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Discretion (0.72; 0.86) (0.93; 0.63) (0.71; 0.56) Judges 13 23 72 Lawyers 21 37 Firms 3 26 ECUADOR (%) (Percentage of the sampled commercial cases where there was first hand knowledge of the following corrupt practices ) Operational Corruption Administrative Corruption Abuse Discretion (0.79; 0.64)) (0.87; 0.71)) (0.59; 0.61) Judges 15 24 82 Lawyers 36 51 Firms 29 40 VENEZUELA (%) (Percentage of the sampled commercial cases where there was first hand knowledge of the following corrupt practices ) Operational Corruption Administrative Corruption Abuse Discretio (0.81; 0.57) (0.92; 0.74) (0.79; 0.58) Judges 23 40 93 Lawyers 25 61 Firms 19 32 An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts 7 We can see from the charts above that the most frequent occurrences of corruption in the three countries appear within the administrative domain. Operational (or substantive) corruption (where politically motivated changes in ruling or/and politically motivated changes of venue are the most common practices) follow in all three countries. We obtain high reliability of these perceptions in the three countries, by identifying a very high, positive, and significant correlations among the perceptions revealed by the three groups of respondents 176 Page 12
(judges, lawyers, and firms). The Spearman correlations for each country (shown in parenthesis in Table 1), are all significant and positive at a 1 percent level for both types of corruption. This shows that the compatible perceptions among the three groups, with different interests at stake, all point at a common pattern of abuse of public authority in its different versions explained above. That is, the frequencies of corruption perceived by judges are highly correlated with the same frequencies perceived by litigators and litigant firms. Additionally, the close examination of sampled files in each country also reveal a large proportion of cases where either substantive or procedural abuse of judicial discretion occurred. It‟s noteworthy that our measures of abuse of judicial discretion represent an objective variable captured by identifying the presence of specific occurrences after a careful examination of the ruling and other case file material. Within the samples of cases described above, 95 percent of the occurrences of abuse of discretion consisted in either judges‟ violations of procedural guidelines (e.g. procedural times or discovery rules) or judges‟ rulings founded on repealed legislation or the application of the wrong laws to the case. For example, we find that 72 percent of all case files were subject to abuse of substantive or procedural discretion in Argentina. This same type of abusive judicial practices occurred in 82 and 93 percent of the sampled cases in Ecuador and Venezuela respectively. One can claim that in these kind of institutional environments within which abuse of discretion is the norm, the abuse of public office for private benefit is more likely and more difficult to detect. In fact, if one examines Table 1 above, it is interesting to note that the subjective frecuencies of cases where either administrative or operational corruption is perceived by judges and lawyers are highly correlated with the objective measures of abuse of judicial discretion measured (e.g. in Argentina, 0.71 and 0.56 correlations between frecuencies of perceived corruption and abuse of discretion for judges and lawyers respectively) This data summarized in Table 1 will be later used in Part III to compute the annual percentage changes in the relative frequencies of corrupt acts for each pilot court between 1991 (i.e. before the reforms) and 1999 (i.e. after the introduction of key reforms). This indicator will be used as the dependant variable in a jurimetric model presented below where the effects of key policy variables affecting corrupt practices will be identified and explained. An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts 8 III. OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND ITS MAIN CAUSES: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL Scholars have already recognized the advantages of going beyond the macroeconomic findings found in Maoro (1995) by stating the urgent need to isolate the structural features that create corrupt incentives (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). For example, in a recent paper, Cooter and Garoupa (2000) correctly state that “a necessary element when approaching deterrence and elimination of corruption is the institutional design. The structure of institutions and the decision process are important determinants of the level of corruption.” Yet, only general descriptions and analyses within which corruption may arise within the court system have been identified in the literature and they are clearly insufficient to develop court-specific anticorruption policy prescriptions. In all past judicial corruption studies, a rigorous analysis of the corruption-enhancing factors related to the procedural, substantive, organizational, and governance aspects within which courts operate are all left unexplored (Buscaglia, 1999 and 1997). The need to develop an empirically-testable model, within which specific types of corrupt behavior in well-defined situations can be explained, is a necessary condition for the application of the economic analysis of corruption to judicial policies in developing countries. More specifically, organizational structures coupled with procedural and administrative patterns make judiciaries prone to the uncontrollable spread of systemic corrupt practices at every level. For example, courts provide internal organizational incentives given by an unchecked abuse of substantive, procedural, and administrative discretion, that make corrupt practices, as measured above, more likely. An economic model of corruption should be able to detect these sources of corrupt incentives. Our main hypotheses state that court officials' capacity to engage in the corrupt practices 177 Page 13
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o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
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justified by recourse to some princ
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pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
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er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
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suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
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pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
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and compromised in a corrupt and in
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
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Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
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case they would occasionally make e
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analogies lead to bad conclusions,
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Indicates the frequency of attempts
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Population Public officials . Not e
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4. Corruption expectations Populati
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. that it is a successful practice
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as corruption within international
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wrath is seen as directed at our ow
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Page 127 and 128: Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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Page 163 and 164: 163 gifts and tributes between loca
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Page 167 and 168: 167 bring together the media, polit
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Page 171 and 172: Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
Page 173 and 174: Courts: a Governance-based Approach
Page 175: indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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Page 191 and 192: 191 2)Even the institutional reform
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Page 197 and 198: connected with a broader sense of f
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Page 203 and 204: that create deprivation face little
Page 205: The debate about the composition of
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