FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

are members of different networks, and he receives a correct signal.
Therefore, γ = (
N−1
N
)(1 − µ), so
∂γ
∂N
= (
1
N
2
)(1 − µ) > 0.
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This is quite intuitive: it says that in a more segmented society, a
larger fraction of randomly selected pairs of clients are members of dif-
ferent networks; so, officials will more frequently be able to successfully
demand bribes - as long as mistakes are infrequent.
Lemma 5.3. If all pairs of clients play the “linked” strategy and all
officials play the “believe the signal” strategy, then transfer frequency
will be lower in a less integrated society, that is,
∂λ
∂N
< 0
Proof: If all players follow the specified strategies, officials will be trans-
ferred when two things happen: an official faces a pair of clients who
are members of the same network, and receives an incorrect signal, so
he demands bribes and, (to his surprise), faces coordinated opposition
(complaints). Therefore, λ = (
1
N
)µ, so
∂λ
∂N
= (−
1
N
2
)µ < 0.
Proposition 3. Suppose that (5) holds. There exists µ
∗
> 0 such that,
for all µ < µ
∗
, there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
officials all play the “believe the signal” strategy and the clients all play
the “linked” strategy. In this equilibrium,
∂γ
∂N
> 0
and
∂λ
∂N
< 0
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