] yang, meskipun demikian, mencoba untuk menghindari peluang di mana ia akan [jadi] ditawarkan uang suap. Kesudahan ini adalah [bahwa/yang] hipotesis dari suatu asymmetry antar[a] semua koruptor dan yang dirusak tidak [boleh/akan] menghambat apapun selain dari suatu format disusutkan. Ada suatu asymmetry antar[a] yang dirusak dan koruptor itu [siapa] yang [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan mereka, viz. yang terdahulu tidaklah perlu [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk dirusak. Bagaimanapun, sebagian dari koruptor itu [siapa] yang tidaklah [yang] bertanggung jawab untuk dirusak tidak sampai bertanggung jawab untuk tindakan jahat mereka juga. Maka, hipotesis yang keempat adalah salah. Fifth Hypothesis: Institutional Corruption involves Institutional Actors who Corrupt or are Corrupted. The fifth and final hypothesis to be discussed concerns non-institutional agents who culpably perform acts that undermine legitimate institutional processes or purposes. As concluded above, corruption, even if it involves the abuse of public office, is not necessarily pursued for private gain. Dennis Thompson also makes this point in relation to political corruption (1995: 29). However, Thompson also holds that political corruption, at least, necessarily involves abuse of public office. We have canvassed arguments that contra this view acts of corruption, including acts of political corruption, might be actions performed by persons who do not hold public office. However, we now need to invoke a distinction between persons who hold a public office and persons who have an institutional role. Citizens are not necessarily holders of public offices, but they do have an institutional role qua citizens, e.g., as voters. Hipotesis akhir dan yang ke lima untuk dibahas perhatian agen tidak kelembagaan [siapa] yang culpably melaksanakan tindakan yang mengikis proses kelembagaan sah atau tujuan. [Seperti/Ketika] disimpulkan di atas, korupsi, sekalipun [itu] melibatkan penyalahgunaan [dari;ttg] kantor publik, tidaklah perlu dikejar untuk keuntungan pribadi. Dennis Thompson juga membuat ini menunjuk dalam hubungan dengan korupsi politis ( 1995: 29). Bagaimanapun, Thompson juga [memegang/menjaga] korupsi politis itu, sedikitnya, perlu melibatkan penyalahgunaan [dari;ttg] kantor publik. Kita sudah mengumpulkan argumentasi yang kontra tindakan pandangan korupsi ini, mencakup tindakan 19
Page 1 and 2: FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
Page 3 and 4: o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
Page 5 and 6: justified by recourse to some princ
Page 7 and 8: We can conclude that the various cu
Page 9 and 10: pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
Page 11 and 12: er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
Page 13 and 14: suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
Page 15 and 16: pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
Page 17: and compromised in a corrupt and in
Page 21 and 22: to, a large corporation who steal f
Page 23 and 24: including the moral characters of t
Page 25 and 26: disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
Page 27 and 28: penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
Page 29 and 30: corruption — although it might se
Page 31 and 32: yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
Page 33 and 34: Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
Page 35 and 36: case they would occasionally make e
Page 37 and 38: analogies lead to bad conclusions,
Page 39 and 40: Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
Page 41 and 42: Indicates the frequency of attempts
Page 43 and 44: Population Public officials . Not e
Page 45 and 46: 4. Corruption expectations Populati
Page 47 and 48: . that it is a successful practice
Page 49 and 50: as corruption within international
Page 51 and 52: wrath is seen as directed at our ow
Page 53 and 54: Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
Page 55 and 56: studies, for example, Watergate. In
Page 57 and 58: Corruption is widely recognised to
Page 59 and 60: Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
Page 61 and 62: Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
Page 63 and 64: phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
Page 65 and 66: Definition of Institutional Corrupt
Page 67 and 68: The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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137 edastic-consisten t t-statistic
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139 erage of log of n um b er of co
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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no incentive to refrain from corrup
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children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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international donor organizations p
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19th Century Sweden - how corruptio
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civil servant to receive income fro
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159 The first is that "agents are n
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161 Science Assocition. Rothstein,
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163 gifts and tributes between loca
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165 corrupt acts in society. Global
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167 bring together the media, polit
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Transparency International, Corrupt
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Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
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Courts: a Governance-based Approach
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indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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(judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
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same kind of administrative and pro
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at a low expected cost and, therefo
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Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
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0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58
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community-based institutions in Per
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Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
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191 2)Even the institutional reform
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UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (U
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20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
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connected with a broader sense of f
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trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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president the power to enact decree
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that create deprivation face little
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The debate about the composition of
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