FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

are conducive to corruption; conditions that are either typically not found outside these
contexts, or conditions found in other contexts but conditions, nevertheless, that are
more conducive to corruption in trans-cultural contexts than in non trans-cultural ones.
Commitment to social norms, including those in part definitive of institutional roles,
processes and purposes - and the feelings of shame generated by non-conformity - often
weakens when dealing with members of another society. „What do I care what they
think?‟ („I only care what we think.‟) Correspondingly, members of the other society are
going to be less concerned to express disapproval of one‟s actions. „What do they care
what I do?‟ In short, there is more likely to be an 'us-them' mentality, a lack of trust, and
a willingness to bend or break moral norms in the service of self-interest.
Further, social norms are sometimes norms only for members of a given social group, or
for a given set of institutional actors in a given social group, but not for other person not
of that group or institution. Naturally, many social norms are near enough to being
universal moral norms. But some are not. For example, social norms of honour can
differ greatly from one society or culture to another. On the other hand, there may be a
substantial difference with respect to the extent to which compliance with the same
social norm is expected by members of one social group by comparison with members
of another social group. For example, a level of deception is typically involved in
business dealings - a seller tries to make out the goods are superior than they might in
fact be, the buyer that he or she is less interested than is actually the case, and so on. But
now an issue can arise concerning the nature and degree of deception that is acceptable
in given trans-cultural, including trans-institutional, contexts. Not being bound by one's
initial word might be morally acceptable to a Japanese business person, but morally
unacceptable to his Australian counterpart. What is an Australian business person to do
when dealing with the Japanese in Japan? For him/her to „do as the Romans do when in
Rome‟ might well be against his/her conscience, because against his/her social norms. It
can be viewed as corrupt, and thus as corrupting. On the other hand, to refuse to accept
the social norms constitutive of the role occupants of some social group may be to court
disaster - one may as well have stayed home.
Differences in institutional frameworks, as opposed to difference of degree in relation to
specific moral norms, raise more profound questions. Consider different institutions of
property rights. Individual property rights in relation to intellectual goods - including
copyright - might have a certain structure and stringency in the Anglo-Saxon world, but
not in China. In China intellectual property might be regarded as essentially a socially
owned good. If so, this might partly explain recent disputes between the Chinese and
US governments. But in that case, is a Chinese person copying material 'owned' by a US
company really doing something morally wrong? More important, given our focus on
corruption, Is the Chinese business person who copies and sells material „owned‟ by a
US company engaged in a corrupt practice? Certainly, he or she (jointly with others)
might be undermining the institution of private ownership of intellectual property.
However, perhaps the Chinese business person ought not to be regarded as an
Paper given at the international conference, Civil Society, Religion & Global Governance:
Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1–2 September 2005, Canberra Australia
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