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generated by hyperinflation and the financial collapse of governments in the 1980s justified the aggressive use of constitutional powers by presidents. There is no better example of such forming a stable coalition in Congress, and his propensity to sidestep, ignore, and/or corrupt those other institutions.‖ See See Guillermo O‘Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 171 Kellog Institute Working Papers (January 1992). 50). This would also explain why Latin American countries have been growing at rates much lower than other developing countries in the last decade and most countries still grow at rates lower even than those of developed Countries. See Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, B ALANCE PRELIMINAR DE LAS ECONOMÍAS DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (CEPAL, 006). Page 22 aggressiveness as the first attempt to implement a ―shock therapy‖ in Latin America, and in the world. In August 1985, Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro enacted the Supreme Decree 21060. The decree had 170 articles, which liberalized exchange rates; foreign investments; reduced tariffs dramatically; liberalized labor regulations; eliminated price controls; demanded a tax reforms; and created rules to reduce public expenditure. 51). About twenty years later, Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia, after significant social turmoil 52). , advocating the gradual overruling of Decree 21060. No matter the merits of the policies implemented by Decree 21060, it will always be an extreme example of the use of executive authority to legislate, pushing the boundaries of presidential constitutional powers. 53). Before coming back to more examples and analyses of the use of executive authority to legislate in Latin America, I will describe a few different models of such mechanism. There are four main models of presidential legislative authority: (i) executive authority to rule by decree; (ii) delegated authority to legislate by Congress; (iii) veto power; and (iv) agenda setting powers. My main concern here is with the two more extreme forms, in which the legislative power is exercised directly by the executive. Indirect forms such as veto powers and agenda setting will not be discussed in deep here. However, they might also be mechanisms of executive supremacy, particularly when the president can issue partial vetoes and Congress has to overcome high thresholds to reverse them, or in cases in which presidents have unlimited 51). See Bolívia, Decreto Supremo No. 21060 (August 29, 1985), available at servdmzw.sbef.gov.bo/circular/leyes/DS21060.pdf 52). In October 17, 2003, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned under the pressure of intense public demonstration and protests. Sánchez de Lozada was the minister of planning in Estensoro‘s government and drafted Decree 21060. His vice-president, Carlos Mesa, assumed the presidency and was forced to resign in June 6, 2005. To avoid a civil war, new election were called for December 18, 2005. 53). Article 96 of the 1967 Constitution of Bolivia gives the following authority to the President: ―ejecutar y hacer cumplir las leyes, expidiendo los decretos y ordenes convenientes, sin definir privativamente derechos, alterar los definidos por la ley ni contrariar sus disposiciones, guardando las restricciones consignadas en esta Constitución.‖ Decree 21060 is an example of a very broad interpretation of this article. Page 23 powers to introduce new bills in Congress with voting priority, giving the president the power to block the agenda of the legislative branch. The executive power to rule by decree has three main categories: (i) administrative decree power; (ii) permanent legislative power; and (iii) temporary legislative power. Administrative decrees are those which have hierarchical status inferior to regular legislation. 54). In countries in which there is not a strong Judiciary, such authority can be exceeded easily, creating supra-constitutional authority to legislate. Permanent legislative decrees would be those that have permanent legislative status, immediately or after a certain limited period of time. An example of the latter would be the Ecuadorian ―decreto-ley‖, described in articles 155 and 156 of the 1998 Constitution. The president can introduce bills regarding urgent economic matters and, if Congress does not vote such bills in 30 days, the president has the power to enact them. An example of the former would be the model of the 1993 Peruvian Constitution, which gives the 200
president the power to enact decrees on economic and financial matters, which have effect immediately. Temporary legislative decrees would be those that have immediate effect, but which require, for example, congressional approval after a certain period of time to become permanent laws. Such is the case of Brazilian ―provisional measures‖ of article 62 of the 1988 Constitution and Argentinean ―need and urgency decrees‖ of article 99 of the 1994 Constitution. Latin American constitutions present examples of all kinds of presidential decree powers. One historical similarity is that such instruments were intimately related to the economic crises of the 1980s. The public demanded the executive to react quickly in face of hyperinflation and 54). Another model of decree power exercised many times in Latin America might be described as supra-constitutional decree power. Many decrees had no constitutional grounding and were implemented based on the prestige of the president and in the mist of economic crises and institutional disarrangement. I will not discuss such model here because it would demand a more detailed evaluation of individual decrees and specific constitutional systems. See John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Calling Out the Tanks or Filing Out the Forms?, in E XECUTIVE DECREE A UTHORITY 1-29, 14 (John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Eds., Cambridge University Press, 1998). Page 24 massive unemployment. As a result, many new Constitutions, which were supposed to represent the transition from authoritarianism, also maintained or expanded mechanism of executive legislative authority. Even in those countries where such mechanisms were not restricted to economic policies, decrees were overwhelmingly used to implement economic reforms. Brazil is an extreme case. Between 1989 and 1997, about 86% of all ―provisional measures‖ were related to economic policy. 55). In Argentina most ―need and urgency decrees‖ were also related to stabilization plans and market reforms. Particularly before such mechanisms were regulated by the 1994 Constitution, such decrees were a result of delegation by Congress, such as in the case of the 1989 Administrative Emergency Act and Economic Emergency Act. Such acts gave the president broad powers to regulate privatizations; trade and financial liberalization; monetary deregulation; and fiscal and tax reforms. During the first presidency of Carlos Menem, from 1989 to 1995, about 58% of all legislative activity was based on ―need and emergency decrees‖ 56). ; in a clear illustration of executive supremacy. In the context of this paper, the executive power to legislate has three problems. First, it generates imbalances between powers. The second problem, more directly related to the main concerns of this paper, is that, theoretically, broad executive decree authority increases the possibility of corruption, once the president can freely negotiate rent-seeking opportunities. However, I believe that the worst effect is that it increases the perception of corruption. It makes easier for the government to implement policies that have negative distributive effects, once the president does not have to deal with opposing parties and interest groups representing those suffering the burdens of reforms. Even if there is no actual corruption, the negative distributive 55). See Argelina Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Partu Behavior in the Legislature, 32 C OMPARATIVE P OLITICS 115, 146 (2000). 56). See Gabriel L. Negretto, Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina, 37 C OMPARATIVE P OLITICAL S TUDIES 531, 553 (2004). Page 25 effects of such policies, coupled with its autocratic mechanisms of implementation, increase the sense of unfairness and distrust in society, increasing also the perception of corruption. As argued before, considering that perception of corruption and income inequality are correlated, preserving presidential authority to legislate only nurtures the vicious circle. Nonetheless, only transferring power from the president to Congress may not help reduce the perception of 201
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FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
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o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
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justified by recourse to some princ
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We can conclude that the various cu
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pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
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er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
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suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
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pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
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and compromised in a corrupt and in
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
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Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
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case they would occasionally make e
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analogies lead to bad conclusions,
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Indicates the frequency of attempts
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Population Public officials . Not e
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4. Corruption expectations Populati
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. that it is a successful practice
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as corruption within international
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wrath is seen as directed at our ow
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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29 7 Empirical Analysis The Data on
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135 theories might explain why soci
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There is strikingly little literatu
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Underdevelopment (The dotted lines
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eform and industrial policy. The su
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147 from his position as vice-presi
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Page 175 and 176: indicators. Yet, it is always possi
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Page 195 and 196: 20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
Page 197 and 198: connected with a broader sense of f
Page 199: trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
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Page 205: The debate about the composition of
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